ZHU Xi and the Idea of One Body

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1. Introduction

ZHU Xi idealizes a state of existence in which one forms one body (*yi ti* 一體) with all things, describing the sage as being in such a state. This chapter will discuss the way he understands this idea and its philosophical implications.

In previous publications, I proposed an approach to the philosophical study of Confucian thought that starts from within the tradition, seeking to approximate the perspectives of the Confucian thinkers before eventually building a linkage to contemporary western philosophical discourse (Shun 2016b). We start by carefully examining the key terms and the texts, taking into account the historical contexts. Having extracted the ideas of the Confucian thinkers on this basis, we probe their life experiences that these ideas reflect, identifying experiences that are shared across cultures and times. We then relate their ideas to our own experiences akin to theirs, before engaging in more systematic reflections on these ideas and relating them to contemporary philosophical discourse. Following this approach, this chapter will be in three main parts: historical background to Zhu's idea of one body (Section 2), Zhu's understanding of the idea (Section 3), and philosophical implications of Zhu's views (Section 4).

Zhu's understanding of the idea has five dimensions: (1) sensitivity to harm to all things; (2) giving life to and nourishing all things; (3) viewing the human community in terms of family relationships; (4) a sense of mission and accountability; and (5) the idea of no self (*wu wo* 無我). The first, second and fourth dimensions spell out the way someone in that state relates to humans and things, the third provides a model for making sense of these three dimensions, while the fifth highlights the central element of the state of one body. The first four dimensions draw on ideas

before Zhu's times, and Section 2 will discuss the evolvement of these four themes from pre-Qin to early Song. Section 3 focuses on Zhu's understanding of the idea of one body, how he draws on and integrates ideas of other early Song Confucians, including ZHANG Zai 張載 (1020-1077), CHENG Hao 程顥 (1032-1085) and CHENG Yi 程頤 (1033-1107). Though the idea of no self can be traced to some earlier sources, it is these early Song thinkers, including Zhu himself, who make it prominent and relate it to the idea of one body. Section 4 discusses the philosophical implications of the idea of one body, in particular its relation to contemporary discussions of related ideas such as sympathy, empathy, perspective taking, and self-other merging.

As the chapter will focus on the human experiences underlying the idea of one body that are shared across cultures and times, its discussion will abstract from details that are specific to Zhu's thinking or to the Song-Ming periods. For example, both Zhu and certain other Song-Ming Confucians believe that humans already form one body with all things in their original state, but this belief is relatively specific to that period. I will bracket this aspect of Zhu's views and instead consider the state of one body primarily as an ethical ideal for humans. Also, Zhu often elaborates on the idea in terms of the way he understands the relation between *li* 理 (pattern) and *qi* 氣 (material force). Again, while these details are crucial to our understanding of Zhu's own perspective in its full complexity, I will abstract from these specific details and focus on the shared human experiences underlying the idea.

2. Historical Background: Four Dimensions of the Idea of One Body

2.1 Sensitivity to Harm to Others

The idea of a sensitivity to harm to others, including humans and animals, is highlighted in certain passages in the *Mengzi* 孟子 (*Mencius*). 2A:6 observes that no human is devoid of the heart/mind of being "unable to bear" (*bu ren* 不忍) (harm to) other humans. It gives the example of how humans would respond, if they suddenly witness an infant about to fall into a well, with the heart/mind of "being noticeably and fearfully moved" and of "being pained" (*chu ti ce yin zhi*

xin 怵惕惻隱之心). It presents the heart/mind of "being pained" (*ce yin zhi xin* 惻隱之心) as the germ of humaneness (*ren* 仁), urging people to fully develop such a heart/mind, and 6A:6 also relates the heart/mind of "being pained" to humaneness. In 1A:7, Mencius reminds King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 of an incident in which the king saw an ox being led to be used for consecrating a new bell. The king was "unable to bear" (*bu ren* 不忍) its shrinking with fear, like an innocent person going to its place of death. Subsequently, Mencius describes the king as "being pained" (*yin* 隱) by an animal going without guilt to its place of death, and remarks that the superior person relates to animals in such a way that, having seen an animal alive, he "cannot bear" (*bu ren*) to see it die, and having heard its cries, he "cannot bear" (*bu ren*) to eat its flesh. Finally, in 7B:31, after commenting that all humans have things that they "cannot bear" (*bu ren*), Mencius goes on to urge people to develop their heart/mind of not wanting to harm others. Since ZHU Xi's understanding of the idea of one body draws on these Mencian ideas, we will examine in detail the nature of the responses presented by Mencius using the terms, for which I have provided tentative translations that reflect the analysis that follows: *chu ti* 怵惕 ("being noticeably and fearfully moved"), *ce yin* 惻隱 and *yin* 隱 ("being pained"), and *bu ren* 不忍 ("unable to bear", "cannot bear").

Chu 怵 is used in texts up to early Han mostly in the sense of the heart/mind's being moved in some noticeable manner. For example, the *Liji* 禮記 (*Record of Rites*) describes sacrifice as involving the heart/mind's being moved (*chu* 怵) in a way that is given expression by the rituals (*xin chu er feng zhi yi li* 心怵而奉之以禮) (*Liji* 14.18a). The *Guanzi* 管子 describes how someone moved by (*chu* 怵) what one likes would cease attending to (*wang* 忘) what one dislikes (*chu yu hao, ze wang qi so wu* 怵於好, 則忘其所惡); it is when one is not so moved that one's desires do not exceed the way they genuinely are (*bu chu hu hao …. yu bu guo qi qing* 不怵乎好….. 欲不過其情) (*Guanzi* 13.5a). The *Huainanzi* 淮南子 describes how, when the sage is confronted with tempting enjoyments, these are not sufficient to cause his heart/mind to be moved (*chu* 怵) in a way that leads him to deviate from his genuine nature (*bu zu yi … shi xin chu ran shi qi qing xing* 不足以 …. 使心怵然失其情性) (*Huainanzi* 1.15a). In another context, it describes how, when confronted with various enjoyments, someone other than a sage would be

moved (*chu* 怵) in a tempted and aspiring way (*chu ran ruo you suo you mu* 怵然若有所誘慕), and when the enjoyments are removed, the heart/mind would feel a sense of loss (*Huainanzi* 1.13b). From these examples, we see that *chu* 怵 has to do with the heart/mind's being moved in some noticeable manner. When so moved by certain specific objects, the objects engage one's attention in such a way that one might cease attending to certain other things and might be drawn along by the objects.

Ti 惕 is used in the *Shijing* 詩經 (*Book of Odes*) to refer to a state of the heart/mind (*xin yan ti ti* 心焉惕惕) (*Shijing* 142/2), but the context of this occurrence or of its occurrence in the *Shangshu* 尚書 (*Documents*) (*Shangshu* 226) does not make clear what that state is. In other early texts, it sometimes refers to the heart/mind's being moved in an alert manner to some troubling state of affairs. For example, the *Guoyu* 國語 (*Discourses of the States*) speaks of the disastrous consequences of the absence of *ti* 惕 upon seeing disorder (*jian luan er bu ti* 見亂而不惕) (*Guoyu* 3.7b), the *Huainanzi* uses the term to describe the response of Wu Qi 吳起 upon hearing that disaster is coming his way (*wu qi ti ran* 吳起惕然) (*Huainanzi* 12.10a), and the *Lüshichunqiu* 呂氏春秋 (*Annals of Lü Buwei*) describes how Duke Zhuang of Qi 齊莊公 woke up in a state of *ti* 惕 after having a dream in which he was disgraced (*ti ran er wu* 惕然而寤) (*Lüshichunqiu* 19.4b). Sometimes, it refers to an alert and attentive state of the heart/mind that need not be directed to any specific troubling state of affairs. For example, the *Zuozhuan* 左傳 (*Zuo's Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*) speaks of how one is in a state of *ti* 惕 on a daily basis, not for a moment daring to not keep in mind one's official duties (*wu ri bu ti, qi gan wang zhi* 無日不惕, 豈敢忘職) (*Zuozhuan* 16.22b), and how one is not *ti* 惕 in response to another party's power and prestige (*bu wei wei ti* 不為威惕) (*Zuozhuan* 30.12a). The *Lüshichunqiu* speaks of how, when confronting a worthy person whose way is subtle and difficult to grasp, one has to be in a state of *ti* 惕 as otherwise one cannot genuinely understand the worthy (*bu ti yu xin, ze zhi zhi bu shen* 不惕於心, 則知之不深) (*Lüshichunqiu* 13.17a). So, *ti* 惕 has to do with an alert and attentive state of the heart/mind; even when not directed to a specifically troubling state of affairs, it still involves one's being alert and on guard against

things going amiss, such as omission of one's duties, what some party with power and prestige might do to oneself, or failing to appreciate the way of the worthies.

This analysis is corroborated by the fact that *ti* 惕 is often used in conjunction with other terms that have to do with alertness and attention: *kong* 恐, *ju* 懼 and at times *jie* 戒. For example, it is used in parallel to *kong* 恐 (*Guoyu* 18.10b) and *ju* 懼 (*Zuozhuan* 27.18a) and in the combination *ti ju* 惕懼 (*Lüshichunqiu* 15.2a) and *kong ju zhen dong ti li* 恐懼振動惕慄 (*Mozi* 53). The combination *chu ti* 怵惕 is used in the *Guoyu* in parallel to *ju* 懼 (*you yue chu ti, ju yuan zhi lei ye* 猶曰怵惕, 懼怨之來也) (*Guoyu* 1.6a) and to *jie ju* 戒懼 (*wei wei chu ti, bao ren jie ju* 亹亹怵惕, 保任戒懼) (*Guoyu* 1.14a). The three terms *kong* 恐, *ju* 懼 and *jie* 戒 have different connotations. *Jie* 戒 is directed toward undesirable occurrences that are already conspicuous, either having already occurred, or is imminent or likely. For example, it describes one's response to the presence of powerful enemies (*Hanfeizi* 1.4b) and to dangers associated with various stages of life (*Lunyu* 16.7). *Kong* 恐 is used to emphasize the possibility of certain undesirable occurrences, though such occurrences are by comparison to objects of *jie* more distant in that they are just possible but not yet imminent or likely. For example, it describes one's attitude toward possible occurrences such as: losing what one has learnt (*Lunyu* 8.17), disgracing one's ancestors (*Xiaojing* 8.1b), one's incompetence (*Xunzi* 19.3a), or the honest village person being mistaken for the virtuous (*Mengzi* 7B:37). *Ju* 懼 is sometimes used in the sense of fear (e.g., *Mengzi* 2A:2), but can also describe one's attitude toward possible undesirable occurrences that one is consciously aware of, such as the aging of parents (*Lunyu* 4.21). When these are alterable, one would seek to pre-empt the undesirable occurrence, such as by cautiously avoiding incorrectness in deliberating about what is correct (*Xunzi* 15.10a), by consciously staying away from disgrace (*Xunzi* 1.12b), or by being very careful in approaching affairs (*Lunyu* 7.11). The linkage of *ti* 惕 to these terms shows that it has to do with a state of the heart/mind that involves alertness, focus of attention, and the avoidance of undesirable occurrences, whether pre-emptively or in response to imminent or actual occurrences. For convenience, we might refer to this as a state of fearfulness.

Thus, the combination *chu ti* 怵惕 describes a state in which the heart/mind is moved in some noticeable way that engages one's attention. This can be a general state of alertness, focus of attention, and being on guard pre-emptively against undesirable occurrences. When directed toward a specific situation such as the infant about to fall into a well, it involves one's focusing attention on that situation and being moved cautiously and fearfully to prevent what is imminent.

Turning to *ce yin* 惻隱, it likely refers to a painful or sorrowful state of the heart/mind, though there are relatively fewer occurrences of *ce* 惻 and *yin* 隱 (used in the relevant sense) in early texts to enable us to provide a more detailed analysis. *Ce* 惻 occurs in the *Liji* in the context of mourning and in conjunction with other terms that show that it has to do with a painful or sorrowful state of the heart/mind (*ce da zhi xin, tong ji zhi yi* 惻怛之心, 痛疾之意) (*Liji* 18.5b-6a). *Yin* 隱, in addition to its frequent uses in the sense of "to hide" or "to cover", is also used to refer to a painful or sorrowful state. The *Guoyu* describes how King Wu led an expedition to relieve the painful or sorrowful state of the people (*min yin* 民隱) (*Guoyu* 1.3a), while the *Liji* uses the term to describe the most painful or sorrowful form of grief (*ai qi zhi zhi yin* 哀戚之至隱) (*Liji* 3.3b). There are a few occurrences of *yin* that could have been used in this sense, but could also be used in the sense of what is hidden or inconspicuous, as in the combination *yin you* 隱憂 (*Shijing* 26/1) or *yin ji* 隱疾 (*Liji* 1.10a). *Yin* 隱, when used to refer to a painful or sorrowful state of the hear/mind, can be directed to a specific situation, as when Mencius describes King Xuan as being in that state in response to a situation involving an animal going without guilt to its place of death (*yin qi wu zui er jiu si di* 隱其無罪而就死地) (*Mengzi* 1A:7).

