1. Introduction

Ren (humaneness, benevolence) is one of the most prominent concepts in the Lunyu (Analects), and is often used in the text to refer to an all-encompassing ethical ideal. In the Mengzi (Mencius), it is used to refer to one among four ethical attributes ren, yi (righteousness, propriety), li (ritual propriety), and zhi (wisdom). In Han thought, it refers to one among five ethical attributes: ren, yi, li, zhi, and xin (trustworthiness). Zhu Xi continues to use ren to refer to one among several ethical attributes, along with yi, li, zhi, and sometimes also xin. At the same time, he also retains its use to refer to an all-encompassing ethical ideal. How, then, does he reconcile these two ways of using ren?

Mencius holds the view that xing (nature) is good, in the sense that human beings share certain ethical predispositions that, when fully developed, lead to the ethical ideal. The idea that xing is good is reaffirmed by later Tang thinkers such as Han Yu and Li Ao. Li Ao holds the view that xing is perfectly good in its original state, though it can be obscured; the task of self-cultivation is to restore the original state of xing. Zhu Xi holds a similar view of xing, regarding ren as the original state of xing. At the same time, he continues to affirm certain observations in the Lunyu about the difference between different kinds of people and about how people are close to each other by nature (xing).
How, then, does he reconcile these ideas with the observations that human beings share an originally good xing?

These two questions reflect a task that Zhu Xi often has to confront in developing his own understanding of Confucian thought. He upholds the status of the Lunyu as a Confucian canon, and at the same time draws on and synthesizes ideas from later Confucian thinkers and texts. These later ideas, however, often appear at odds with ideas in the Lunyu, and he faces the task of having to resolve this apparent conflict. In what follows, I consider how his attempt to resolve the apparent conflict shapes his interpretation of the concept of ren, the view of xing, and the conception of self-cultivation in the Lunyu.

2. Zhu Xi on Ren in the Lunyu

To understand Zhu Xi’s interpretation of ren in the Lunyu, let us first consider his own understanding of ren. Often, he characterizes ren in terms of forming one body (yi ti) with all things and in terms of a ceaseless life giving force (sheng sheng).

In early texts, Heaven (tian), the ideal ruler, and even the ideal person, are often described as forming one body with other people and things. The Liji describes the ideal ruler as someone who regards the common people as part of his body (17/16a), while the Guanzi describes him as one who forms one body with the common people (10/18a). The Zhuangzi describes Heaven and Earth (tian di) as forming one body, and myself as being one, with the ten thousand things (1/18a, 10/21a), and similar ideas are found in the Liezi (8/14b). Later Confucian thinkers continue to advocate similar ideas, and characterize ren in these terms. Zhang Zai describes the ten thousand things as being one thing (2/5a) and
describes ren as embodying all affairs just as Heaven embodies all things without omission (2/11b). The Cheng brothers describe the body of the ten thousand things as my body (Cuiyan 1/10b-11a), and characterize ren in terms of forming the same body with all things (Yishu 2a/3a-3b) or regarding the ten thousand things as one body and as part of myself (Cuiyan 1/7b).

Zhu Xi endorses similar ideas, regarding Heaven and Earth and the ten thousand things as originally forming one body with myself (Zhongyong Zhangju 2b), and characterizes ren in these terms (Lunyu Jizhu 3/18a-b). Ren, for him, involves forming one body with all things (Commentary on Siming in Zhangzi Quanshu 1/9b-10a). Though one may have deviated from this state of existence, the task of self-cultivation is to enlarge one’s heart/mind until one sees everything as connected to oneself (Yulei pp. 2518-19).

In early texts, the operation of Heaven (tian) is also described in terms of a ceaseless life-giving force. For example, Xunzi (5/7a, 6/6a, 13/2b) and Zhuangzi (7/1b) refer to Heaven, or to Heaven and Earth (tian di), as what gives birth to things. The Yijing highlights the idea of sheng sheng, or continuously giving life (7/4a), and speaks of sheng (giving life) as the ‘great virtue’ of Heaven and Earth (8/1b). In later Confucian thought, Zhang Zai describes the ren of Heaven and Earth in terms of giving birth to and nourishing the ten thousand things (5/4b), and the Cheng brothers refer to sheng (giving life) as the dao (Way) of Heaven (Cuiyan 1/5a). According to the Cheng brothers, the heart/mind of humans should be identical with the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth (Yishu 2a/1a), which is to give life to things (Waishu 3/1a). This is ren, which is compared to the life giving force of a seed (Cuiyan 1/4b, Yishu 18/2a). The Cheng
brothers even link the idea of ceaselessly giving life to the idea of forming one body with the ten thousand things – in giving life to all things, it is as if all things are part of one’s own body (Yishu 2a/15b).

