In this article, I discuss Dai Zhen’s views on the relation between the nature (xing 性) of humans and pattern (li 理). For Dai, the nature of humans comprises their physical makeup (xue qi 血氣), in which their emotional propensities (qing 情) and desires (yu 欲) are rooted, as well as their knowing heart/mind (xin zhi 心知). I will explore his views on the way pattern relates to the emotional propensities and desires of humans, and the way their knowing heart/mind relates to pattern. In the process of doing so, I will also show how his views on self-cultivation derive from his views on the relation between nature and pattern. For him, the primary task in self-cultivation is to develop the capability of the heart/mind to discern pattern in the affairs it encounters, where discerning pattern involves using one’s emotional propensities and desires to gauge the emotional propensities and desires of others.²

I. DAI ON PATTERN, EMOTIONAL PROPENSITIES, AND DESIRES

Dai regards the nature of a thing as that which accounts for the characteristic of the thing and distinguishes it from things of other kinds.³ For example, the nature of
peach or almond is that which accounts for the way its seed grows and develops, eventually becoming a plant of a distinctive kind. In the case of animals, they have the physical makeup (xue qi 血氣) as well as conscious awareness (zhi jue 知覺), and these are also different for animals of different kinds. Humans surpass other animals in their conscious awareness, and Dai refers to the conscious awareness in humans as the knowing heart/mind (xin zhi 心知); for him, their physical makeup and knowing heart/mind comprise the nature of humans.¹

The reference to the physical makeup and the knowing heart/mind (xue qi xin zhi 血氣心知) already occurs in the “Yueji” chapter of the Liji, which describes these as the nature of the common people.⁵ Dai also takes from the “Yueji” chapter the distinction between an inactive state (jing 靜) prior to being affected by things and an active state (dong 動) after having been affected by things, and regards nature as being without error in its inactive state.⁶ When nature, or more specifically the physical makeup that is part of nature, is activated upon being affected by things, desires arise; these are the desires of nature (xing zhi yu 性之欲), which are the same for all humans.⁷ They include the tendencies exhibited by different parts of the body, such as the tendencies of the senses to go after certain sensory objects.⁸ According to Dai, they relate to nature in the way that the flow of water relates to water.⁹ These tendencies, especially the tendency to eat and drink, help to nourish the physical
makeup of humans, enabling them to grow from weak to strong.\textsuperscript{10} Hence, knowing the nature of humans is important to nourishing their growth, just as knowing the nature of peach and almond enables us to know what contributes to their growth and thereby puts us in a better position to nourish them.\textsuperscript{11}

As for emotional propensities, or \textit{qing} 情, Dai cites joy, anger, sorrow and contentment (\textit{xi nu ai le} 喜怒哀樂) as examples, and also describes emotional propensities as nature’s response when one comes into contact with things; he ascribes emotional propensities to the physical makeup, just like desires.\textsuperscript{12} In such contexts, the term \textit{qing} probably refers to one’s emotional responses upon contact with things. On other occasions, however, Dai seems to also emphasize the connotation of \textit{qing} that has to do with what is genuine in humans, especially in contexts in which he explains pattern in terms of \textit{qing}. To better understand the nature of \textit{qing} and its relation to desires, we need to consider the way he explains pattern in terms of \textit{qing} and desires. As he draws on both connotations of \textit{qing} – as emotional propensities and as what is genuine in humans – in the way he presents his views, I will leave \textit{qing} untranslated for now, while continuing to use “desires” as a translation of \textit{yu} 欲.