Commenting on *Mengzi* 2A:6, ZHU Xi suggests that *chu ti* 怵惕 concerns one's being moved and shocked by an occurrence, *ce* 惻 one's being deeply hurt, and *yin* 隱 the deep pain one feels (*chu ti jing dong mao, ce shang zhi qie ye, yin tong zhi shen ye* 怵惕 驚動貌, 惻 傷之切也, 隱 痛之深也) (*Mengzi Jizhu* 2.13b). Elsewhere, he also relates *yin* 隱 to pain (*tong* 痛) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 1297) and does not object to the suggestion that *chu ti* 怵惕 comes before *ce yin* 惻隱 (*Zhuzi Yulei* 1281). What he presents is a possible account that fits in with our analysis. That is, upon suddenly seeing an infant about to fall into a well, one's heart/mind is noticeably moved (*chu* 怵)

and one's attention is directed to an imminent undesirable occurrence that one is moved to prevent, cautiously and fearfully (*ti* 惕). At the same time, one's own heart/mind is itself hurt, that is, affected in a negative manner (*ce* 惻), so that one feels pain or sorrow (*yin* 隱) at the situation that triggers this chain of responses.

Turning to *bu ren* 不忍, it can be directed to a situation that is negatively viewed. For example, in relation to burials, the *Liji* describes how one cannot bear (*bu ren* 不忍, *fu ren* 弗忍) the departed being without a resting place for even a single day (*Liji* 3.5a). It can also be directed to a course of action that one cannot bring oneself to undertake – the expression *bu ren wei* 不忍為 occurs frequently in early texts (e.g., *Lüshichunqiu* 19.6b), and there are frequent references to specific actions that one cannot bring oneself to undertake, such as the inability of Bo Yi 伯夷 to allow himself to hold a position in a corrupt government (*bu ren ju* 不忍居) (*Mengzi* 5B:1) or the superior person's being unable to bring himself to do wrong (*bu ren wei fei* 不忍為非) (*Huainanzi* 10.9b). Presumably, what one cannot bring oneself to do involves bringing about a situation that one finds unacceptable or unpleasant. For example, commenting on why it is proper to bury the deceased, the *Lüshichunqiu* observes how it is characteristic of humans that they cannot bear (*bu ren* 不忍) to just disposed of the bodies of a deceased parent in the gullies (*Lüshichunqiu* 10.5a). This comment relates in an obvious way to the hypothetical story in the *Mengzi* about how, in ancient times, having disposed of dead bodies of parents in the gullies, people responded in a horrified manner upon seeing the bodies being eaten by foxes and sucked by flies (*Mengzi* 3A:5). Thus, what one cannot bear to do often involves bringing about a situation that one finds unbearable.

Conversely, when one is in a situation that one finds unbearable, it can lead one to act in certain ways. For example, finding one's anger unbearable can lead to all kinds of action, often unwise. Early texts describe various examples of the disastrous consequences of one's not being able to bear anger that is directed to matters of minor significance (*bu ren xiao fen* 不忍小忿) (e.g., *Guoyu* 2.3b, 5.6a). In these instances, what one cannot bear is a state of one's own heart/mind. Such a state can also be a matter of one's own pain (*bu ren tong* 不忍痛) (*Hanfeizi* 8.8a), or one's sense of suffering. For example, the *Guoyu* describes how the people cannot bear being

oppressed by the late Shang king (*shu min bu ren* 庶民不忍) and how King Wu, through his military expeditions, relieved the painful or sorrowful state of the people (*min yin* 民隱) (*Guoyu* 1.3a). In this example, what the people cannot bear is presented as the situation of their being oppressed by the late Shang king, unlike the other examples in which what one cannot bear is presented as one's own state, such as anger (*fen* 忿) or pain (*tong* 痛). But their being oppressed is also presented as bringing about a painful or sorrowful state of the heart/mind (*yin* 隱). Presumably, while the term *bu ren* can take as its object a situation or an action, in addition to one's own state such as anger (*fen* 忿) or pain (*tong* 痛), one's finding the situation or action unbearable is connected with a painful or sorrowful state of one's own heart/mind that the situation, or the situation brought about by the proposed action, brings about.

In the examples just considered, what causes one anger (*fen* 忿) or pain (*tong* 痛) is something that happens to oneself, and the situation that causes the people pain or sorrow (*yin* 隱) is their being oppressed. By contrast, the *Mengzi* passages that we considered have to do with a painful or sorrowful state of one's heart/mind that results from what happens to others – an infant about to fall into a well, or an ox being led to be killed. In 1A:7, King Xuan describes his response as being unable to bear the ox's shrinking with fear, like an innocent person going to its place of death (*bu ren qi hu su, ruo wu zui er jiu si di* 不忍其觳觫, 若無罪而就死地). And Mencius subsequently describes the king's response in terms of his being pained by the animal going without guilt to its place of death (*yin qi wu zui er jiu si di* 隱其無罪而就死地). In these descriptions, both terms *bu ren* 不忍 and *yin* 隱 take as their object a certain situation. In addition, in the same passage, the term *bu ren* takes as its object one's witnessing a certain situation, such as seeing an animal (which one has seen alive) die (*bu ren jian qi si* 不忍見其死) or one's doing certain things, such as eating the flesh of an animal (whose cries one has heard) (*bu ren shi qi rou* 不忍食其肉). In another passage 7B:31, after commenting that all humans have things that they cannot bear (*ren jie you suo bu ren* 人皆有所不忍), Mencius goes on to talk about the heart/mind of not wanting to harm others (*wu yu hai ren zhi xin* 無欲害人之心), with the implication that what humans cannot bear is the harming of others. Thus, while the term *yin* 隱 takes a situation as object, the term *bu ren* 不忍 can take a certain situation, one's

witnessing a certain situation, or one's action which brings about a certain situation, as object, the situation in each instance being one that brings about a painful, sorrowful, or in other ways unpleasant response in one's heart/mind. And in these examples, the situation at issue involves some harm, including death, coming to parties other than oneself. We saw earlier that *bu ren* 不忍 can be directed to one's own unpleasant state due to something that happens to oneself, such as one's anger (*fen* 忿) or pain (*tong* 痛). There is no clear instance in pre-Han texts of *bu ren* being directed to one's own painful or sorrowful state that is due to some harm or potential harm coming to others. But we do find such uses of the term in Han texts. For example, in the *Xinshu* 新書 of JIA Yi 賈誼 (200-168 B.C.), while commenting on *Mengzi* 1A:7, *bu ren* 不忍 is used in a way that takes as its object not just the situation (*bu ren qi si* 不忍其死) (*Xinshu* 5.4b) or one's witnessing the situation (*bu ren jian qi si* 不忍見其死) (*Xinshu* 6.3a), but also the painful or sorrowful state that is due to one's witnessing the situation (*yin fu ren ye* 隱弗忍也) (*Xinshu* 6.3a).

Early texts contain several examples of one's being unable to bear (*bu ren*) situations or actions involving harm to others, such as a general's being unable to bear killing a prince (*Guoyu* 8.1b). At times, they highlight how such a response, when it leads to one's refraining from certain acts, can generate a potential conflict with one's official duties or with what is prescribed by law. Examples include being unable to bear bringing one's father, who has committed a murder, to justice (*Lüshichunqiu* 19.7b-8a), being unable to bear causing death to a person or animal thereby resulting in defiance of an order (*Hanfeizi* 7.9b-10a), or being unable to bear imposing punishment on the guilty thereby undermining what is required by law (e.g., *Guanzi* 10.14a). *Mengzi* 1A:7 itself describes a potential conflict between sparing the ox and the ritual practice of using an animal's blood to consecrate a new bell, one that the king resolved by substituting a lamb that he has not seen.

To summarize, the terms we have examined are used to describe one's responses to actual, imminent, or anticipated situations that involve harm to others, including humans and animals. They involve the heart/mind's being noticeably moved (*chu* 怵) by the situation, in such a way that one's attention is focused on the situation and one cautiously and fearfully seeks to prevent

or remedy it (*ti* 惕). Furthermore, one's own heart/mind is negatively affected by the situation (*ce* 惻) resulting in a painful or sorrowful state (*yin* 隱). The responses also involve one's being unable to bear (*bu ren* 不忍) the situation, one's witnessing the situation, the resulting pain or sorrow in one's heart/mind, or one's action which potentially brings about or fails to prevent such a situation. These responses can move one to act to alleviate the actual harm or prevent the potential harm, or to refrain from acting in a way that brings harm to others.

What the *Mengzi* highlights is that humans have such a sensitivity to harm not just to oneself, but to others in certain contexts, and it urges people to develop this sensitivity so that it applies generally to all humans, going beyond the specific contexts. In Section 3.2, we will consider how ZHU Xi takes up this Mencian idea and relates it to the way CHENG Hao comments on the idea of one body. In Section 4.1, we will consider how to make sense of the idea of no self in this connection, drawing on two points in particular in the preceding discussion. The first is that the focus of these responses concerns a *situation* in which some object is harmed. The terms *yin* 隱 and *bu ren* 不忍 are directed to such a situation, rather than to the object that is harmed, making them syntactically different from the English expressions "sympathy" and "empathy." The second is that, while our focus is on situations involving harm to others, these responses can also be directed to a situation in which *oneself* is harmed. We considered the example from the *Guoyu* in which the people cannot bear (*shu min bu ren* 庶民不忍) a situation in which they are oppressed by the late Shang king, a situation that causes them to be in a painful or sorrowful state (*min yin* 民隱). Here, what the people cannot bear, and feel pain or sorrow at, is a situation involving harm to *themselves*.

2.2 Giving Life and Nourishing

Another theme in early texts that bears on ZHU Xi's understanding of the idea of one body is that, just as Heaven and Earth gives life to and nourishes all things, the ideal ruler similarly gives life to and nourishes all humans and things. The point is put in terms of *sheng* 生, whose intransitive verbal use refers to the process of coming into being and growing, and whose transitive verbal use refers to the process of giving life to and furthering life in, viz. nourishing,

an object. Early texts present Heaven, or Heaven and Earth, as giving life to and nourishing the ten thousand things, and regard sage kings as similarly related to the people and to things. For example, the *Yijing* 易經 (*Book of Change*) presents Heaven and Earth as giving life to the ten thousand things (*Yijing* 9.4b; cf. *Yijing* 9.6a) as well as nourishing (*yang* 養) them (*Yijing* 3.8a). At the same time, it presents the ancient kings as nurturing (*yu* 育) the ten thousand things (*Yijing* 3.6a) and the sages as nourishing worthies so as to reach the myriads of people (*Yijing* 3.8a). The effects of the sages extend to the heart/mind of humans – just as Heaven and Earth affects the ten thousand things to transform and give life to them, the sages affect the heart/mind of humans to bring harmony and peace to all under Heaven (*tian di gan er wan wu hua sheng, sheng ren gan ren xin er tian xia he ping* 天地感而萬物化生, 聖人感人心而天下和平) (*Yijing* 4.1a). When the sages persevere in their course, all under Heaven will be transformed and brought to completion (*tian xia hua cheng* 天下化成) (*Yijing* 4.2a-2b).

This view of Heaven and Earth is found in other early texts (e.g., *Xunzi* 13.10a) and is generally shared in early Chinese thought. The idea that the role of the ideal ruler is to give life to the people (*sheng min* 生民), in the sense of both attending to their livelihood and guiding them, is also pervasive. For example, the *Zuozhuan* comments on how Heaven, having given life to the people (*sheng min* 生民), establishes a ruler to benefit them, and so the main task of the ruler is to nourish the people (*yang min* 養民) (*Zuozhuan* 9.6a). The way to nourish the people is to gear governmental affairs toward enriching their livelihood (*Zuozhuan* 8.14b) as well as to properly guide (*si mu* 司牧) them (*Zuozhuan* 15.23a). Likewise, the *Guoyu* describes virtue and propriety (*de yi* 德義) as the basis for giving life to and nourishing the people (*Guoyu* 10.17b), while the *Liji* also emphasizes the way to give life to and nourish the people (*sheng min zhi dao* 生民之道) (*Liji* 11.16b). The *Xunzi* comments on how Heaven establishes the ruler for the sake of the people and not vice versa (*Xunzi* 19.9b), and presents giving life to and nourishing the people as the main task of the sage kings (*Xunzi* 12.10a) and the main purpose of governmental affairs (*Xunzi* 6.3a).