Zhu Xi again endorses similar ideas. He describes the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth as one of giving life to things (Yulei pp. 4, 1791; Zhouyi Benyi, p. 142). This heart/mind of giving life to things is ren (Yulei pp. 85, 2634; Daquan 67/20a-21b), and ren is compared to the life giving force of seeds (Yulei pp. 464-5, 2419). And, just like the Cheng brothers, he relates the idea of giving life to all things to the idea of forming one body with Heaven and Earth and with the ten thousand things (Yulei p. 2810).

How, then, does Zhu Xi reconcile the use of ren in the Lunyu to refer to the ethical ideal in general with its more specific use to refer to one of the four, or five, ethical attributes? Of the five attributes often mentioned together in Han and post-Han thought, xin is not highlighted in the Mengzi. This, according to Zhu Xi, is explained by the fact that xin refers to one’s truly (shi) having the other attributes ren, yi, li and zhi, and so is not distinct from these other attributes (Yulei, pp. 104, 1296; Daquan 74/18b-19b). This is the reason why Mencius speaks of only four sprouts, and does not mention a sprout for xin (Yulei pp. 255-6).

As for the more specific use of ren to refer to one of the four ethical attributes, Zhu Xi reconcile this with the more general use of ren by invoking the idea that ren, understood in the more general manner, refers to a ceaseless life giving force. This life giving force runs throughout the four more specific attributes, in the way that it runs through the life cycle of a plant throughout the four seasons. It is most conspicuous in the
spring when the plant begins to grow, and so the first of the four attributes is also referred to as *ren*. But it also runs through the development of the plant in the summer, autumn, and winter, as the plant flourishes, then completes its growth and starts to recede, and then subsides (*Yulei* pp. 109, 112, 2416; *Daquan* 74/18b-19b). Just as Heaven and Earth has this life giving force as its heart/mind, human beings also has this life giving force, namely *ren*, as their heart/mind. And just as the life giving force of Heaven and Earth goes through the four phases described above, *ren* in human beings also manifests itself in the four attributes *ren*, *yi*, *li*, and *zhi* (*Daquan* 67/20a-21b).

So, while *ren* in the specific sense refers to one of these four attributes, the one that has to do with love (*ai*) and in which this life giving force is more conspicuous, *ren* in the general sense encompasses all four attributes (*Daquan* 67/13a; cf. *Yulei* p. 2634). While Confucius occasionally uses *ren* in the specific sense, as when he associates *ren* with love (*Lunyu* 12.22), he more often uses it in a general sense (*Yulei* p. 2416). However, according to Zhu Xi, in speaking of *ren* in the general sense, Confucius is also implicitly talking about *ren*, *yi*, *li*, and *zhi*, which it encompasses (*Daquan* 74/18b-19b). Putting this in terms of the distinction between substance (*ti*) and function (*yong*), *ren* in the general sense refers to the substance of *ren* while *ren*, *yi*, *li*, and *zhi* refer to the different functions or manifestations of this substance. Thus, according to Zhu Xi, Confucius’ and Mencius’ different usages of *ren* is reconciled by the observation that Confucius focuses more on substance and Mencius more on function (*Yulei* p. 115).