He explains pattern in terms of \textit{qing} by saying that pattern is a matter of \textit{qing}’s not being lost (\textit{shuang shi} 爽失); there is no instance of one’s attaining (\textit{de} 得) pattern without attaining (\textit{de} 得) \textit{qing}.\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Qing} is what resides in oneself and in others,
while pattern is a matter of not being excessive or deficient in relation to qing. To arrive at pattern, what one needs to do is to use one’s qing to measure the qing of others (yi qing qi qing 以情對情), thereby ensuring that the qing of all attains its proper balance. He also explains pattern in terms of desires by saying that it is by regulating desires and avoiding excess that one follows the pattern of Heaven (tian li 天理). This point he again illustrates with the analogy of water; having compared nature to water and desires to the flow of water, he further compares following the pattern of Heaven to the legendary Yu’s channeling water in such a way that it is regulated and not overflowing.

On several occasions, Dai mentions qing and desires together in his characterization of pattern. He describes the sage as someone who personally understands (ti 體) the qing of the common people and enables them to satisfy their desires. A similar point is sometimes put in terms of desires being satisfied (sui 遂) and qing being attained (da 達). Elsewhere, he also refers to qing and desires in a way that presents them as intimately related. For example, by regulating (rather than eliminating) desires, one is able to be not excessive or deficient with regard to qing, thereby attaining the pattern of Heaven. And, according to him, to regard pattern as a matter of qing’s not being lost is also to regard pattern as residing in desires.

The way pattern relates to qing and desires is partly spelt out in the way he
elaborates on the Confucian notion of *shu* 恕 (reciprocity) and *zhong shu* 忠恕 (devotion and reciprocity). He adopts the explanation of *shu* 恕 in the *Lunyu* in terms of not imposing on others what one would not wish to be done to oneself.  

And he explains *zhong* 忠 sometimes as being able to devote oneself and sometimes as regarding others as like oneself. His explication of *zhong* in terms of regarding others as like oneself (*shi ren you ji* 視人猶己) might seem to take *zhong* close to the idea of *shu*. However, he might just be making the point that *zhong* involves devoting oneself to the affairs of others’ in such a way that one treats the affairs of others’ as if they were one’s own. There is, as far as I can tell, no clear evidence for adjudicating between these two interpretations of his understanding of *zhong*. For Dai, *zhong* and *shu* are methods of learning to be a sage, and although the sage’s accomplishments cannot be adequately described by *zhong* and *shu*, it is actually the utmost attainment of *zhong* and *shu*.  

Implicit in the idea *shu* or *zhong shu* is the general idea of using oneself to gauge the situation of others, and he refers to this idea when describing the relation between one’s *qing* and desires and the *qing* and desires of others.  

With regard to the desires of nature, my desires are the same as others’ and it is from desires that likes (*hao* 好) and dislikes (*wu* 惡) arise. The ethical task is to avoid indulging in one’s desires, which involves pursuing one’s likes and dislikes to the neglect of others’ likes and dislikes. To do so, one should turn back on oneself and
think about one’s own qing should one suffer from others’ indulging in their desires.

This is what it means to use my qing to measure (qi 氣) the qing of others. By doing so, qing attains its proper balance, one’s likes and dislikes are properly regulated, and one comes to follow the pattern of Heaven.25 He also relates qing and desires in other contexts. For example, citing the reference to desires in the Lunyu and to dislikes in the Daxue in connection with the idea of using oneself to gauge the situation of others, he says that desires and dislikes are the common qing of the people and that it is by using one’s qing to measure the qing of others that one seeks pattern.26 Elsewhere, he also describes as qing the way one would respond if others were to treat oneself in the way one proposes to treat others, presumably taking this to explain the qing of oneself that one uses to measure the qing of others.27