The *Yijing* (*Yijing* 7.3b-4a) highlights the idea of continuously giving life and nourishing, or *sheng* 生生, an idea that gains prominence in Song-Ming Confucian thought. ZHU Xi and other

early Song Confucians expand the scope of the idea, taking the process to characterize the ideal relation between each human and all other humans and things – each human should be engaged in the process of continuously giving life to and nourishing all humans and things. On this view, humans should ideally perform the function that Heaven and Earth performs, and so humans can be described as "the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth" (*ren zhe, tian di zhi xin ye* 人者, 天地之心也), an idea that comes from the *Liji* (*Liji* 7.8a-8b) with the idea of "the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth" also highlighted in the *Yijing* (*Yijing* 3.4b). This view constitutes the second dimension to Zhu's understanding of the idea of one body, and it complements the first dimension in that they both have to do with a concern for the well-being of other humans and things – the first has to do with a sensitivity to anything detrimental to, and the second a dedication to promoting, their well-being. And these two dimensions come together in the relationship between parents and children – parents give life to and nourish their children, and are at the same time sensitive in an intimate manner to any harm to their children. ZHU Xi and other early Song Confucians develop this point further, idealizing a state in which each human relates to other humans in a way like one's relation to close family members, both promoting their well-being and being sensitive to harm to them. This constitutes the third dimension of Zhu's understanding of the idea of one body.

2.3 The Human Community and Family Relationships

The *Kang Gao* 康誥 chapter of the *Shangshu* (*Shangshu* 389) comments on how the ruler should ideally protect the people as if they were newborn infants (*ruo bao chi zi* 若保赤子), and this idea is generally endorsed by early Confucians. For example, in the *Mengzi,* the Moist Yi Zhi 夷之 presents this as "the way of the Confucians" (*Mengzi* 3A:5), and a modified saying (*ru bao chi zi* 如保赤子) is cited in the *Daxue* (*Great Learning*) (*Liji* 19.12a) as well as the *Xunzi* (*Xunzi* 7.13a). In this context, the *Xunzi* observes how the people will treat such a ruler as if he were their parent (*Xunzi* 7.13a; cf. 7.10b), and other texts similarly comment on this reciprocal relation – if the ruler treats the people as his children, he would also gain their allegiance (e.g., *Zuozhuan* 15.23a, 20.22b, 30.12b; *Mengzi* 2A:5; *Xunzi* 5.11b, 6.4b, 6.8b, 10.3a, 11.1b). More often, though,

the emphasis is on how the ruler should treat the people as such, a relationship modeled on the relation between Heaven and the ten thousand things.

The *Shijing* describes Heaven as parent (*Shijing* 198/1), and having similarly described Heaven and Earth as parent of the ten thousand things, the *Shangshu* goes on to describe the ruler as parent of the people (*Shangshu* 283), a description found elsewhere in both texts (*Shijing* 172/3, 251/1; *Shangshu* 333). The *Zuozhuan* observes how the ideal ruler nourishes his people like his children, covering them like Heaven and accommodating them like Earth (*yang min ru zi, gai zhi ru tian, rong zhi ru di* 養民如子, 蓋之如天, 容之如地) (*Zuozhuan* 15.23a). The *Mengzi* comments on what it is for the ruler to act as parent of the people (*Mengzi* 1B:7) or to fail to so act (*Mengzi* 1A:4), and the *Liji* (*Liji* 15.11a-11b, 17.6a), including the *Daxue* chapter (*Liji* 19.13a), does likewise. The *Xunzi* elaborates on what practicing this idea involves, such as being moderate in assigning tasks to the people and doing so in accordance with their needs and circumstances, as well as covering and nourishing them (*jian fu zhi, yang zhang zhi* 兼覆之, 養長之) (*Xunzi* 6.9a, cf. 10.11b). It also adds that, as parent of his people, the role of the ruler is not just to look after their livelihood but also to educate and counsel (*jiao hui* 教誨) them (*Xunzi* 13.14a), and this educational role is also highlighted in other texts (e.g., *Liji* 17.6a, *Lüshichunqiu* 18.23a).[1]

This emphasis on the way parents nourish their children continues to be highlighted in Han texts. For example, in the *Shuoyuan* 說苑 of Liu Xiang 劉向 (77-6 B.C.), the idea that the sages treat the people as if they were newborn infants is explained in terms of how they nourish the people – the sages would feed them when they are hungry, give them clothing when they are cold, and nourish them so that they will grow, for fear that they might not attain adulthood (*Shuoyuan* 5.1a). At the same time, some early texts also comment on the parents' sensitivity to the conditions of their children, showing that the parent-children relationship links up with both of

[1] Legalist oriented texts such as the *Hanfeizi* similarly describes the ruler as parent (*Hanfeizi* 11.12b-13a), but adds that, as the love of parents is not sufficient for this educational function, there is need for law and punishment to bring people to order (*Hanfeizi* 19.3a-4a). Interestingly, given this role of the institution of law, the *Guanzi* even describes such institution as parent of the people (*Guanzi* 6.3b).

the two dimensions previously discussed. For example, the *Lüshichunqiu* remarks that parents and children are related like a single body divided into two (*yi ti er liang fen* 一體而兩分). It is for this reason that, even when in separate locations, the two parties break through to and link up with each other (*yi chu er xiang tong* 異處而相通) so that they would come to the aid of each other when in pain and suffering (*tong ji xiang jiu* 痛疾相救), share each other's worries and longings (*you si xiang gan* 憂思相感), as well as take joy or sorrow in each other's life or death (*Lüshichunqiu* 9.17b).

While early texts invoke the parent-children relationship largely in the context of commenting on the way the ruler relates to his people, that relationship is mentioned in a broader context in two ways in the Han Dynasty. First, the relationship between humans in general comes to be viewed on the model of a family. That the ideal ruler relates to the people as parent to children has the corollary that all humans are related as part of one family, a corollary explicitly stated in the *Liji* which observes that the sages view "all under Heaven" as one family (*yi tian xia wei yi jia* 以天下為一家) (*Liji* 7.7a). It also follows that each person should ideally view the ruler as parent and others as blood relatives, a point explicitly stated in the *Qianfulun* 潛夫論 (*Discourses by a Hermit*) of WANG Fu 王符 (1st to 2nd century). According to WANG Fu, the worthy and superior person loves his ruler as if the ruler were his parent, and the people as if they were his children and younger brothers – he would be concerned about dangers that his ruler confronts as he would his own parents, and sorrowful over the miseries of the people as he would his own children and younger brothers (*Qianfulun* 7.7b).

Second, the parent-children relationship also becomes a model for the ideal relation between a local official and people directly under his care. In early texts, there is occasional reference to a high ranking official in the central government as parent to the people. For example, in the *Guanzi*, GUAN Zhong 管仲 (8th to 7th century B.C.), by virtue of his accomplishments, is described as parent of the people (*Guanzi* 8.3b). In Han, two prefecture chiefs of Nanyang 南陽, ZHAO Xinchen 召信臣 (active around 1st century B.C.) and later DU Shi 杜詩 (1st century B.C. to A.D. 38), were honored by the people of Nanyang for their efforts on behalf of the people with, respectively, the titles of Father Zhao (*zhao fu* 召父) (*Qianhanshu* 28b.35b, 89.18b-19a)

and Mother Du (*du mu* 杜母) (*Houhanshu* 106.2a; *Houhanshu Buyi* 14.2a). This subsequently resulted in a common saying among the people of Nanyang that they had Father Zhao who came earlier and then Mother Du who came later (*Houhanshu* 61.4b; *Houhanshu Buyi* 9.11b). Over time, a local official who is close to and cares for the people as if they were his children came to be referred to as an official who performs the role of a parent, or *fu mu guan* 父母官, an expression that was used no later than the beginning of the Song Dynasty and that subsequently became idiomatic. For example, WANG Yucheng 王禹偁 (954-1001) used the expression in a poem in his *Xiaoxuji* 小畜集 (*Xiaoxuji* 11.19b-20a), while WEI Ye 魏野 (960-1019) similarly used the expression in his *Dongguanji* 東觀集 (*Dongguanji* 8.1a-1b).

In addition to giving life to and nourishing their children, as well as being sensitive to their conditions, parents also feel a sense of responsibility and accountability to look after their well-being. They would devote attention, energy and efforts to the betterment of their children, and would feel accountable should their children suffer harm or fail to fully flourish as a result of their negligence. In this way, the parent-children relationship also illustrates the fourth dimension of the idea of one body – a sense of mission and accountability.

2.4 A Sense of Mission and Accountability

This fourth theme is conveyed in early texts through observations about how certain idealized individuals take "all under Heaven" as their concern (*you* 憂) or mission (*ren* 任) in life. In the *Mengzi*, Mencius urges King Xuan of Qi to take contentment in the contentment of the people (*le min zhi le* 樂民之樂) and to be concerned with their concerns (*you min zhi you* 憂民之憂); it is through taking "all under Heaven" as one's contentment and concern (*le yi tian xia, you yi tian xia* 樂以天下, 憂以天下) that one becomes a true king (*Mengzi* 1B:4). The *Lüshichunqiu* characterizes the ideal ruler as one concerned with the benefit of the people (*you min zhi li* 憂民之利) (*Lüshichunqiu* 21.11b), while the *Huainanzi* describes five legendary sages as being concerned about the people (*you min* 憂民) (*Huainanzi* 19.2b). The *Mengzi* likewise presents legends about Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 as well as Yu 禹 and Hou Ji 后稷, commenting on the way in

which these sages are concerned about the people (*you min* 憂民) (*Mengzi* 3A:4). Yu, in his dedication to regulating the waters to prevent flooding, passed by his home on three occasions without entering; his sense of accountability is so deep that he viewed those who drowned through flooding as if he himself had drowned them. Likewise, Hou Ji dedicated himself to teaching agriculture to the people, and viewed those who starved from shortage of food as if he himself had starved them (*Mengzi* 3A:4, 4B:29). In both instances, though acting only as an official, each takes "all under Heaven" as his central mission in life.

The *Mengzi* similarly describes the way YI Yin 伊尹 served in office. He saw his task as one of making his prince like Yao and Shun, so that the people can benefit like subjects of Yao and Shun. Having attained understanding and been awakened himself, he saw his task as one of awakening those not yet with understanding nor awakened. Again, his sense of accountability is so deep that he viewed those not subject to the benefits of the rule of a Yao or Shun as if he himself had pushed them into the gutter. This is how profoundly he takes "all under Heaven" as his mission in life (*zi ren yi tian xia zhi zhong* 自任以天下之重) (*Mengzi* 5A:7, 5B:1). Here, the term *ren* 任 can refer to a task that one has been assigned (*ren ren* 人任) (e.g., *Lunyu* 17.6) or taken up on one's own (*zi ren* 自任). One can be up to the task (*sheng qi ren* 勝其任) or not (e.g., *Mengzi* 1B:9), and the task can be huge (*da ren* 大任) (e.g. *Mengzi* 6B:15) or heavy (*ren zhong* 任重) (e.g., *Lunyu* 8.7) as opposed to light (*zi ren zhe qing* 自任者輕) (*Mengzi* 7B:32). It is so heavy in the case of YI Yin that, like Yu and Hou Ji, he saw himself as being accountable for any instance in which his accomplishment failed to reach anyone. These three individuals all demonstrated a deep sense of mission in that they were fully dedicated to benefitting the human community in certain specific ways, and a sense of accountability should the benefit fail to reach broadly.

While these examples involve appointed officials, this sense of mission and accountability can extend to those not in office. In response to the criticism that he is fond of disputation, Mencius cites the examples of Yu's efforts to regulate the waters and the Duke of Zhou's efforts to assist King Wu in overthrowing the late Shang king and driving away the wild beasts that are devouring the people. According to him, Confucius noted the decline of the Way and the

profound disorder of his times, to the point of officials and sons murdering their rulers and fathers, and so composed the *Chunqiu* 春秋 (*Spring and Autumn Annals*) to set straight these disorderly individuals. Mencius sees himself as similarly driven. The teachings of MO Di 墨翟 (5th century B.C.) and YANG Zhu 楊朱 (5th to 4th century B.C.) are, in his own times, undermining the family and state and bringing disastrous consequences comparable to wild beasts devouring humans. His own disputations serve to correct this situation and are continuous with the efforts of these three former sages. Thus, from Mencius' perspective, he himself is also driven by a deep sense of mission and accountability in his own specific ways (*Mengzi* 3B:9).

Such a sense of mission and accountability continues to be portrayed vividly in Han texts. LIU Xiang comments on how the humane person, being moved by a painful and sorrowful state from within (*ce yin yu zhong* 惻隱於中), governs as if he were desperately trying to save those who are drowning, being unable to bear (*bu ren qi ran* 不忍其然) the strong bullying the weak, the many doing violence to the few, the young being orphaned, as well as other miserable states of existence (*Shuoyuan* 5.1b). The reference to the rescue of those drowning echoes Yu's sense of mission, which is linked here to a sensitivity to the conditions of others that is conveyed through the terms *ce yin* 惻隱 and *bu ren* 不忍. WANG Fu describes the worthy and superior person as having a deep concern for the people (*you min* 憂民) (*Qianfulun* 7.8a); this point is related to his other observation, noted earlier, that such a person loves and is concerned about the people as if they were his children and younger brothers. These examples show how the fourth dimension of the idea of one body is connected with the other three in that it has to do with a sense of mission to nourish others and a sensitivity to their conditions that is coupled with a sense of accountability, these being modeled on the way one relates to members of one's own family.