3. **Zhu Xi on Xing in the Lunyu**
Zhu Xi’s views on *xing* are expressed through his conception of the distinction between *li* (pattern, principle) and *qi* (material force, vital energies). *Li* is used verbally in early texts in the sense of “give order to” (*Guanzi* 10/3b, *Huainanzi* 21/8a). It is often used in relation to another term *zhi*, meaning “bring order to” or “be in order” (*Xunzi* 5/7a; *Guanzi* 16/3a; *Hanfeizi* 6/6b, *Xiaojing* 7/1b), and is sometimes contrasted with *luan*, or disorder (*Mozi* 36/25/14). *Li* pertains to things (*Xunzi* 15/9b; *Huainanzi* 21/3a; *Liji* 11/15a-b; *Zhuangzi* 10/14a), and the ten thousand things differ in *li* (*Hanfeizi* 6/8a-b; *Zhuangzi* 8/30a-b). *Li* is something to be conformed to (*Mozi* 3/3/15-17) or followed (*Guanzi* 13/8b; *Hanfeizi* 20/8a; *Zhuangzi* 10/18a). As such, it is often paired with *dao* (Way) (*Hanfeizi* 6/3b; *Zhuangzi* 6/3b, 10/17b) and *yi* (propriety) (*Xunzi* 10/8b, 19/3b; *Mengzi* 6A:7; *Lushichunqiu* 18/19b; *Guanzi* 13/4a; *Mozi* 63/39/33). So, *li* resides in things, is the way things operate, and is also that to which their operation should conform.

This notion of *li* continues to be emphasized by later thinkers. For example, Guo Xiang regards *li* as pertaining to everything (1/19a) and the notion is related to *fen* (proper place) (1/2a), which in turn is related to *xing* in the expression *xing fen* (1/1a, 3/16a). The difference between these terms is that *li* emphasizes that which resides in a thing and governs its operations, *xing* emphasizes the thing’s possession of *li*, and *fen* emphasizes the proper place of the thing given its *li*. For Guo Xiang, everything has its *xing fen*, and one should follow one’s *xing* and live in accordance with one’s *fen* (1/1a). By the late Tang and early Song, *xing* has come to be seen by Confucian thinkers as something that is originally good but can potentially be obscured. Li Ao takes this view, regarding *qing* (emotions) as that which can potentially obscure *xing* (2/1a-b) and the task of self-cultivation as one of restoring the original *xing* (2/3a-3b). Shao Yong emphasizes
the idea of responding to things in accordance with their \( li^* \), putting this in terms of viewing things with things (6/26b) or with the \( li^* \) in things (6/26a).

Zhu Xi continues to emphasize the notion of \( li^* \). \( li^* \) resides in things, and it accounts for the way things are (\( suo\ yi\ ran \)) (Yulei p. 414, Mengzi Jizhu 2/6a) as well as the way things should be (\( dang\ ran \)) (Yulei pp. 414, 863; Lunyu Jizhu 2/11a; Lunyu Huowen 9/14b). Following the Cheng brothers (Yishu 22a/11a), he regards \( xing \) as constituted by \( li^* \) (Yulei pp. 92-3, 1387, 2427). As \( li^* \) resides in human beings and constitutes their \( xing \), it takes the form of \( ren, yi, li, \) and \( zhi \) (Yulei pp. 63-4, 83, 92). Thus, \( xing \) is identical with \( li^* \) and is originally good; that human beings might be not good is due to \( qi \).

In early texts, \( qi \) is viewed as something that fills Heaven and Earth (Guoyu 1/10a; Zhuangzi 3/11a). \( Qi \) also fills the body of human beings; for example, \( qi \) grows in a person through the intake of the senses, and the proper balance of \( qi \) accounts for the proper operation of the senses (Guoyu 3/13b). Both Mencius and Xunzi regard properly nourishing \( qi \) under the guidance of the heart/mind as an important part of self-cultivation (Mengzi 2A:2, 6A:8; Xunzi 1/8b-9a). By contrast, the Zhuangzi advocates emptying the heart/mind so that \( qi \) in oneself can respond without influence from the heart/mind (Zhuangzi 2/7a). Han thinkers such as Dong Zhongshu continue to advocate the proper balance of \( qi \) in oneself (10/3b), while Wang Chong speaks of people having different endowments of \( qi \) (2/14a-b, 18/4a). By early Song, Confucian thinkers such as Zhang Zai speaks of the purity and impurity of \( qi \) (2/3b), and refers to \( xing \) constituted by one’s endowment of \( qi \) as material nature (\( qi\ zhi\ zhi\ xing \)) (2/18b-19a).
Zhu Xi regards things as comprising both li* and qi – li* does not exist without qi and vice versa (Yulei pp. 2-3). Thus, though xing in a thing is constituted by li*, this li* must reside in an endowment of qi that the thing has (Yulei pp. 61, 66). While xing in a human being is constituted by li* and is perfectly good, the endowment of qi can be pure or impure (Yulei pp. 8, 56, 64-67). This accounts for the ethical difference between people (Daquan 74/20a; Yulei pp. 68, 2429). The endowment of qi in a person is also part of xing, and material nature (qi zhi zhi xing) refers to li* as embedded in qi (Yulei p. 67). Accordingly, Zhu Xi endorses the Cheng brother’s distinction between original nature (ben ran zhi xing) and material nature (Yulei p. 2431); the former is perfectly good while the latter can be not good (Yulei p. 89). This distinction provides the apparatus for resolving the apparent conflict between the Mencian view that xing is good and Confucius’s observations in the Lunyu about different kinds of people and about how people are close to each other by nature (xing).