II. PATTERN, EMOTIONAL PROPENSITIES, AND DESIRES

Based on these observations of Dai’s about pattern, qing, and desires, we may reconstruct his views as follows. From the way he discusses qing and desires, it appears that the two are related in the following manner. Humans share certain desires of nature that take the form of parts of one’s body being drawn toward certain things, such as the senses being drawn toward certain sensory objects. As one becomes aware of such tendencies when one comes into contact with things, one comes to form likes
(hao 好) and dislikes (wu 恶), and such likes can also be described as desires in a more reflective sense. That is, it is no longer just a matter of parts of one’s body being drawn unreflectively toward certain objects, but a matter of one’s person as a whole liking certain things, with an awareness of what it is that one likes. One’s liking certain things moves one to go after such things. On the other hand, one’s dislike is a response to certain contemplated or actual situations involving oneself, especially situations in which one is deprived of certain things by others who indulge in their own desires. Such likes (or desires of the more reflective kind) and dislikes are the qing of humans. Here, Dai is probably drawing on the dual connotations of qing as what is genuinely so and as emotional propensities: such likes and dislikes are genuinely in humans and are manifested in a variety of emotional responses such as joy, anger, sorrow and contentment.

As one is moved by one’s likes and dislikes, there is a tendency to pursue what one likes to the neglect of others’ likes and dislikes. To follow pattern, one has to not just realize that humans share the same basic unreflective tendencies, but also understand their more reflective responses to situations – what they like and dislike, and the associated emotional responses such as joy, anger, sorrow and contentment. To do so, one has to use one’s own qing (that is, the emotional propensities that are genuinely in oneself) to measure the qing of others, and understand how others would
react to one’s treatment of them by turning back on oneself and reflecting on how oneself would react if similarly treated by others. This, presumably, is what is involved in the sages’ personally understanding the qing of the common people. The goal is to go beyond satisfying one’s desires by also satisfying others’ desires, and to go beyond attaining one’s qing by also enabling others to attain their qing, so that everyone’s desires are appropriately satisfied and qing appropriately attained. By attainment of qing, Dai probably has in mind being able to take joy in certain things and to avoid dissatisfaction – he sometimes cites passages in the Mengzi about how humane government involves the ruler’s sharing his enjoyment with the common people and ensuring that there is no dissatisfaction among them.

With regard to both qing and desires, he works with some conception of a proper balance of each – he speaks of properly regulating desires so that one is not excessive with regard to them (jie er bu guo 節而不過), and of being not excessive and not deficient with regard to qing (wu guo qing wu bu ji qing 無過情無不及情) so that they attain their proper balance (qing de qi ping 情得其平). Probably, what constitutes the proper balance of each has to do with whether the extent of, and the means by which one secures, the satisfaction of one’s desires and attainment of one’s qing will prevent others from equally satisfying their desires and attaining their qing. Attaining the proper balance enables people to mutually nourish their lives, and this is
the way of the sages. This emphasis on nourishing life is reflected in his characterization of humaneness (ren 仁) in terms of the idea of giving and nourishing life (sheng sheng 生生) from the Yijing; humaneness involves one’s not just promoting one’s own life but also working to promote everyone’s life.

III. THE KNOWING HEART/MIND (XIN ZHI 心知)

While noting that Dai often uses qing with both connotations of emotional propensities and of what is genuine in humans, I will for convenience continue to translate qing as “emotional propensities” in the rest of this paper. Having considered his views on emotional propensities and desires, which are rooted in the physical makeup, let us now turn to the knowing heart/mind, the other aspect of nature. Just as the physical makeup manifests itself as emotional propensities and desires when one comes into contact with things, the knowing heart/mind manifests itself in knowledge (zhi 知), where the objects of knowledge are such things as beauty and ugliness, right and wrong, as well as various human relations. Like other Confucian thinkers before him, Dai ascribes a guiding role to the heart/mind. He regards the knowing heart/mind as having a priority over the physical makeup in that the heart/mind is able to and should regulate the senses, which he ascribes to the physical makeup, a point that he illustrates by comparing the heart/mind to a ruler and
the senses to officials.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, he emphasizes the heart/mind’s ability to make the fine discriminations that constitute clarity with regard to pattern (\textit{ming li} 明理).\textsuperscript{35}

Referring to the \textit{Mengzi}, in which Mencius compares the heart/mind’s relation to pattern to the senses’ relation to their corresponding sensory objects, Dai thinks that the heart/mind’s ability to discern pattern is like the senses’ ability to discern their respective sensory objects.\textsuperscript{36} The way the heart/mind reaches out to pattern is like the way a fire lights up objects, an analogy that reinforces the idea that the heart/mind’s relation to pattern is like a perceptual relation.\textsuperscript{37}