In the Tang Dynasty, the "scholar", or *shi* 士, which includes scholar-officials and aspiring scholar-officials, are again portrayed in similar terms. LI Ao 李翺 (772-841) observes how the "scholar" who seriously dedicates himself to learning about antiquity and to understanding the Way would share the concerns and contentment of the common people and would not venture to restrict the scope of his heart/mind to himself (*gu yu fu tian xia bai xing tong you le, er bu gan du si qi xin ye* 固與夫天下百姓同憂樂, 而不敢獨私其心也), adding that this is something that he

LI Ao devotes himself to without lapse (*Liwengongji* 8.8a-8b). Similarly, HAN Yu 韓愈 (768-824) describes the "scholar" as having a heart/mind that is deeply concerned about "all under Heaven" (*you tian xia zhi xin* 憂天下之心), so that although he might withdraw himself into the mountains and forests when unable to be effective in government, he could not be contented with this, again adding that he HAN Yu shares such aspirations (*Wubaijiazhu Changliwenji* 16.11a-11b, *Dongyatang Changlijizhu* 16.10b-11a). Thus, by the Tang Dynasty, all scholar-officials and aspiring scholar officials are supposed to share the deep sense of mission and accountability depicted in early texts through the works of the legendary sages.

In early Song, this sense of mission and accountability is given memorable expression by FAN Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989-1052) in his short essay *Memorial to Yueyang Tower* (*Yueyanglou Ji* 岳陽樓記). Here, he comments that the humane people of ancient times have such a heart/mind that – put in a well-known saying of his – their concerns and worries come before the concerns and worries of the world, while their delights and contentment come after the delights and contentment of the world (*xian tian xia zhi you er you, hou tian xia zhi le er le* 先天下之憂而憂, 後天下之樂而樂). When these individuals reside in high office, they are concerned and worried about the common people, and when they reside in seclusion far away from court, they are concerned and worried about the ruler. They have such a deep sense of concern whether in office or in withdrawal, and they feel delight and contentment only when "all under Heaven" are in delight and contentment. This is a depiction of Fan's own sentiments, and he ends the essay with the rhetorical question about whom, in the absence of these humane individuals of ancient times, he could have as his companion (*Fanwenzhengji* 7.4b-5b).

Fan's sentiments are reflected in his actual life, and his well-known saying has inspired generations of youths up to modern times. The sentiments are also reflected in his comments on other officials whom he describes as taking "all under Heaven" as their deep concern (*yi tian xia wei you* 以天下為憂) (e.g., *Fanwenzhengji* 12.22b), and in his idealizing officials who have a heart/mind that is deeply concerned about "all under Heaven" (*you tian xia zhi xin* 憂天下之心) (*Fanwenzhengji* 5.19b, 7.3a, 8.31b), noting that HAN Yu also describes himself in such terms (*Fanwenzhengji* 8.27b). He himself is often commended, in biographies of and memorials to

him, as an individual particularly outstanding in his broad and far-reaching aspirations. Citing his well-known saying, his biography also describes him as someone who takes "all under Heaven" as his mission in life (*yi tian xia wei ji ren* 以天下為己任) and who sets his heart/mind on working for "all under Heaven" (*you zhi yu tian xia* 有志於天下) without being affected in the slightest way by the external conditions of his life (*Fanwenzhengji Bupian* 2.22a-23a). Various commentators describe him in a similar fashion (e.g., *Fanwenzhengji Bupian* 3.27a, 5.2a; *Fanwenzhengzouyi Tiyao* 2a), with one memorial noting that he already regarded "all under Heaven" as his mission in life when just starting to embark on his official career (*zuo xiu cai shi ji yi tian xia wei ji ren* 做秀才時即以天下為己任) (*Fanwenzhengji Bupian* 5.2a-2b; cf. 4.9b), a point also noted by Zhu Xi (*Zhuzi Yulei* 3088).

2.5 The Idea of One Body

So far, we have only mentioned one occasion on which the idea of one body occurs in early texts – the description in the *Lüshichunqiu* of the relation between parents and children as being like a single body divided into two (*yi ti er liang fen* 一體而兩分), with emphasis on the sensitivity of one party to the conditions of the other. It is not difficult to see how the idea of forming one body with all things brings together the first two of the four dimensions mentioned earlier. The different parts of one's body should ideally be connected in such a way that one is sensitive to the conditions of every part of the body, and the life giving and nourishing force within the body should ideally also reach every part. As we will see in Section 3.2, this is the way CHENG Hao and CHENG Yi present the idea of one body, something that ZHU Xi takes up. But the idea is not yet invoked in this manner in early texts. It is not used to describe the relation between humans generally, nor – except for the one instance in *Lüshichunqiu* – to emphasize the two dimensions just mentioned. Instead, it is invoked mostly to describe the relation between those above and those below in the governmental hierarchy, emphasizing how, under ideal conditions, the two parties would act and respond as a unified whole. For example, the *Liji* describes how, ideally, the people would take the ruler as their heart/mind and the ruler would take the people as his body (*min yi jun wei xin, jun yi min wei ti* 民以君為心, 君以民為體) so that the condition of one party affects that of the other (*Liji* 17.16a). The *Xunzi* describes how, without his exerting effort,

all under Heaven would follow the ideal ruler as if they formed one body with him (*tian xia cong zhi ru yi ti* 天下從之如一體) (*Xunzi* 8.5a). The *Guanzi* refers to the method of governing characterized by one body (*yi ti zhi zhi* 一體之治) as one in which everything acts as a unified whole (*Guanzi* 2.6b-7a), with those above and those below performing their respective roles (*Guanzi* 10.14a); the ancient kings were good at forming one body with the people (*xian wang shan yu min wei yi ti* 先王善與民為一體) in that they are good at employing officials in accordance with their abilities (*Guanzi* 10.18a). Extending a similar observation beyond the ruler, the *Huainanzi* comments on how a general takes the people as his body and the people take the general as their heart/mind (*jiang yi min wei ti, min yi jiang wei xin* 將以民為體, 民以將為心), emphasizing how, in ideal conditions, those below would follow the general's commands without question (*Huainanzi* 15.8a-8b).

In the Han Dynasty, the idea continues to be used to describe how those above should relate to those below. Some thinkers continue to emphasize the point that the two parties should ideally function as a unified whole. For example, DONG Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179-104 B.C.), in his *Chunqiufanlu* 春秋繁露 (*Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals*), makes this point while at the same time emphasizing the educational role of the ruler. The ruler is the heart/mind of the people, and the people is his body (*jun zhe, min zhi xin ye, min zhe, jun zhi ti ye* 君者, 民之心也, 民者, 君之體也), and what the heart/mind likes the body will follow and take comfort in, which is why the educational role of the ruler can transform the people (*Chunqiufanlu* 11.2a). Ideally, the ruler and his officials should function as a unified whole with the former in command (*Chunqiufanlu* 17.2a-3a). Others invoke the idea to emphasize the ruler's sensitivity to the condition of the people. LIU Xiang notes (through the mouth of a fictionalized Mozi) how the people treat their ruler as their heart/mind, accounting for the ruler's transformative effect on the people (*Shuoyuan* 20.2b). This is why the legendary sage Yao was pained and moved to tears when he came across someone convicted of a crime – the crime shows that the people have taken their own heart/minds, rather than Yao's, as their heart/minds, showing a failure on the part of Yao. And this is why, citing (with modification) a line from the *Tang Gao* 湯誥 chapter of the *Shangshu*, the fault always resides with the ruler whenever a crime is committed within his realm (*Shuoyuan* 1.3b; *Shangshu* 189). XUN Yue 荀悅 (148-209), in his *Shenjian* 申鑑 (*Using History*

as a Mirror), notes that “all under Heaven” form one body (*tian xia guo jia yi ti ye* 天下國家一體也), which is why those above would not have delight should there be people below with worries, and would be unable to take comfort in food and clothing should there be people below who are starving or suffering from the cold (*Shenjian* 1.4b).

Although the idea of one body is up to the Han Dynasty invoked mostly to describe the relation between those above and those below, one important element of the idea is already highlighted, namely, that which forms one body with others relates to them as heart/mind to the physical body. This element is retained in ZHU Xi’s use of the idea of one body to describe the ideal relation of each human to other humans and things – the heart/mind of each human should ideally also be the “heart/mind of Heaven and Earth” (*tian di zhi xin* 天地之心), an expression that, as we saw, derives from the *Yijing* and the *Liji*. Before his times, LI Ao, as we saw, also describes how the “scholar” should not restrict the scope of his heart/mind to himself and should share the concerns and contentment of the common people. FAN Zhongyan similarly highlights such an all-encompassing heart/mind in his *Poetic Essay on Taking the Heart/Mind that Encompasses All Under Heaven as One’s Heart/Mind* (*Yong Tian Xia Xin Wei Xin Fu* 用天下心為心賦). He urges the ruler to examine the people’s likes and dislikes as well as the correctness or incorrectness of governmental policies, and to exert efforts to eliminate miseries and prevent disasters. One should subordinate oneself to others rather than have others follow one’s own desires, and should use the heart/mind of the multitude as one’s heart/mind (*yi zhong xin wei xin* 以衆心為心); it is through “emptying oneself” in this way that one follows the Way (*xu ji zhi wei dao* 虛己之謂道) (*Fanwenzhengji* 20.12a-13b).

In his *Poetic Essay on the Ruler’s Regarding the People as His Body* (*Jun Yi Min Wei Ti Fu* 君以民為體賦), Fan also urges the ruler to treat the people as his body, nurturing them as if they were his children, thereby bringing the ten thousand things together in his one body (*qi wan wu yu yi ti* 齊萬物於一體) (*Fanwenzhengji Bieji* 2.2a-3b). Elsewhere, he also makes the point that “all under Heaven” forms one body (*tian xia yi ti* 天下一體) in the context of emphasizing how the people would benefit from good governmental policies and suffer under bad policies (*Fanwenzhengzhouyi* 1.25b). Though Fan’s own focus is on the ruler in these comments, a later

memorial describes Fan himself in similar terms, noting how his taking "all under Heaven" as his mission in life shows that he has "all under Heaven" as his heart/mind (*yi tian xia wei xin* 以天下為心) (*Fanwenzhengji Bupian* 4.9b-10a). These comments of Fan relate the idea of one body to an all-encompassing heart/mind as well as to the three dimensions that spell out the content of the idea of one body – sensitivity to the conditions of others, life giving and nourishing, and a sense of mission and accountability. His reference to "emptying oneself" and to using the heart/mind of the multitude as one's heart/mind also hints at the idea of no self, which we will take up in Section 3.4.

3 ZHU Xi: One Body and No Self

3.1 ZHU Xi and the Idea of One Body

Zhu takes up the four themes presented in Section 2 and extends them to the relationship between each human and all other humans and things. Drawing on ideas from ZHANG Zai and the Cheng brothers, he integrates these four themes in the idea of one body, and adds a fifth theme related to the idea of no self. For him, extending the kind of responses to harm to others highlighted by Mencius leads to one's being sensitive to the conditions of all humans and things in an intimate fashion, comparable to the way one's heart/mind is sensitive to the conditions of one's physical body, an idea highlighted by CHENG Hao. And one's heart/mind should bear a life giving and nourishing relation to all humans and things, and in that sense shares in the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth. This feature of the heart/mind he compares to the life giving force in the seeds of grains, taking this idea from CHENG Yi. In this sense, the scope of one's heart/mind should ideally embrace all humans and things, with nothing external to it. This idea he draws from ZHANG Zai who, in elaborating on the idea, also emphasizes the deep sense of mission and accountability that such a heart/mind bears. In addition, Zhang highlights the idea that one ideally relates to the human community in the way one relates to one's family, an idea that Zhu also takes up. For Zhu, one body is an ideal state of the heart/mind in which one relates to other humans as one would to members of one's own family, making efforts to nourish them and being sensitive to their conditions, in a way that engages one's dedicated attention and efforts as well as one's sense of responsibility and accountability. One still retains a sense of the

ordinary distinction between oneself and others, and there is still a differentiation in the way one responds to their conditions or devotes efforts to working on their behalf, depending on the different relations one stands to them. But beyond this ordinary distinction between oneself and others and this differential response due to different relations, one does not see oneself as distinct from others in any significant way. This is the idea of no self, which the other three early Song Confucians already highlight and which Zhu regards as fundamental to the state of one body.