In Lunyu 17.2, Confucius observes that people are close to each other by nature (xing), though they can come apart through practice. Zhu Xi endorses the Cheng brothers’ view that this is an observation about material nature (cf. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao Yishu 18/19b, 22a/10b-11a). If the passage were about original nature, which is constituted by li*, then people are equally good and it would have been inappropriate to speak of their being close to each other by nature (Lunyu Jizhu 9/1b-2a; Lunyu Huowen 22/2b-3a; Yulei pp. 67-69, 1177-8). While material nature accounts for the ethical difference among people, the difference is not extreme at the start, and it is only through practice that people come further apart.
There are two passages in the *Lunyu* that describe different kinds of people. In 17.3, Confucius observes that only those of superior intelligence or profound stupidity do not change. And in 16.9, he describes various kinds of people – those who are born knowing, those who know after having learnt, those who learn upon feeling perplexed, and those who do not learn even when perplexed. Again, Zhu Xi takes these passages to describe the difference in the endowment of *qi* among people (*Lunyu Jizhu* 8/12b, 9/2a; *Lunyu Huowen* 21/8a-b). The difference between 17.2 and 17.3 is that 17.2 concerns most people, who are close to each other by nature, while 17.3 describes the extreme cases of those at the highest or lowest end (*Yulei* p. 1178). Even in the extreme cases, it is not that these people cannot change (*bu ke yi*). Those of superior intelligence just follow *li* without effort, and so there is no need to change (*Yulei* p. 2875). Those of profound stupidity, on the other hand, do not change (*bu yi*) only because they are unwilling to change (*bu ken yi*) (*Lunyu Huowen* 22/4a-b; *Yulei* p. 1178). These are the people described in *Mengzi* 4A:11 as people who do violence to themselves (*zi bao*) or throw themselves away (*zi qi*). The former refuse to believe in their ability to change, while the latter refuse to undertake change (*Lunyu Jizhu* 9/2a; cf. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao *Yishu* 18/17b).

Thus, the distinction between original nature and material nature allows Zhu Xi to explain how people differ despite the fact that they are all fundamentally good. It is the difference in endowment of *qi* that accounts for this difference as described in *Lunyu* 16.9 (*Yulei* p. 66) and in chapter 20 of *Zhongyong* (*Zhongyong Huowen* 4/25b-26b). According to Zhu Xi, while Confucius is discussing material nature in the passages just considered, he rarely comments on original nature. This accounts for a disciple’s
observation in passage 5.13 that Confucius rarely discourses on xing, which according to Zhu Xi is xing as constituted by li* (Yulei p. 726; Lunyu Jizhu 3/5a).

Zhu Xi also uses the distinction between two notions of nature to characterize other views of xing found in the history of Chinese thought (Yulei p. 70). According to him, Mencius discusses xing as constituted by li*, which is perfectly good (Mengzi Huowen 30/1a). The same is true of the observation in chapter 1 of Zhongyong that what is mandated by tian is what is meant by xing (Yulei pp. 67-69; Zhongyong Huowen 3/4b-6a). On the other hand, Xunzi’s view that xing is bad, Yang Xiong’s view that xing is mixed, and Han Yu’s view that there are different grades of xing, are all about material nature (Yulei p. 78). This is also true of Gaozi’s view that sheng (life, to give life) is what is meant by xing, a view that focuses on what pertains to qi, such as consciousness and the operation of the senses (Yulei pp. 71, 1375-6, 2425; Mengzi Jizhu 6/2a-2b; Mengzi Huowen 36/2a). The Cheng brothers comment that to discourse on xing without discoursing on qi is to lack comprehensiveness, and to do the reverse is to lack understanding. According to Zhu Xi, to talk about original nature without regard to the different endowments of qi in which it is embedded is to lose sight of the difference between people and so lacks comprehensiveness. On the other hand, to talk about material nature without regard to the original good nature is to lose sight of the source of goodness, something fundamental to human beings, and so lacks proper understanding (Yulei pp. 1387-9, 1493).