According to Dai, what distinguishes humans from and makes them superior to animals is the heart/mind’s capability to know. The various basic desires that humans have can also be found in animals, and are not what distinguish humans from them.\textsuperscript{38} Neither does the distinctive feature of humans reside in their capability of social relations, since some animals are apparently capable of such relations. There appears to be love between mother and child among certain animals and some seem to observe a ruler-subordinate relation.\textsuperscript{39} Rather, the distinctive feature is that, while other animals are limited in their capability of such relations, humans can expand their knowledge of such relations to the utmost to attain a god-like clarity (\textit{shen ming} 神明).\textsuperscript{40} Accordingly, the highest accomplishment for humans is to develop the knowledge of the heart/mind to attain clarity, something that everyone can do.\textsuperscript{41}
How, then, do humans attain knowledge of pattern? Earlier, we described the process of using one’s emotional propensities and desires to gauge the emotional propensities and desires of others, with the goal of enhancing the attainment of the emotional propensities and the satisfaction of the desires of all. In addition to this process, Dai also regards shared agreement as a way to ensure that the outcome one attains is genuine pattern rather than what he refers to as personal opinion (yi jian 意見). This he takes to be the point of Mencius’ remark in the Mengzi that pattern and propriety (liyi 理義) is what all heart/mind’s agree in affirming (xin zhi suo tong ran 心之所同然) and is something that the sages first attained. Here, he is taking ran 然 to mean affirming, or regarding something as being the case (yi wei ran 以為然); this is a plausible interpretation as the parallel between the ways in which the operations of the heart/mind and those of the senses are described in this passage makes it likely that ran is used verbally, in which case it would have the meaning ascribed to it by Dai. According to him, Mencius is making the point that, if something is in accord with pattern, everyone would agree in approving of it and would regard it as unalterable for ten thousand generations. And if what one takes to be pattern does not have the shared agreement by others, then it would be a matter of personal opinion rather than of pattern.

Having acquired a grasp of pattern, such knowledge should guide one’s action.
The task of learning to be a sage is to first acquire knowledge through inquiry, and then practice in human relations and daily activities (ren lun ri tong 人倫日用) that with regard to which one’s heart/mind is not obscured, or bi 蔽.46 The words of the sage are geared toward steering people to first work on knowledge by seeking what is proper; to emphasize action without first emphasizing knowledge goes against the sages’s teachings.47 And it is only after one has exercised one’s capability to know that one who seeks satisfaction of one’s own desires and attainment of one’s own emotional propensities will broaden this to satisfying the desires and attaining the emotional propensities of others.48

IV. ETHICAL FAILURE AND SELF-CULTIVATION

Two implications follow from Dai’s emphasis on the priority of knowledge. One implication is that the primary source of ethical failure is a deficiency in knowledge, which he refers to as obscuration (bi 蔽). He does acknowledge that there can be problems with one’s emotional propensities and desires, which are rooted in the physical makeup, and not just with knowledge, which is rooted in the knowing heart/mind. Desires can become self-centered (si 私), emotional propensities one-sided (pian 偏), and knowledge obscured (bi 蔽).49 Self-centeredness is a matter of satisfying one’s own desires to the neglect of others’ desires, and it is opposed to
humaneness (ren 仁), which involves satisfying the desires of others as well as of oneself.\textsuperscript{50} This point he takes to be implicit in the \textit{Lunyu}, in which Confucius refers to overcoming the self (ke ji 克己) as part of his explication of humaneness.\textsuperscript{51}

According to him, the reference to self (ji 己), which is often contrasted with others (ren 人) in early texts, is in this passage contrasted with everyone in the world (tian xia 天下), and to overcome the self is to overcome the gap between self and others that characterizes self-centeredness.\textsuperscript{52}