Since Zhu's views draw heavily on these early Song Confucians, we will present their respective ideas on each of these themes before presenting Zhu's own views. The main source of ZHANG Zai's ideas is the *Zhangziquanshu* 張子全書 (*Complete Works of Zhang Zai*). As for the Cheng brothers, when consulting the *Erchengquanshu* 二程全書 (*Complete Works of the Cheng Brothers*), I will distinguish between ideas that can be attributed to each individually and those that cannot. Attributions to CHENG Hao are given by his names or title, as Mingdao 明道, Bochun 伯淳, Ming 明 or Zongcheng 宗承, and to CHENG Yi as Yichuan 伊川, Zhengshu 正叔, Zheng 正 or Shijiang 侍講. Of the works included in the *Erchengquanshu*, chapters 1-5 of *Erchengwenji* 二程文集 (*Essays of the Cheng Brothers*) and chapters 11-14 of *Erchengyishu* 二程遺書 (*Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers*) can be attributed to CHENG Hao, while chapters 6-13 of *Erchengwenji*, chapters 15-25 of *Erchengyishu*, and the *Yichuanyizhuan* 伊川易傳 (*CHENG Yi's Commentary on the Book of Change*) can be attributed to CHENG Yi. Some sayings in chapters 1-10 of the *Erchengyishu* are specifically attributed to CHENG Hao (as *Ming* 明 or *Zongcheng* 宗承) or CHENG Yi (as *Zheng* 正 or *Shijiang* 侍講), while parts of *Chengshijingshuo* 程氏經說 (*The Cheng Brothers' Explication of the Classics*) can also be individually attributed, such as the two versions of the *Daxue* attributed to each separately, or the discourse on the *Yizhuan* 易傳 likely attributable to CHENG Yi. The remaining parts of the *Erchengyishu* and *Chengshijingshuo*, as well as two other works *Erchengwaishu* 二程外書 (*Other Works of the Cheng Brothers*) and *Erchengcuiyan* 二程粹言 (*Refined Sayings of the Cheng Brothers*), cannot be individually attributed, and there might be occasional inclusion of ZHANG Zai's sayings by a student of Zhang's who is involved in the editorial work. I will mention ideas that cannot be individually attributed only when they bear affinity to ideas that can be so attributed (Cf. Graham 1992: Appendix 1).

As for ZHU Xi, I will confine attention to his mature thinking, namely, ideas that he endorses in roughly the last twenty years of his life. I will use primarily his *Lunyu Jizhu* 論語集注 (*Commentary on the Analects*), *Mengzi Jizhu* 孟子集注 (*Commentary on the Mencius*), *Lunyu Huowen* 論語或問 (*Questions and Answers on the Analects*), and *Mengzi Huowen* 孟子或問 (*Questions and Answers on the Mencius*), supplemented by ideas from the *Zhuzi Yulei* 朱子語類 (*Sayings and Conversations of ZHU Xi Topically Arranged*) that are not in conflict with the former works. The works on the *Lunyu* and *Mengzi* were composed at age 48, and Zhu continues to affirm these works in late life, reissuing the commentaries on the Four Books at age 61.[2] So, ideas in these works may be regarded as representing his mature thinking. As for the *Zhuzi Yulei*, its content likely spans the last 30 years of his life, with the main body datable to the final 20 years, and a significant portion datable to the final 10 years (see Deng 1986: 8-10). Given its rather mixed nature, I will use the *Zhuzi Yulei* only as a supplementary source, drawing on ideas that do not conflict with, while elaborating on, ideas in his works on the *Lunyu* and the *Mengzi*. In addition, two of Zhu's other commentaries, *Ximing Jieyi* 西銘解義 (*Commentary on ZHANG Zai's Western Inscription*) composed at age 43 and *Taijitushuojie* 太極圖說解 (*Commentary on ZHOU Dunyi's Explication of the Meaning of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*) composed at age 44, are used by him in teaching at age 59 and so continue to represent his mature thinking (see Qian 1982: v5, 411-420; Chan 1990: 305-310). I will have little occasion to use the *Taijitushuojie*, but will draw heavily on the *Ximing Jieyi*. By contrast, I will not draw on his *Zhouyi Benyi* 周易本義, which was composed at age 48 but was repudiated by him in late life (see Deng 1986: 14-15), nor his *Renshuo* 仁說 (*A Discourse on Humaneness*), which is likely to be a much earlier work, composed no later than at age 42 (see Chan 1982: 40-42).

3.2 ZHU Xi and the Cheng Brothers: Sensitivity and Life Giving

Both of the Cheng brothers explicitly mention the idea of one body, emphasizing respectively the humane person's sensitivity to the conditions of others and her giving life to and nourishing others. CHENG Hao comments that humaneness involves a sensitivity to the conditions of all

[2] I follow the dating of these texts in Qian 1982: v5, 411-420 and Chan 1990: 305-310; see also Chan 1988: 62-79. Both Qian and Chan draw heavily on Wang Maohong's *Zhuzi Nianpu* 朱子年譜 (*A Chronological Record of the Life of ZHU Xi*). See also Deng 1986: 11-12.

things in the way one is sensitive to the conditions of all parts of one's own body. In this sense, the humane person and all things form the same body (*ren zhe hun ran yu wu tong ti* 仁者渾然與物同體), which he takes to be the point of Mencius' observations that the ten thousand things are already in oneself (*Mengzi* 7A:4) and of ZHANG Zai's *Ximing* 西銘 (*Western Inscription*), also referred to as *Dingwan* 訂頑 (*Erchengyishu* 2a.6b-7a, SBBY 2a.3a-3b). Alternatively put, the humane person has the same body as Heaven and Earth (*yu tian di tong ti* 與天地同體) (*Erchengyishu* 11.22b, SBBY 11.11b), and views all things as one body so that there is nothing that is not part of oneself (*ren zhe yi tian di wan wu wei yi ti, mo fei ji ye* 仁者以天地萬物為一體, 莫非己也) (*Erchengyishu* 2a.4a-4b, SBBY 2a.2a-2b), this last remark being repeated elsewhere in the collected works as an unattributed saying (*Erchengcuiyan* 1.16a, SBBY 1.7b-8a).

This sensitivity CHENG Hao illustrates with the use of the term *bu ren* 不仁 in the medical context (*Erchengyishu* 11.5a-5b, SBBY 11.3a). Just as the term is used in medical texts to describe numbness in the four limbs, to be not humane, or *bu ren*, is to be indifferent to the conditions of things as if they did not concern oneself (*Erchengyishu* 2a.4a-4b, SBBY 2a.2a-2b), and similar ideas are found in a number of unattributed sayings (e.g., *Erchengyishu* 2a.33a, SBBY 2a.15b; *Erchengwaishu* 3.2a, SBBY 3.1a-1b). On one occasion, the point is put by saying that the humane person has Heaven and Earth as her body and the ten thousand things as different parts of her body and, again citing the medical analogy, to be not humane is to be able to bear (others' suffering) and to be lacking in kindness (*ren xin wu en* 忍心無恩) (*Erchengyishu* 4.9b-10a, SBBY 4.5a).

CHENG Yi, by contrast, emphasizes the idea of giving life to and nourishing things. He compares the heart/mind to the seeds of grains (*xin pi ru gu zhong* 心譬如穀種) and humaneness to the heart/mind's tendency to give life (*sheng zhi xing bian shi ren* 生之性便是仁) (*Erchengyishu* 18.3b-4a, SBBY 18.2a), the point being that the fundamental function of humaneness is *sheng* 生, to give life and nourish. The same point is found in several unattributed sayings (e.g., *Erchengcuiyan* 1.8b, SBBY 1.4b), some making the point that the way of Heaven is to give life and nourish (*Erchengcuiyan* 1.10a, SBBY 1.5a) or that Heaven and Earth has as its heart/mind

giving life to and nourishing things (*Erchengwaishu* 3.1b, SBBY 3.1a). Since the function of Heaven and Earth is also one's function and the body of the ten thousand things one's body (*Erchengcuiyan* 1.22b, SBBY 1.10b-11a), the humane person also serves to give life to and nourish all things. In another context, the idea that the ten thousand things form one body (*wan wu yi ti* 萬物一體) is explicitly linked to the idea of *shen sheng* 生生 (continuously giving life and nourishing) from the *Yijing* (*Erchengyishu* 2a.33a-33b, SBBY 2a.15b).

ZHU Xi similarly invokes the idea of one body to describe one's sensitivity to others' conditions and one's giving life to and nourishing them, explicitly relating these two aspects of humaneness. Commenting on *Lunyu* 6.30, he cites with approval CHENG Hao's medical analogy and his observation that lack of humaneness can be compared to numbness in one's limbs, explaining the idea of one body in such terms (*Lunyu Jizhu* 3.18a; cf. *Ercheng Yishu* 2a.4a-4b, SBBY 2a.2a-2b). As we saw in Section 2.1, he explains *ce yin* 惻隱 in *Mengzi* 2A:6 by saying that *ce* is a matter of being deeply hurt and *yin* a matter of deep pain (*Mengzi Jizhu* 2.13b), and also explains *yin* in *Mengzi* 1A:7 in terms of pain (*Mengzi Jizhu* 1.9b). In light of Mencius' shift from speaking of *bu ren* 不忍 to speaking of *ce yin* 惻隱 (and *yin* 隱) in *Mengzi* 2A:6 (and 1A:7), he takes the two expressions to refer to the same state of the heart/mind (*Mengzi Jizhu* 2.13b; *Mengzi Huowen* 28.12b; *Mengzi Jizhu* 1.9a). And taking up Mencius' point about extending such responses to all humans and animals, he further broadens their scope to all things, animate or inanimate. The heart/mind should ideally respond with *ce yin* to any situation that is problematic in anyway (*bu wen chu* 不穩處), that is, any situation in which anything is adversely affected, just as one would feel pain whenever one's body is pricked by a needle. One should so respond to not just prospective harm to infants, but also harm to ants or even damage to window lattice (*Zhuzi Yulei* 1283-84; cf. 1297-98).

While commenting on the *Mengzi*, Zhu draws a connection between this sensitivity of the heart/mind and its giving life to and nourishing things. All humans have the heart/mind of being unable to bear harm to others because they have received as their heart/mind the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth which functions to give life to and nourish things (*tian di sheng wu zhi xin* 天地生物之心) (*Mengzi Jizhu* 2.13a; *Zhuzi Yulei* 1280-1281; *Mengzi Huowen* 26.8a-8b). And commenting on King Xuan's response to the ox, he adds that, while one should ideally have such

a sensitivity to the conditions of all things, there should also be a differentiation in one's response depending on the object. It is because there is such a differentiation that, while sensitive to their conditions, it would be appropriate to use animals for food or for performing rituals, though one should not use animals wastefully or cause pain unnecessarily (*Mengzi Huowen* 26.9a-11a).

In his comments on the Cheng brothers, Zhu again connects the heart/mind's sensitivity and its life giving force, saying that the heart/mind of *ce yin* is the Way of giving life (*ce yin zhi xin, ren zhi sheng dao ye* 惻隱之心, 人之生道也), citing CHENG Yi's remark that the heart/mind is the Way of giving life (*xin sheng dao ye* 心生道也) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2440). He also illustrates the sensitivity of the heart/mind with CHENG Yi's example of the seeds of grains. Responses of *ce yin* are offshoots of the life giving force of humaneness just as sprouts are offshoots of the life giving force of seeds of grains (*Zhuzi Yulei* 1380-1381). Thus, for Zhu, the idea that humaneness has to do with one's forming the same body with Heaven and Earth and the ten thousand things is a matter of this life giving force of humaneness as well as its sensitivity (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2810). In this way, his views on the idea of one body combines both CHENG Hao's comparison of the lack of humaneness to the numbness of limbs and CHENG Yi's comparison of humaneness to the life giving force of the seeds of grains.

Zhu embeds these ideas in the framework of *li* 理 (pattern) and *qi* 氣 (material force). It is because *li* 理 runs through all things that the life giving force of the heart/mind extends to all things. To fail to be sensitive to the adverse conditions of and to fail to extend one's kindness to others (*ren xin wu en* 忍心無恩) is to be self-centered (*si* 私) in a way that separates oneself from other things (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2424- 2425). He also ascribes the differences between different kinds of things to differences in their endowment of *qi* 氣. These differences explain why we should have differential responses to different kinds of things, a point conveyed by saying that although *li* 理 is one (*yi* 一) in all things, its instantiations in things are differentiated (*shu* 殊) (*Mengzi Huowen* 26.9a-11a). In addition, he regards humaneness as a matter of grasping this one and at the same time differentiated *li* 理, and this leads him to occasionally distinguish between humaneness and the state of one body. For example, in response to a question about XIE Liangzuo 謝良佐 (or XIE Shangcai 謝上蔡) (1050-1103), who uses the notion of awareness (*jue*

覺) to explain humaneness, Zhu maintains that awareness is not the same as humaneness (*Zhuzi Yulei* 118). This difference he explains in two ways, that awareness has connotations that are closer to the attribute wisdom (*zhi* 智) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 118-119) rather than humaneness, and that when we talk about awareness, the focus is more on being aware of and sensitive to the conditions of things, unlike humaneness which also involves the grasp of *li* 理 (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2562). As a result, he is led on a few occasions to maintain some difference between humaneness and the idea of forming one body with things (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2484), taking the latter to focus primarily on awareness, namely the sensitivity to the conditions of all things, and hence on the "scope" of humaneness (*ren zhi liang* 仁之量) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 118). More typically, though, he would speak interchangeably of the two as the same state. This is probably a result of his often viewing *ti* 體 as itself also involving a grasp of *li* 理 – a point we will elaborate on in the next section – so that to form one body with things is also a matter of grasping the *li* 理 in things.