4. **Zhu Xi on Self-Cultivation in the Lunyu**
Zhu Xi’s view that human beings are originally good influences his reading of certain important passages in the *Lunyu*. Consider, for example, passage 1.2 in which Youzi observes that being filial to parents and obedient to elders is the basis (*ben*) for, depending on interpretation, *ren* or *wei ren*. If human beings are already *ren*, then being filial and obedient cannot be the basis for acquiring *ren*. For this reason, the Cheng brothers think that 1.2 is an observation about the basis for *wei ren*, namely the practice of *ren*, rather than for *ren* (*Waishu* 7/3a; cf. *Yishu* 11/7a). They take *wei ren* to be about the practice of *ren* (*xing ren*) – the practice of *ren* starts with being filial to parents and obedient to elders (*Cuivan* 1/3b; *Yishu* 18/1b). Zhu Xi endorses the Cheng brothers’ view (*Lunyu Jizhu* 1/2a; *Lunyu Huowen* 6/10a-b). Not only is being filial toward parents and obedient toward elders not the basis for *ren*, but it is the latter that provides the basis for the former – being filial and obedient is a manifestation of *ren* which is in one’s original nature (*Yulei* p. 462-3, 471). Because *ren* is first manifested within the family setting in these two qualities, one should start by practicing them so that the manifestation of *ren* will eventually broaden to other areas (*Daquan* 67/12b, 70/20a-20b; *Lunyu Huowen* 6/10a-b).

Thus, Zhu Xi regards 1.2 as about the practice of *ren* rather than about *ren* as such. This is the way he interprets many of the passages in the *Lunyu* that apparently are about *ren* – he sees them as primarily about self-cultivation rather than about *ren* itself (*Daquan* 73/46a). And since *ren* is, according to him, used primarily in the *Lunyu* in a general sense that encompasses *ren*, *yi*, *li*, *zhi*, and *xin*, he takes these passages to be also implicitly about these other attributes. For example, 1.2 is also about the basis for the practice of these other attributes. Loving parents (*ai qin*) is the starting point for the
practice of ren in the specific sense that focuses on love. Following parents (shun qin) and respecting parents (jing qin) are respectively the bases for practicing yi and li, while knowing to do these is the basis for practicing zhi. One’s truly (cheng) doing all of the above, on the other hand, is the basis for the practice of xin (Lunyu Huowen 6/11b).

But if human beings are originally good, why do we need a process that starts with being filial to parents and obedient to elders in the practice of ren? According to Zhu Xi, human beings are drawn by external things and can lose what they received from Heaven. As a result, they might no longer be able to practice ren without effort, and so have to start with the more intimate relations within the family (Lunyu Huowen 6/11a-b). The view that ethical failure is due to the influence of external things can be found in various early texts.

The Mengzi ascribes ethical failure to the operation of the senses, regarding the heart/mind as the organ that should regulate the senses (6A:15). The Huainanzi observes how sensory objects can distort the operation of the senses (7/3a) and how it is only under the heart/mind’s regulation that the senses attain their proper balance (14/7b). The Guanzi observes how external things can distort the operation of the senses (16/3a), which in turn can distort the operation of the heart/mind (13/6a). The “Yueji” chapter of the Liji describes how, when human beings come into contact with external things, likes and dislikes arise, and how such likes and dislikes, if not regulated, can do damage to tian li* (11/8b-9a). Zhu Xi similarly ascribes ethical failure to distortion that arises when one comes into contact with external things. When the senses come into contact with external things, desires (yu) arise, and desires can become numerous because external things are without limit (Daxue Huowen 1/5a-b). When such desires are plenty and unregulated,
they become problematic (Mengzi Jizhu 7/28a) and one becomes subordinated to external things (Yulei p. 262).