He often mentions self-centeredness along with obscuration. For example, in criticism of the Daoists and Buddhists, he opposes the idea of eliminating emotional propensities, desires and knowledge; instead, the important task is to get rid of self-centeredness and obscuration.\textsuperscript{53} And at times, he describes the self-centeredness of desires, which derive from the physical makeup, and the obscuration of knowledge, which derives from the knowing heart/mind, as the two great problems of the world.\textsuperscript{54}

But there is evidence that he regards obscuration as the more fundamental problem. For example, he criticizes the views of those who emphasize getting rid of the self-centeredness of desires without also emphasizing getting rid of obscuration.\textsuperscript{55}

Pattern is something we grasp by using our emotional propensities and desires to gauge the emotional propensities and desires of others. Obscuration is a problem with our knowledge in that there is a deficiency in our undertaking this exercise. It leads to
our being unable to take into account others’ emotional propensities and desires in appropriate ways, resulting in the kind of separation between oneself and others that constitutes self-centeredness. In this way, self-centeredness is a consequence of obscuration. It is only after one has attained proper knowledge that one can go beyond oneself to also satisfy others’ desires and attain others’ emotional propensities, and so it is by getting rid of obscuration that one also gets rid of self-centeredness.56

This relation between obscuration and self-centeredness can also be seen from the priority he gives to wisdom (zhi 智) over humaneness (ren 仁). For him, humaneness is the absence of self-centeredness and wisdom the absence of obscuration.57 Humaneness involves giving life to and nourishing everyone, while wisdom involves knowing the pattern that underlies this process.58 According to him, since pattern underlies the life-giving and nourishing process, it is only when one knows pattern that one can partake in the process.59

Another implication of Dai’s emphasis on knowledge is that he regards developing one’s knowledge as the primary task in self-cultivation. In addition to studying the classics, one need to broaden one’s acquaintance with things, inquire into details to resolve uncertainties, and cautiously reflect on what one has acquired in the process.60 Xue 学, or learning, is mentioned along with si 思, or reflection, in the Lunyu, and si for Mencius describes the heart/mind’s relation to pattern and propriety
(li yi 理義) that is akin to a form of perception. Citing Mencius’ remarks on si, Dai interprets si to refer to a discernment of pattern, which is refined and developed through learning until it attains a god-like clarity. This process is described in terms of an advance from the narrow and small to the broad and large, or from dimness and hiddenness to clarity and discernment, until one’s knowing heart/mind attains clarity. An analogy that he gives is that, just as the body grows from small and weak to big and strong via the nourishment of food and drink, one’s moral character grows from being obstructed and dim to being sagely and wise via enquiry and learning (wen xue 问学). This analogy also illustrates another point of his: if we see that enquiry and learning nourish the knowing heart/mind in the way that food and drink nourish the physical makeup, we also see that what is important in enquiry and learning is to digest what one has learnt and make it part of oneself, rather than to just memorize and store. Another analogy that he uses is to compare the knowledge of the heart/mind to the brightness of fire; just as the increased brightness of fire can allow one to discern clearly not just objects further away but also the finer details in objects, the advance in the knowledge of the heart/mind enables one to discern the pattern in more things and affairs as well as the finer details of the pattern that resides in things and affairs.

For Dai, not only is acquiring knowledge the primary task in self-cultivation, but
what self-cultivation leads to is also viewed in terms of the clarity of the knowing heart/mind, which constitutes wisdom ($zhi$ 智). Thus, he describes the four ethical attributes highlighted by Mencius in terms of the clarity of the heart/mind reaching its utmost, thereby attaining a god-like clarity.\(^{67}\) This is what sageness ($sheng$ 聖) amounts to, and sageness is often paired with wisdom in the combination $sheng\ zhi$ 聖智.\(^{68}\) Sageness is also described as a matter of not being obscured in knowledge – those who are not sages are subject to obscuration, and those who are sages are free from obscuration.\(^{69}\) He poses the question why Confucius highlights only wisdom when commenting on the supremely wise as contrasted with those of the lowest intelligence, while Mencius highlights the three other ethical attributes, humaneness ($ren$ 仁), propriety ($yi$ 義), and observance of the rites ($li$ 禮), along with wisdom.\(^{70}\) His response is that this is because the other three attributes follow from wisdom, a response that again illustrates his emphasis on the perfection of knowledge as the ultimate ethical ideal.\(^{71}\)