3.3 ZHU Xi and ZHANG Zai: Family Relationships and Sense of Mission

Just like FAN Zhongyan's well-known saying, ZHANG Zai, who was advised by Fan in his youth, is widely known for his "four sentence maxim" (*Heng Qu Si Ju* 橫渠四句), which again reflects the broad and far-reaching aspirations that all scholar-officials and aspiring scholar-officials are supposed to share. It urges them to "establish their heart/mind on behalf of Heaven and Earth, establish their purpose in life on behalf of the living multitude, transmit the teachings of the past sages, and work for harmony and peace for the next ten thousand generations (*wei tian di li xin, wei sheng min li ming, wei wang sheng ji jue xue, wei wan shi kai tai ping* 為天地立心, 為生民立命, 為往聖繼絶學, 為萬世開太平) (*Zhangziquanshu* 14.6b; SBBY 14.3b). Such aspirations are reflected in his *Ximing* 西銘, extracted from a chapter in his *Zhengmeng* 正蒙 (*Awakening the Dim and Obscure*), which also contains his well-known saying that "all people are siblings of mine, and all things are fundamentally connected to me" (*min wu tong bao, wu wu yu ye* 民吾同胞 物吾与也). Echoing an idea we noted earlier in connection with WANG Fu, it describes the ruler as one's parent and all people as one's brothers (*Zhangziquanshu* 1.5a-6b, SBBY 1.3a-3b), thus presenting the human community as one family.

In the *Zhengmeng*, Zhang describes how the ten thousand things are fundamentally one thing (*wan wu sui duo, qi shi yi wu* 萬物雖多, 其實一物), and how Heaven is large with nothing external to it (*tian da wu wai* 天大無外) (*Zhangziquanshu* 2.9b-10a; SBBY 2.5a-5b). Just as Heaven embodies all things without omission, humaneness embodies all affairs and encompasses them all within its reach (*tian ti wu bu yi, you ren ti shi wu bu zai ye* 天體物不遺, 猶仁體事無不在也) (*Zhangziquanshu* 2.22b, SBBY 2.11b). What one needs to do is to enlarge one's heart/mind so as to embody all things (*da qi xin ze neng ti tian xia zhi wu* 大其心則能體天下之物), and the sage views all things as part of oneself. As long as there is one thing that is not embodied, there is still something external to one's heart/mind (*wu you wei ti, ze xin wei you wai* 物有未體, 則心為有外), and such a heart/mind will not accord with the heart/mind of Heaven (*Zhangziquanshu* 2.40b-41a, SBBY 2.21a). That is, all humans should aspire to this state of a "great person" (*da ren* 大人) in which one's heart/mind encompasses all things; such far reaching aspirations (*zhi da* 志大) will deepen our talents and make our accomplishments momentous (*Zhangziquanshu* 3.4b, SBBY 3.2b). And in the *Hengquyishuo* 横渠易說 (*ZHANG Zai's Explication of the Book of Change*), Zhang describes this all-encompassing heart/mind as the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth (*tian di zhi xin* 天地之心) whose fundamental task is to give life to and nourish things (*sheng wu* 生物) (*Zhangziquanshu* 9.55a-55b, SBBY 9.29b-30a). This is the task of the "great person", which involves forming one body with Heaven and Earth (*yu tian di yi ti* 與天地一體), and this ideal state of the heart/mind is compared to the heart/mind of Yu, which takes "all under Heaven" as its mission (*Zhangziquanshu* 9.12a-12b, SBBY 9.6a-6b).

From this summary, we see that the teachings of Zhang bring together three themes – giving life and nourishing, viewing the human community as one family, and a deep sense of mission and accountability – with particular emphasis on the last two. The sense of mission and accountability is particularly highlighted in his "four sentence maxim" and throughout his works, and also in his views about enlarging one's heart/mind to encompass all things. ZHU Xi draws on all these ideas and, in the context of commenting on Zhang's *Ximing*, also elaborates on the idea that *li* 理 is one and at the same time differentiated.

YANG Shi 楊時 (or YANG Guishan 楊龜山) (1053-1135) at one point questions whether Zhang's *Ximing* is advocating the Moist idea of indiscriminate concern for all (*jian ai* 兼愛), and CHENG Yi responds that the *Ximing* actually teaches the idea that *li* 理 is one and at the same time differentiated (*li yi fen shu* 理一分殊). ZHU Xi endorses CHENG Yi's view and comments further on Zhang's ideas. According to him, the oneness of *li* has to do with the observation that all things come from Heaven and Earth as if Heaven and Earth is the parent of all things. All humans, being of the same kind and sharing a heart/mind of sharp intelligence, are like my siblings (*min wu tong bao* 民吾同胞), and so all under Heaven are part of one family and the whole kingdom is like one single person (*tian xia wei yi jia, zhong guo wei yi ren* 天下為一家, 中國為一人). At the same time, although other things are not of the same kind as myself, they all come from Heaven and Earth, the same source as myself, and so are fundamentally connected to me (*wu wu yu ye* 物吾與也) and are things that I should nurture. Still, although all things are connected, there is a differentiation among things (*yi tong er wan shu* 一統而萬殊), some closer to and some more distant from me, and so there should be a differentiation in the way one interacts with things (*Zhangzi Quanshu* 1.1b-2a, SBBY 1.1a-1b; 1.5a-5b, SBBY 1.3a; 1.13a-13b, SBBY 1.7a). This point Zhu takes to be implicit in the observation in *Mengzi* 7A:45 about the different attitudes one takes toward parents, the people in general, and animals (*Mengzi Jizhu* 7.16b; *Zhuzi Yulei* 2520). This idea of differentiation in the midst of unity is captured by the saying that *li* 理 is one and at the same time differentiated, which Zhu takes to be the underlying thesis of ZHANG Zai's *Ximing* (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2524-2525, 2527).

In the context of these comments, Zhu at times explains the idea of forming one body with things in terms of one's personally grasping the *li* in things. We noted earlier Zhang's view that one should enlarge one's heart/mind to embody (*ti* 體) all things, and that as long as there is one thing not so embodied, there is still something external to one's heart/mind. While commenting that Zhang's presentation is at times too abstract and can be misinterpreted (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2517-2519), Zhu proposes that the term *ti* 體 here should be understood in terms of situating one's heart/mind in things to grasp their *li* 理 (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2518), agreeing with a suggestion put to him that this is a matter of entering into things and affairs to personally experience (*ti ren* 體認) them (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2518). This way of understanding *ti* is related to Zhu's interpretation of the idea of

qiong li 窮理 in terms of grasping and exhausting *li* as it resides in things. But since truly grasping the *li* in things and affairs would involve one's responding properly to them, this interpretation of *ti* also implies that to truly *ti* a thing involves being sensitive to its conditions as well as giving life to and nourishing it. Thus, this interpretation of what it is to form one body with things is consistent with that presented in the previous section.

Zhu relates the idea of one body to a sense of mission in his comments on Zhang's idea that "I have as my body what fills Heaven and Earth, and as my nature what commands Heaven and Earth" (*tian di zhi sai wu qi ti, tian di zhi shuai wu qi xing* 天地之塞吾其體, 天地之帥吾其性). According to Zhu, what fills Heaven and Earth is *qi* 氣 – *Mengzi* 2A:2 also refers to the flood-like *qi* as what fills (*sai* 塞) Heaven and Earth – and Zhang's point is that the *qi* that fills Heaven and Earth is part of my body. What commands (*shuai* 帥) Heaven and Earth is its master (*zhu zai* 主宰), which is the *li* 理 of Heaven and Earth and also the *li* 理 that I have as my nature. Thus, on Zhu's view, Zhang's statement has the implication that I take as my responsibility all that fills Heaven and Earth (*you wo qu cheng dang zhi yi* 有我去承當之意) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2520). In his commentary on the *Mengzi*, Zhu also takes note of this deep sense of mission as exemplified in the legendary figures Yao, Shun, Yu and Hou Ji (*Mengzi Jizhu* 3.10a-12a, 4.27a-27b), and in Confucius' and Mencius' efforts to combat the corrupt teachings prevalent in their respective times, teachings whose corrupting effects on the human heart/mind are no less disastrous than the devastating effects of floods and rampant wild beasts on the general population (*Mengzi Jizhu* 3.26a-27b, *Mengzi Huowen* 31.3a-3b). In connection with the latter, he adds that similar efforts are needed in his own times to combat Buddhist and Daoist teachings, which have equally disastrous consequence, citing concrete examples from the Jin and the Southern and Northern dynasties to illustrate his point (*Zhuzi Yulei* 1320-1321).

Thus, while Zhu's comments on ZHANG Zai sometimes highlight the point that one forms one body with all things in the sense of grasping the *li* 理 in them, he also views this as grounding the four different dimensions of the idea of one body that we have highlighted. Another point of note in his comments on ZHANG Zai is that he emphasizes that the state of one body should not be understood as involving some reflective position that one adopts and that grounds its different dimensions. When any part of my body is touched, I immediately have the feeling, be it itch or

pain, without this being dependent on reflection and direction from my heart/mind. Similarly, I should feel what happens to things without being dependent on reflection and direction from my heart/mind (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2511). Or, thinking in terms of love, we love all things because they form one body with us – the love flows naturally from the fact that they form one body with us, and is not derived from our reflecting on this fact. That is, the fact that they form one body with us describes a state we are in, and our being in that state need not involve our reflecting on how that state came about, such as reflections about how humans and things all owe their existence to Heaven and Earth and are endowed with a common *li* 理. For this reason, it is misleading to say that we should love all things *because* humans and the ten thousand things all receive the same endowment of *li* and *qi* (*Zhuzi Yulei* 852). Thus, while ZHU Xi himself offers a certain reflective account of the basis for this state of one body, he is also emphatic that having some such reflective account is not itself part of what is involved in being in that state.

3.4 The Idea of No Self

For Zhu, what is fundamental to this state of one body is the state of no self (*wu wo* 無我), and this latter idea can also be traced to early Chinese thought. It is implicit in the *Zhuangzi* 莊子, which speaks of "losing oneself" (*sang wo* 喪我) (*Zhuangzi* 1.10a), forgetting oneself (*wang ji* 忘己) (*Zhuangzi* 5.6a), and no self (*wu ji* 無己) (*Zhuangzi* 1.5a, 6.8b). While the *Zhuangzi* grounds the idea on considerations quite different from the Song Confucians and ascribes to it quite different implications, there are also commonalities to the way these ideas are understood. Neither the *Zhuangzi* nor the Song Confucians understand the idea in terms of the non-existence of some entity identifiable as "the self" construed in some specific manner – for both, the idea is conveyed using the first personal pronoun *wo* 我 or *ji* 己, and the pre-modern Chinese language does not have a vocabulary comparable to the way "the self" is used in contemporary English. Rather, for both, the idea represents a direction of self-transformation that involves the eventual elimination of certain contributions by one's own heart/mind that adversely affect the way one views one's place in the world and the way one responds to it.

As we saw, FAN Zhongyan also hints at this idea when he idealizes one's "emptying oneself" (*xu ji* 虛己) and using the heart/mind of the multitude as one's heart/mind (*yi zhong xin wei xin* 以衆

心為心). ZHANG Zai and the Cheng brothers explicitly highlight this idea. In the *Zhengmeng*, Zhang mentions the idea in connection with the "largeness" (*da* 大) of the sense of mission that characterizes the sage, saying that it is through being without the self that one is "large" in this sense (*wu wo er hou da* 無我而後大) and that one will be free from pride if one is "large" (*da ze bu jiao* 大則不驕) (*Zhengziquanshu* 2.27a-27b, SBBY 2.14a-14b). This state of no self characterizes the sage, who has aspirations that runs through "all under Heaven" (*tong tian xia zhi zhi* 通天下之志) (*Zhangziquanshu* 3.3a, SBBY 3.2a), so that one's virtue matches that of Heaven and Earth and one's brightness matches that of the sun and moon (*Zhangziquanshu* 3.1b, SBBY 3.1a-1b). In other parts of his collected works, he again links the idea to broad and far-reaching aspirations and to qualities akin to what we would describe as humility. The learner should practice no self to avoid being subject to restricted aspirations (*zhi xiao* 志小) or superficial efforts (*qi qing* 氣輕). If their aspirations are restricted, they will be easily satisfied and will not advance far. If their efforts are superficial, they will take what is lacking to be full (*xu er wei ying* 虛而為盈), what is narrow to be broad (*yue er wei tai* 約而為泰), what is lacking to be possessed (*wang er wei you* 亡而為有); they will falsely assume they understand what is not yet understood and have learnt what is not yet learnt, will be ashamed of asking and learning from others, and will be fond of demonstrating superiority over others (*hao sheng yu ren* 好勝於人) (*Zhangziquanshu* 7.8a-8b, SBBY 7.4a). The link between broad and far-reaching aspirations and qualities akin to humility is understandable – those who have such aspirations will inevitably focus attention on continually advancing their goals without thoughts of how much they have accomplished, especially by comparison to others. That is why the sage, being without "self-centeredness" and without a "self" (*wu si wu wo* 無私無我), will not have any thoughts about himself despite his all-surpassing accomplishments (*Zhangziquanshu* 14.4a-4b, SBBY 14.2b).