This phenomenon Zhu Xi refers to as *si* (private, partial, self-centered), which contrasted with *gong* (public, impartial). *Si*, when used to refer to what has to do with oneself, does not by itself carry any negative connotation. The Lunyu speaks of examining Yan Hui’s *si* in the sense of examining his ‘private’ life (2.9), and the Mengzi talks about attending to one’s own (*si*) affairs after having attended to public (*gong*) affairs (3A:3). However, *si* can also be used to describe a focus on oneself that prevents a balanced perspective. For example, *gong yi*, or propriety that is ‘public’ or ‘objective’, is contrasted with resentment that is self-centered (*si*) (Mozi 9/8/20), with private (*si*) affairs (Xunzi 8/5a) or with selfish (*si*) desires (Xunzi 1/13a). Zhu Xi likewise sees *si* as problematic when contrasted with *gong*. *Gong* is compared to being comprehensive, and *si* to forming associations and being swayed by close personal relations (Lunyu Jizhu 1/11b; Yulei p. 581). To form one body with the ten thousand things is *gong*, by contrast to *si*, which has to do with focusing on oneself in a way that inappropriately neglects the interest of other people and things (Yulei p. 117, Daxue Huowen 1/14a-b). One’s being drawn by external things without regulation leads to this inappropriate focus on oneself to the neglect of others.

This understanding of *si* influences Zhu Xi’s interpretation of several important passages in the Lunyu. In 12.1, in response to a question by Yan Hui about *ren*, Confucius responds that *ren* has to do with overcoming the self and returning to ritual propriety (*ke ji fu li wei ren*). For Zhu Xi, *ke ji* refers to overcoming or winning over (*ke*) the *si* of the self (*ji*). *Li* is the embodiment of *tian li*†, and *fu li* refers to one’s returning
(fu) to tian li* with which one is already endowed and which is embodied in li. Wei ren refers to the way to practice the ren that one has, which involves overcoming one’s selfish desires (si yu) thereby returning to tian li* (Lunyu Jizhu 6/10a; Yulei p. 1045; Daquan 67/20a-21b). Li (rites) pertains to li*, by contrasted to ji (self) which has to do with selfish human desires (Lunyu Huowen 17/4a-b), and this contrast is the same as that between gong and si (Lunyu Huowen 17/2a). While fu li follows from ke ji and is not another process distinct from it (Yulei p. 1060), the two differ in that ke ji is a general description of the process while fu li emphasizes the details that pertain to daily life (Yulei p. 1046).

In Lunyu 12.2, in response to Zhong Gong’s query about ren, Confucius says: “When traveling behave as if you were receiving an important guest. When employing the services of the common people behave as if you were officiating at an important sacrifice. Do not do to others what you yourself do not desire.” Zhu Xi takes the two halves of this remark to be about, respectively, jing (reverence, seriousness) and shu (reciprocity). Jing involves maintaining one’s mental focus and attention, while shu involves extending oneself to other people and things. By practicing jing and shu, one eliminates the selfish thoughts (si yi) in oneself – the former prevents selfish thoughts from arising, while the latter prevent them from manifesting themselves in one’s interaction with other people and things (Lunyu Jizhu 6/11a-b; Lunyu Huowen 17/7a). These two aspects of self-cultivation are related – jing precedes and is preparation for shu (Yulei p. 1071).

The first half of 12.2 describes dealing with others as if receiving an important guest and conducting a sacrifice; the attitude highlighted is directed toward deities and
persons, and is often characterized as jing in early text. The *Lunyu*, however, also uses jing in relation to affairs (e.g., *Lunyu* 1.5, 13.19, 15.38, 16.10), and presents it as a way to cultivating oneself (*Lunyu* 14.42) as well as a quality of the superior person (*Lunyu* 12.5). Other early texts relate jing to jie (e.g., Zuozhuan 16/23a) and shen (e.g., Zuozhuan 19/23b, citing Shijing), both of these terms having to do with an attitude of being on guard and cautious. So, even in early texts, jing has the more general meaning of an attitude of mental focus, caution, and fearfulness. Zhu Xi, following the Cheng brothers (cf. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao *Yishu* 15/5a, 15/20a; Cuiyan 1/3b), characterizes jing as having oneness as master in that the heart/mind is not divided (*Yulei* p. 2635), so that one is not distracted by other things when focused on one thing (*Yulei* pp. 2464, 2467). Jing is an attitude of caution and fearfulness (*Yulei* pp. 2471, 2767) and involves being constantly alert (*Yulei* pp. 494, 2788). This attitude of mental focus prevents selfish thoughts from arising, which Zhu Xi takes to be the point of the first half of the remark from 12.2.