Note that, for Dai, developing one’s knowledge is not a matter of eventually grasping all the multitude of pattern, but a matter of developing the capability of the knowing heart/mind to the point when it can grasp the pattern in any affair it encounters. That is, the emphasis is on perfecting the capability to know pattern, not on knowing all pattern. In presenting the analogy with the brightness of fire, what he
emphasizes is how the clarity of the knowing heart/mind is capable of lighting up what it encounters; clarity for him is not a matter of the heart/mind’s knowing all the pattern in things and affairs, but a matter of its being capable of knowing (*zu yi zhi* 足以知) the pattern in things and affairs when it encounters them. Self-cultivation involves one’s developing an increasing capability to discern the fine details of pattern in situations one confronts, even with regard to affairs with which one has no previous acquaintance.

While Dai conceives of self-cultivation primarily in terms of developing one’s capability to know, he does not totally ignore the other aspects of self-cultivation that also occupy the attention of later Confucians, such as seriousness (*jing* 敬), caution and fearfulness (*jie shen kong ju* 戒慎恐懼), and watchfulness over *du* (*shen du* 慎獨). For example, in one passage, he discusses all three ideas, explaining seriousness as well as caution and fearfulness in terms of a posture of focus, alertness and caution, and explaining watchfulness over *du* in terms of ensuring the propriety of one’s intentions and thoughts that are not conspicuous to others. Still, he devotes relatively little attention to these ideas by comparison to developing one’s capability to know pattern, and this reinforces the point that it is the latter that he regards as the fundamental task in self-cultivation.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

From our discussion, we see that Dai’s ethical thinking derives from two fundamental ideas, both having to do with the way he views the relation between the nature of humans and pattern. The nature of humans comprises the physical makeup, in which emotional propensities and desires are rooted, and the knowing heart/mind. The first idea is that pattern derives from using one’s emotional propensities and desires to gauge the emotional propensities and desires of others; to follow pattern is to act in a way that conduces to the satisfaction of others’ desires as well as one’s own desires and the attainment of others’ emotional propensities as well as one’s own emotional propensities. The second idea is that humans have a knowing heart/mind which has the capability of grasping pattern that is derived from emotional propensities and desires in this manner, and that such knowledge of pattern should guide one’s action. From these two ideas, it follows that the primary source of ethical failure is a failure to develop such a capability. The primary source of ethical failure is an obscurcation of knowledge, which accounts for the self-centeredness of desires in the sense of satisfying one’s own desires to the neglect of others’ desires. It also follows that the primary goal of self-cultivation is to develop such a capability, to the point when one attains a god-like clarity in the sense of being able to grasp pattern in any affair one encounters. Such clarity constitutes wisdom, with which sageness is
identified and which is the primary goal of self-cultivation.

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ENDNOTES

1 It is an honor and delight to contribute to this issue, which celebrates the 40th anniversary of the publication of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy. Since its founding in 1973, the Journal has established itself as a major venue for the publication of contemporary scholarly studies of Chinese thought in the English language. As such, it has made significant contributions not just to advancing scholarship in this area, but also to promoting interest in, as well as recognition of the significance of, the study of Chinese and comparative thought within Anglo-American academic communities.

2 This article is based on research related to a book manuscript, tentatively titled Zhu Xi and Later Confucian Thought, which discusses the thinking of Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming, and Dai Zhen.