Zhang also conveys the idea of no self in terms of there being no distinction between oneself and other things in that one does not make oneself stand out as having a distinctive place among things. This is put in the *Zhengmeng* in terms of there being no "self-centeredness" in the sense of a distinction between oneself and things (*wu wu wo zhi si* 無物我之私) (*Zhangziquanshu* 2.47b, SBBY 2.25a), and elsewhere in terms of "evening out" the distinction between oneself and things (*ping wu wo* 平物我) (*Zhangziquanshu* 6.3b, SBBY 6.2a). This idea is further

explicated in another context. One should view things without "using oneself to mirror things" (*yi shen jian wu* 以身鑑物), that is, without viewing things in terms of our own preconceptions. One is just one thing among others (*ji yi shi yi wu* 己亦是一物), and without such preconceptions, one can see oneself and things as they are (*shen yu wu jun jian* 身與物均見), and everything will be properly illuminated. And what constitutes such preconceptions is further explicated in terms of an idea from *Lunyu* 9.4, which advocates being without four items: *yi* 意, *bi* 必, *gu* 固, *wo* 我. It is these four items that are difficult to eliminate and that account for the "self-centered self" (*si ji* 私己) (*Zhangziquanshu* 7.4a-5a, SBBY 7.2b-3a). Later, we will discuss how ZHU Xi elaborates on what these four items involve.

CHENG Hao also highlights the idea of no self and speaks against using oneself to view things. On his view, it follows from the point that the humane person forms one body with all things that there is nothing that is not part of oneself (*mo fei ji ye* 莫非己也) (*Erchengyishu* 2a.4a-4b, SBBY 2a.2a-2b) or that one is just one thing (*wu* 物) among others, without standing out from them in any way. To treat oneself as standing out from other things is to pit one thing (oneself) against another (all other things) (*er wu you dui* 二物有對) (*Erchengyishu* 2a.6b, SBBY 2a.3b). Furthermore, once there is a conception of oneself as standing out from other things, one will be viewing and responding to other things with one's own preconceptions (*yi ji dai wu* 以己待物). Instead, we should view and respond to things as they are, without any such preconceptions (*yi wu dai wu* 以物待物), and this is what it is to be without a self (*wu wo* 無我) (*Erchengyishu* 11.12a-12b, SBBY 11.6b). The sage has attained this state and operates in the way Heaven does; to fall short of this is to have a self (*you ji* 有己) (*Erchengyishu* 11.14a-14b, SBBY 11.7b).

These ideas CHENG Hao presents in his letter *Dingxingshu* 定性書 (*Calming One's Nature*), written in response to ZHANG Zai, in terms of the idea that Heaven and Earth encompasses the ten thousand things with its heart/mind and does not have a heart/mind (of its own) (*yi qi xin pu wan wu er wu xin* 以其心普萬物而無心), while the sage flows along with the ten thousand affairs with his emotions and does not have any emotion (of his own) (*yi qi qing shun wan shi er wu qing* 以其情順萬事而無情). Put differently, one should flow along with and respond to things as they come (*wu lai er shun ying* 物來而順應). For example, the sage's joy (*xi* 喜) or

anger (*nu* 怒) is not primarily a matter of how his heart/mind views a situation, but a matter of whether the situation itself makes such a response appropriate, and so his joy or anger resides in things and not in his own heart/mind (*sheng ren zhi xi nu bu xi yu xin er xi yu wu ye* 聖人之喜怒不繫於心而繫於物也). Being able to view situations in this manner is particularly difficult in the case of anger, which is difficult to control (*Erchengwenji* 3.1a-1b, SBBY *Mingdaowenji* 3.1a-1b; cf. *Erchengcuiyan* 2.63b-64b, SBBY 2.28b-29a). In this way, the idea of no self is linked up with the idea of no emotions (*wu qing* 無情), both having to do with the absence of any preconception in oneself that adversely affects the way one views and responds to situations one confronts.

Turning to CHENG Yi, when commenting on *Mengzi* 7A:4, he refers to no self as ideally one's substance (*yi wu wo wei ti* 以無我為體) so that *shu* 恕 (reciprocity), one's treating others as one would oneself, flows naturally from it without effort (*Erchengyishu* 21b.5a-5b, SBBY 21b.2b). What *shu* flows naturally from is humaneness, which is a matter of *gong* 公, viewing oneself and others in a balanced fashion without tilting toward oneself, so that one responds to situations without bias toward oneself (*wu wo jian zhao* 物我兼照) (*Erchengyishu* 15.18b, SBBY 15.8b). And commenting on *Lunyu* 12.1 in which Confucius responds to YAN Hui's 顏回 question about humanness by explaining it in terms of "overcoming the self and returning to the observance of the rites" (*ke ji fu li* 克己復禮), he remarks that when one practices seriousness (*jing* 敬), there will not be a self to overcome (*wu ji ke ke* 無己可克) (*Erchengyishu* 15.1b, SBBY 15.1a; *Erchengyishu* 15.24a, SBBY 15.11b).[3]

Like ZHANG Zai, CHENG Yi also relates the idea of no self to qualities akin to humility, such as by describing pride as a matter of having a self (*jiao zhi wei you ji* 驕只為有己) (*Erchengyishu* 22a.4a, SBBY 22a.2a). Other sayings not individually attributed to either brother further elaborate on this theme. One saying in the *Erchengcuiyan,* about the sage being without a self and so does not claim credit despite his unsurpassed accomplishments, is likely a saying of ZHANG Zai's as it matches (with omission of one character) a saying of Zhang's recorded in his

[3] ZHU Xi, who compiled the *Erchengyishu*, indicates that volume 15 contains the sayings of CHENG Yi, though he also notes the alternative view that these are CHENG Hao's sayings.

collected works (*Erchengcuiyan* 2.76a, SBBY 2.34b; cf. *Zhangziquanshu* 14.4a-4b, SBBY 14.2b). But the idea in this saying is not that different from other sayings from the *Chengshijingshuo* which are likely by one or the other of the Cheng brothers. For example, in one saying, after similarly describing the sage as being without a self (*wu wo* 無我) and not claiming credit despite his unsurpassed accomplishments, it goes on to describe one's storing any thought of one's accomplishment in one's heart/mind as a matter of having a "self-centered heart/mind" (*six in* 私心), which then leads one to have the air of being prideful (*jin man zhi qi* 矜滿之氣) (*Chengshijingshuo* 2.5a-5b, SBBY 2.2b-3a). In another saying, the idea of no self is illustrated by the example of YAN Hui 顏回, who is (on a common interpretation) described in the *Lunyu* by Zengzi 曾子 as someone who is capable but who nevertheless seek advice from those less capable (*Chengshijingshuo* 7.23b, SBBY 6.11a; cf. *Lunyu* 8.5). That the idea of no self, which these early Song Confucians relate to the idea of one body, is also related to qualities akin to humility shows that humility is also connected to the state of one body.

ZHU Xi basically endorses all of these ideas. For example, he endorses CHENG Hao's point that the state of one body, illustrated by the medical analogy, implies that none of the ten thousand things is not part of oneself (*mo fei ji ye* 莫非己也) (*Lunyu Jizhu* 3.18a; cf. *Ercheng Yishu* 2a.4a-4b, SBBY 2a.2a-2b), and ZHANG Zai's point that the state of one body, understood in terms of enlarging one's heart/mind to embody all things, implies that there is not a single thing that is not part of oneself (*wu yi wu fei wo* 無一物非我). To fail to embody anything is to exclude it from one's heart/mind thereby opposing that thing to oneself (*wu wo dui li* 物我對立) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 2518; cf. *Zhangzi Quanshu* 2.40b, SBBY2.21a). And separately from his comments on the other early Song Confucians, Zhu himself makes similar observations. According to him, in the heart/mind of the sage, which operates in the way the heart/mind of Heaven and Earth gives life to and nourishes all things, there is no separation between things and oneself, or between what is internal and what is external to oneself (*wu wo nei wai zhi jian* 物我內外之間) (*Lunyu Huowen* 16.14a-14b). As long as things and oneself penetrate and connect to each other (*wu wo guan tong* 物我貫通), there will be the sense of ceaselessly life giving. Otherwise, there will be a separation between things and oneself (*wu wo ge jue* 物我格絕), so that one would work toward one's own interests at the expense of others' (*Zhuzi Yulei* 690).

If there is no separation between things and oneself and one does not stand out from other things, there is no longer a "self" that has some special status, and in this sense there is no self (*wu wo* 無我), an idea that Zhu highlights repeatedly. For example, he takes ZHANG Zai's *Ximing* to advocate the elimination of the self-centeredness of working for oneself (*wei wo zhi si* 為我之私) so as to attain the impartiality of no self (*wu wo zhi gong* 無我之公) (*Zhangzi Quanshu* 1.13a-13b, SBBY 1.7a). Commenting on *Lunyu* 15.24, he cites the view of a student of CHENG Yi that *shu* 恕, when taken to the extreme, would lead to the state of no self of the sage (*Lunyu Jizhu* 8.5b-6a). Commenting on *Lunyu* 12.1, he thinks that the "self" (*ji* 己) in Confucius' reference to "overcoming the self" (*ke ji* 克己) has to do with self-centered desires (*si yu* 私欲), and having a self (*you ji* 有己) is a problematic state to be overcome (*Lunyu Jizhu* 17.1b-2a). And commenting on *Lunyu* 12.2, which concerns (though without explicitly mentioning) *jing* 敬 (seriousness), he endorses CHENG Yi's view that, through the practice of *jing* 敬 and *shu* 恕 (reciprocity), there will no longer be a "self" to overcome (*wu ji zhi ke ke* 無己之可克) (*Lunyu Jizhu* 6.11a-11b), this being the state of humaneness (*Lunyu Huowen* 17.7a).

Zhu also invokes the idea of no self in contexts that highlight qualities akin to humility. In *Lunyu* 8.5, Zengzi 曾子 describes a friend who, being capable, would seek advice from those less capable, having talents, would seek advice from those less talented, and who would appear wanting while actually possessing (*you ruo wu* 有若無) and appear empty while being full (*shi ruo xu* 實若虛). Following the common view that this friend is YAN Hui 顏回, Zhu comments that YAN Hui's heart/mind is not subject to the separation between things and oneself (*wu wo zhi you jian* 物我之有間), and cites the observation by a student of CHENG Yi that this requires a state of the heart/mind close to that of no self (*ji yu wu wo* 幾於無我) (*Lunyu Jizhu* 4.12a). YAN Hui is close to the state of no self without yet attaining it because he still has thoughts about not showing superiority over others, and so still works with some distinction between self and others (*shang you ge ren yu wo xiang dui* 尚有個人與我相對). By contrast, the sage has truly attained the state of no self (*sheng ren ze quan shi wu wo* 聖人則全是無我) because he no longer works with that distinction (*ren wo du wu* 人我都無) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 922).

This comment highlights the point that there are certain conceptions that an external observer might use to describe the sage's heart/mind while the sage does not work with those conceptions; having such conceptions might even detract from the sage's state of the heart/mind. Zhu makes a similar point in other contexts, such as his comments on *Lunyu* 14.1 read in conjunction with his comments on *Lunyu* 8.5 (summarized above) and on *Mengzi* 2A:8. Commenting on *Mengzi* 2A:8, he invokes the idea of no self to describe our relation to goodness (*shan* 善). Goodness has to do with *li* 理*,* which exhibits impartiality (*gong* 公) in that it draws no distinction between self and others. If one is without the self-centeredness of having a self (*you wo zhi si* 有我之私), one will view goodness impartially, without thoughts about such goodness residing in oneself (*Mengzi Huowen* 28.13b-14b; cf. *Zhuzi Yulei* 399). Commenting on *Lunyu* 14.1, he relates the idea of one body to this idea and to qualities akin to humility. In response to questions put to him, he notes that the state of forming one body with others (*ren ji yi ti* 人己一體) is connected to the absence of a desire to be superior to others and to seeing that *dao li* 道理 (the Way and its pattern) is something shared impartially. Yet he adds that these ways of talking are "secondary" (*di er zhu* 第二著) and do not capture the basic state they seek to describe, namely, a state in which one just attends to *dao li* 道理 without thoughts about its being impartial or about one's not being superior to others (*Zhuzi Yulei* 1117). In this last comment, Zhu again makes the point that the state of one body or no self in itself does not involve the kind of reflective thoughts that some observer might have when describing the state from the outside; these descriptions by an observer need not be part of the self-description by someone whose state is so described. We will return to this idea in Section 4.3.