As for the second half, not doing to others what one does not oneself desire is explicitly described as shu in 15.24, and shu is linked to zhong (doing one’s best, devotion) in 4.15. Related ideas are also found in 5.12 and 6.30. According to Zhu Xi, shu involves extending oneself (*tui ji*) to other things (*Lunyu Jizhu* 8/6a). The extension of oneself to other things flows naturally from the sage without effort, while others in the process of self-cultivation do need to exert effort (*Yulei* p. 672). According to Zhu Xi, the way Zigong describes himself in 5.12 emphasizes the effortless of his extending himself to others, and that is the reason why Confucius remarks that this is not yet something Zigong has accomplished. The way it is described in 12.2 and 15.24, on the other hand,
uses a term of prohibition *wu* thereby emphasizing effort (*Lunyu Jizhu* 3/4b-5a; *Yulei* pp. 116, 358; *Lunyu Huowen* 11/30a; cf. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao *Jingshuo* 6/5a and *Waishu* 7/3a). Through the exercise of *shu*, one overcomes the *si* of human desires (*Yulei* pp. 1435-6), and this restores the original state in which one forms one body with all things (*Lunyu Jizhu* 3/18a).

For Zhu Xi, *jing* and *shu* highlighted in 12.2 and *ke ji fu li* referred to in 12.1 mutually support each other (*Yulei* p. 1072). The former focuses more on positively developing oneself, and the latter on correcting what is problematic (*Yulei* p. 1073). He compares *jing* to guarding the doors of one’s house and *ke ji* to warding off robbers, as well as comparing *jing* to resting to build up strength and *ke ji* to taking medicine to cure one’s illness. The former, if successful, preempts the need for the latter; on the other hand, the latter comes into play should the former not do its job (*Yulei* p. 151). In both cases, the goal is to preempt *si* and to eliminate its presence if it does arise.

On Zhu Xi’s interpretation, 12.1 and 12.2 are not directly about *ren* though Confucius is responding to queries by disciples about *ren*. He relates *ren* to *gong*, and regards *si* as what detracts from *ren* (*Yulei* p. 2486); the *gong* of *ren* is compared to the way Heaven and Earth nourishes the ten thousand things without discrimination (*Yulei* p. 2415). However, *ren* is not identical with nor produced by *gong*. Rather, *gong* is identical with the absence of *si* and enables *ren*, which one originally has, to flow and manifest itself (*Yulei* p. 116-7, 2833-4). Passages 12.1 and 12.2 are not direct characterizations of *ren* but describe the process by which one preempts and eliminate *si*, thereby allowing *ren* to fully manifest itself (*Yulei* p. 2453). This point he illustrates with the imagery of a mirror. *Ren* is compared to the brightness of the mirror, which is originally there. *Si* is
compared to the dust on the mirror, and *gong* to the absence of dust. The absence of dust enables the brightness of the mirror to shine forth, but this brightness is originally there and is not identical with nor produced by the absence of dust (*Yulei* p. 2454).

This understanding of the contrast between *gong* and *si* in relation to *ren* shapes his interpretation of other passages in the *Lunyu*. Consider as further examples passages 6.3 and 6.7, which comment on Yan Hui. 6.3 describes how Yan Hui does not “transfer his anger”. Following the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi uses the imagery of the mirror to explain this observation. Yan Hui’s heart/mind is like a bright mirror. Just as the image in a mirror is a response to things and does not originate from the mirror, Yan Hui’s anger is an appropriate response to a situation and does not originate from himself. Since his anger is directed only to what appropriately calls for such anger, it would not be inappropriately transferred to other situations (*Lunyu Jizhu 3/10b; Yulei* pp. 768, 772).

Similarly, he interprets 6.7, which describes how Yan Hui’s heart/mind does not deviate from *ren* for three months, in terms of the notion of *si*. Since *ren* already exists, one’s heart/mind will deviate from *ren* only as a result of the effect of selfish desires (*si yu*). Just as the absence of dust enables the brightness of the mirror to shine forth, the absence of selfish desires in Yan Hui enables his heart/mind to not deviate from *ren* (*Yulei* pp. 781, 787).