3 Dai Zhen 戴震 Mengzi Ziyishuzheng 孟子字義疏証, 2nd ed. (Beijing, Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局 1982), no. 27, p. 35. All subsequent references to Dai Zhen are to this text and are by passage and page numbers, with the whole text divided into 43 passages.

4 No. 2, p. 2; no. 9, p. 8; no. 20, p. 25; no. 21, pp. 29-30; no. 30, pp. 40-41; no. 38, p. 50.

5 Liji 禮記 (Sibubeyao 四部備要 edition): 11.13b.

6 No. 2, p. 2.

7 No. 2, p. 2.

8 No. 8, pp. 6-7; no. 30, p. 40.

9 No. 11, pp. 10-11.

10 No. 9, p. 8; no. 28, p. 37; no. 30, p. 40.

11 No. 27, p. 35.

12 No. 30, p. 40.


14 No. 3, p. 2.

15 No. 2, pp. 1-2.

16 No. 11, pp. 10-11.

17 No. 11, p. 10; cf. Mengzi 4B:26. All references to the Mengzi 孟子 follow the numbering of passages, with book numbers 1A-7B substituted for 1-14, in Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 Mengzi Yizhu 孟子譯注, 2nd edition (Zhunghua Shuju 中華書局, 1984).

18 E.g., no. 10, pp. 9-10; no. 43, p. 59.
20 No. 30, p. 41.
21 No. 11, p. 11.
23 No. 41, p. 55; no. 15, p. 18.
24 No. 41, p. 55.
26 No. 5, pp. 4-5.
27 No. 11, p. 10.
28 No. 30, pp. 40-41.
29 No. 10, pp. 9-10.
30 No. 2, p. 2; no. 3, p. 2; no. 5, p. 3; no. 11, pp. 10-11.
31 No. 11, p. 10; no. 15, p. 18.
33 No. 28, p. 37; no. 30, p. 40.
34 No. 8, p. 7.
35 No. 4, p. 3.
36 Mengzi 6A:7.
37 No. 6, p. 5.
38 No. 21, pp. 26-27.
39 No. 21, pp. 27-28.
40 No. 6, pp. 5-6; no. 23, p. 30; cf. no. 21, pp. 28-29; no. 27, p. 35.
41 No. 15, p. 18.
42 Mengzi 6A:7.
43 See my Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 136-137, for a discussion of this point.
44 No. 4, p. 3; no. 5, p. 3.
45 No. 5, p. 3.
46 No. 40, p. 54.
47 No. 42, p. 57.
48 No. 30, p. 41.
49 No. 30, p. 41.
50 No. 36, p. 48.
51 Lunyu 12.1.
52 No. 42, p. 56.
53 No. 10, pp. 9-10; no. 40, pp. 53-54; no. 43, pp. 57-58.
54 No. 10, p. 9.
55 No. 42, p. 57.
56 No. 30, p. 41.
57 No. 39, p. 51; no. 40, p. 53.
58 No. 36, p. 48.
59 No. 36, p. 48.
60 No. 40, p. 54; no. 41, p. 55.
61 Lunyu 2.15; Mengzi 6A:15. Also see my Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 149-153, for a discussion of *si* as it occurs in Mengzi 6A:15.
62 No. 6, p. 5.
63 No. 9, p. 8; no. 41, pp. 55-56.
64 No. 14, p. 15.
65 No. 9, p. 8; no. 41, p. 55.
66 No. 6, pp. 5-6; cf. no. 8, p. 7.
67 No. 6, p. 6; no. 9, p. 8; no. 21, p. 28-29.
68 No. 1, p. 1; no. 6, p. 6; no. 13, p. 13.
69 No. 4, p. 3; no. 5, p. 4.
70 Lunyu 17.3; Mengzi 2A:6, 6A:6.
71 No. 24, p. 31.
72 No. 8, p. 8; cf. no. 6, p. 6.
73 No. 41, p. 55, citing Mengzi 4B:14.
74 No. 12, p. 11.