5. **Concluding Remarks**

Zhu Xi’s interpretation of ideas in the *Lunyu* is shaped by his own version of Confucian thought and by his conception of Confucian orthodoxy as defined by a set of canonical texts. The latter accounts for his explicit attempts to both defend ideas in the *Lunyu* and make these ideas compatible with ideas from other canonical texts such as the
Mengzi. Our discussion shows how both are at work in his interpretation of ideas in the Lunyu related to ren, xing, and self-cultivation.

In relation to ren, he understands ren in terms of two related ideas – forming one body with all things and a ceaseless life giving force. He also sees the need to reconcile the general use of ren in the Lunyu with its more specific use to refer to one of several ethical attributes in the Mengzi and in later Confucian thought. The view of ren as a life giving force enables him to do this by observing how this life giving force manifests itself in different ethical attributes, though more visibly in the attribute that focuses on affective concern.

In relation to xing, he regards xing as constituted by li*, while at the same time holding the view that li* is always embedded in qi. Thus, there is a distinction between original nature, which refers to li* as such, and material nature, which refers to li* as embedded in qi. He also sees the need to reconcile Confucius’ observations about how people are close to each other by nature and about different kinds of people with the Mencian view that xing is good. He does this by invoking the distinction between original and material nature, claiming that Mencius’ view is about original nature while Confucius’ view is about material nature.

Zhu Xi’s view that the xing of human beings is constituted by li*, which is perfectly good, leads him to view ethical failure as a deviation from the original state of human beings. This original state is characterized by ren, which involves one’s forming one body with all things, and ethical failure is due to one’s focusing inappropriately on oneself in a way that separates one from other people and things. This is the phenomenon of si, which is contrasted with gong, a state in which there is no inappropriate focus of
this kind. His view that *ren* characterizes the original state of human beings leads him to interpret passages in the *Lunyu* such as 1.2 to be about the practice of *ren* rather than about *ren* itself. And his understanding of *si* also leads him to interpret passages such as 12.1 and 12.2, in which Confucius responds to disciples’ queries about *ren*, as observations not about *ren* as such but about the practice of *ren* through the prevention or elimination of *si*. For him, many of the comments on *ren* in the *Lunyu* are not directly about *ren*, but about the practice of *ren*. Even in the case of Yan Hui as depicted in 6.3 and 6.7, he sees these passages as not directly about *ren* in Yan Hui, but about how the absence of *si* enables his *ren* to manifest itself.

Earlier, in discussing Zhu Xi’s interpretation of Confucius’ and Mencius’ different usages of *ren*, we noted that he regards Confucius as focusing more on the substance (*ti*) of *ren* and Mencius more on function (*yong*). Our discussion of Zhu Xi’s understanding of self-cultivation in the *Lunyu*, however, also shows that he believes Confucius does not directly talk about the nature of *ren*. That is, while Confucius’ focus is on substance, the focus is on how to enable this substance to manifest itself rather than on the direct characterization of this substance. This point is reflected in his interpretation of passage 5.13 as saying that Confucius rarely discusses original nature – Confucius’ focus is on material nature, namely *li* as embedded in the endowment of *qi*. So, Confucius’ focus is more on the practical manifestation of *ren*, and this accounts for his focusing on the practice of *ren* rather than on the nature of *ren* itself when responding to disciples’ queries about *ren*. According to Zhu Xi, it is exactly the contribution of the *Mengzi* and the *Zhongyong* that they take the Confucian discourse beyond this practical
focus to a more explicit discussion of the fundamental characteristics of the original nature of human beings.
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Qing 情
Ren 仁
Shen 慎
Sheng 生
Sheng sheng 生生
Shi 实
Shu 恕
Shun qin 顺亲
Si 私
Si yi 私意
Si yu 私欲
Suo yi ran 所以然
Ti 体
Tian 天
Tian di  天地
Tian li* 天理
Tui ji 推己
Wei ren 为仁
Wu 勿
Xin 信
Xing 性
Xing fen 性分
Xing ren 行仁
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Yi ti 一体
Yong 用
Yu 欲
Zhi 智
Zhi* 治
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