In relation to the idea of no self, Zhu also describes Heaven and Earth as having no heart/mind (*wu xin* 無心) and the sage as having no emotions (*wu qing* 無情), drawing on CHENG Hao's ideas. According to Zhu, the point of CHENG Hao's comment is that Heaven and Earth just engages in the activity of giving life and nourishing things, which constitutes its heart/mind, and does not have a heart/mind of its own in the sense of deliberately so acting. Similarly, the sage's emotions just flow along with situations that the sage confronts, in the sense of just responding in a manner that conforms to *li* 理, and the sage does not have emotions of his own in the sense of emotional responses that stem from self-centeredness, namely, one's own preconceptions (*Zhuzi*

Yulei 4-5, 2442-2443). These comments do not deny that the heart/mind and emotions are present in some ordinary sense. But they are absent in some other sense – in the case of Heaven and Earth, a heart/mind that acts with deliberate intent, and in the case of the sage, emotions that are influenced by one's own preconceptions. In another context, ZHU Xi emphasizes the same point in relation to the idea of no self. This is not a state in which one mistakenly thinks that one is identical with others; one can still tell the difference between oneself and others in some ordinary sense. What is absent is a self that in some sense stands out from others, in a way that Zhu again describes in terms of self-centeredness (*Lunyu Huowen* 23.7a-7b).

Commenting on *Lunyu* 9.4, and following ZHANG Zai's lead, Zhu elaborates on how such a self might come about. The passage idealize the absence of four items – *yi* 意, *bi* 必, *gu* 固, *wo* 我. On Zhu's interpretation, *yi* has to do with self-centered thoughts (*yi, si yi ye* 意, 私意也), thoughts that place an emphasis on what relates to oneself in a way that makes one stand out. *Bi* has to do with one's striving after or aiming at things that stems from *yi,* with anticipation of the outcome (*bi, qi bi ye* 必, 期必也), while *gu* has to do with one's fixating on the outcome (*gu, zhi zhi ye* 固, 執滯也). On the basis of these three items, *wo*, the self-centered self (*wo, si ji ye* 我, 私己也) forms and solidifies, and as it does so, it further generates other self-centered thoughts, so that the four items move in a cycle and reinforce each other (*Lunyu Jizhu* 5.1b-2a; *Lunyu Huowen* 14.2b-3b). The phenomenon that Zhu describes is quite familiar to us. For example, I might have thoughts of making a favorable impression at an upcoming public event, and as I attend the event, I am moved by the thought to speak in a certain manner in order to impress, in anticipation of making a favorable impression. I then become fixated on the outcome – I feel pleased if I succeed and displeased if not, and these responses stay in the heart/mind (*de ze xi, xi bu neng de hua, bu de ze yun, yun yi bu neng de hua* 得則喜, 喜不能得化, 不得則慍, 慍亦不能得化). They then feed into the formation of a conceited self, with a conception of myself as superior and deserving of attention, and as such a self solidifies, it generates further self-centered thoughts, perhaps thoughts of criticizing others for the purpose of displaying my supposed superiority. Someone not vulnerable to these influences would, by contrast, just speak in whatever manner is appropriate to the occasion, without deliberate thoughts about what one can accomplish for oneself. This is the situation of the sage, who just responds to situations in

accordance with *li* 理 (*sheng ren zhi kan li dang wei bian wei, bu dang wei bian bu wei* 聖人只看理當為便為, 不當為便不為); he does not have any thoughts of what he would like to do or not do that is distinct from what *li* 理 dictates in that situation. That is, the sage's responses do not derive from his own thoughts but just follow *li* 理 (*bu zai ji yi er wei li zhi shi cong* 不在己意而惟理之是從), unlike someone whose responses are based on pre-conceived thoughts that arise without regard to what *li* 理 might dictate (*xian qi yi, bu wen li zhi shi fei* 先起意, 不問理之是非). The latter constitutes self-centeredness (*si* 私) and leads to the danger of having a self (*you wo zhi huan* 有我之患) (*Zhuzi Yulei* 951-955).

3.5 A Profound Cosmic Sense and a Profound Sense of Humanity

ZHU Xi's comments on the idea of one body invoke certain ideas specific to his thinking, such as his belief that each human already forms one body with all things in the original state because there is a single *li* 理 running through them. As the purpose of this chapter is to probe the nature of the life experiences conveyed through his idea of one body that are shared across cultures and times, we will bracket these specific details and focus on how his understanding of the idea brings together the five themes mentioned earlier.

First, it involves a sensitivity to the conditions of humans and things. Zhu elaborates on Mencius' reference to *chu ti* 怵惕 and *ce yin* 惻隱 as responses to situations involving significant harm, either actual or potential, and takes *ce yin* to be intimately related to *bu ren* 不忍, the latter taking as its object a situation involving actual or potential harm, one's witnessing the situation, the pain one feels upon witnessing the situation, and one's failing to prevent or bringing about such a situation. Two points are worth noting in this connection. First, the terms *yin* and *bu ren* take as their object a situation involving actual or potential harm to a thing, rather than the thing itself, and so syntactically they differ from such English expressions as "sympathy" and "empathy", which take the thing harmed as object. Second, yet another point of difference, the terms can take as their object a situation in which the actual or potential harm is harm to oneself. Thus, what we are considering is a complex response of the heart/mind that is directed to *situations* involving actual or potential harm to things, *including harm to oneself*. These observations will play a crucial role in Section 4.1. Mencius highlights instances in which

humans have a sensitivity to harm not just to oneself, but to others in certain contexts, and urges people to develop this sensitivity so that it applies more generally, going beyond the specific contexts. While Mencius likely advocates broadening the sensitivity to encompass primarily humans and animals, ZHU Xi broadens its scope to include all things, whether animate or inanimate. This he takes to lead to CHENG Hao's idea that the humane person forms one body with all things in that, just as one should be sensitive to the conditions of every part of one's own physical body, one should also be sensitive to the conditions of all things in the sense of responding in the manner just described to situations involving harm to them.

The second theme concerns the idea of giving life and nourishing, which is also implicit in the comparison of one's relation to all things to one's relation to parts of one's physical body. The idea of giving life and nourishing is highlighted in early texts primarily in connection with the relation between the ruler and his people. But over time, with the emergence of a conception of all scholar-officials and aspiring scholar-officials as potentially having an influence on central policies, the idea is broadened to characterize the way each human should relate to other humans and things. CHENG Yi highlights the idea by comparing the human heart/mind to seeds of grains and humaneness to the heart/mind's tendency to give life. ZHU Xi draws on these ideas, and relates the sensitivity of the heart/mind to its tendency to give life and nourish. His elaboration on the idea of one body combines these two themes and brings together CHENG Hao's comparison of the lack of humaneness to the numbness of limbs and CHENG Yi's comparison of humaneness to the life giving force of seeds of grains.

These two themes are illustrated by the parent-children relationship – a parent gives life to and nourishes her children and is also intimately sensitive to their conditions. While early texts invoke this relationship largely in connection with the way the ruler relates to his people, the relationship is later mentioned in a broader context, including the way a local official relates to those directly under his care. The idea that the ruler should relate to the people as parent to children also has the corollary that all people are related as part of one single family, a point explicitly stated in the *Liji* and elaborated on by WANG Fu and ZHANG Zai. This provides the third theme in the idea of one body, which ZHU Xi takes up while at the same time emphasizing that there should be a differentiation in how one interacts with other humans and things depending on their different relations to oneself.

The fourth theme concerns the deep sense of mission and accountability. Just as a parent dedicates herself to nourishing her children and regards herself as accountable for their well-being, each human should similarly relate to all humans and things. Such life giving activities should, in a form appropriate to one's life circumstances, be something around which one's life revolves and to which one devotes constant attention. This sense of mission and accountability is illustrated in early texts by the efforts of Yu, Hou Ji and YI Yin, and in the *Mengzi* by Confucius' and Mencius' efforts at combating corrupt teachings. By the Tang Dynasty, all scholar-officials and aspiring scholar-officials are supposed to share such a sense of mission, a point given vivid portrayal in early Song Dynasty through FAN Zhongyan's and ZHANG Zai's well-known sayings. In advocating that humans enlarge their heart/mind, Zhang is also advocating that humans broaden their aspirations to encompass this deep sense of mission. ZHU Xi endorses these ideas of Zhang's and associates them with the idea of one body. For him, the state of one body involves having as a central driving force in one's life, one that is undergirded by a deep sense of accountability, the concern for all humans and things conveyed by the three themes mentioned earlier – giving life to and nourishing them and being sensitive to their conditions, in the way that one would in relation to family members and things to which one is fundamentally connected.

Finally, the fifth theme is that, in taking up such a perspective, one will no longer have a "self" in a sense that makes oneself stand out from other things, an idea conveyed by saying that there is no self. The idea can be found in the works of ZHANG Zai and of the Cheng brothers, and is put in terms of there being no self, all things being part of oneself, there being no opposition or separation between things and oneself, or oneself being just one thing among others. Zhu endorses these ideas, and regards the idea of no self as central to the idea of one body. He is explicit that being in this state is compatible with drawing some ordinary distinction between oneself and others; it is not a state of confusing oneself with others. Also, he allows and finds appropriate a differentiation in the way we interact with humans and things, depending on their different relations to us. Since such differential interactions are in a way centered on oneself, what is rejected is a perspective on one's place in the world that makes one stand out in a way that goes beyond such differential interactions. For convenience, we may say that what is rejected is the presence of an *emphatic self*.

ZHU Xi and the other early Song Confucians make several other observations about the idea of no self. CHENG Hao relates it to there being "no emotions", ZHANG Zai and CHENG Yi relate it to qualities akin to humility, and ZHANG Zai ascribes the presence of an emphatic self to the four items highlighted in *Lunyu* 9.4. In addition to endorsing these ideas, Zhu characterizes the state of no self in terms of the way one attends to goodness, and also relates the idea of one body directly to some of these other ideas, showing that the idea of one body also has the broader implications that he associates with the idea of no self. In addition, he emphasizes how these more reflective ways of describing the state of one body or no self are just our ways of talking about someone in that state and do not describe the person's own perspective.

This summary shows that the idea of one body is extremely complex, with several interconnected dimensions. In relation to the human community, it is a state of existence that involves one's relating to all other humans as if they are immediate family members, working for their betterment in dedicated ways and being intimately sensitive to their conditions, viewing this as a central mission in one's life and viewing oneself as accountable for any shortfall due to one's negligence. One's perspective on the human community is such that, aside from the differential interactions due to different relations, it is as if each and every human is part of oneself, and one does not have any distinctive place among humans. For convenience, we may refer to such a perspective as a *profound sense of humanity*. Going beyond the human community, the state of one body also involves one's being similarly related to all things, whether animate or inanimate. The profound sense of humanity is but a more specific component of what may be called a *profound cosmic sense*. For ZHU Xi and the other early Song Confucians, this profound cosmic sense is something that each person should aspire to. Indeed, the key elements of Confucian learning are all geared toward helping the student build such broad and far reaching aspirations, and learn in a way that exhibits depth and connectedness so as to build an overall perspective of the kind just described on the human community, on the world at large, and on one's place in it (see Shun 2016a).

Given the complexity of the idea of one body, an obvious question is how its different dimensions, including related ideas such as the linkage to qualities akin to humility, are connected. Making sense of the idea of no self is crucial to addressing this question since, for Zhu, the state of one body is basically identical with the state of no self. To make sense of the

idea of no self, we need to examine the idea of an emphatic self – that is, what it is for one to take up a perspective that makes one stand out in a way that goes beyond the ordinary distinction between oneself and others and the differential interactions due to different relations. It will not be possible to fully address this question in this paper.[4] But we will partly address the question in Section 4, focusing on the first dimension concerning the sensitivity to harm to others. To keep the discussion manageable, we will confine attention to our relation to humans, exploring the idea of no self in relation to the profound sense of humanity.

4. Philosophical Implications: A Profound Sense of Humanity

4.1 Sensitivity to Harm and the Idea of No Self

In the following discussion, I will assume the notion of *well-being* of humans, and will refer to as *harm* an occurrence that is detrimental to someone's well-being in some significant way. To the extent that the person is aware of the harm and responds with some negative mental state, I will say that she *suffers* the harm. In Section 2.1, we considered the responses to harm to others that Mencius presents using the terms *chu ti*, *ce yin* and *bu ren* and that ZHU Xi takes up and elaborates on. We highlighted two points in this connection. First, the primary focus of the responses concerns actual, imminent or anticipated *situations* in which some object is harmed. They involve the heart/mind's being noticeably moved (*chu* 怵) by the situation, in such a way that one's attention is focused on it and one cautiously and fearfully seeks to prevent or remedy it (*ti* 惕). Furthermore, one's own heart/mind is negatively affected by the situation (*ce* 惻) resulting in a painful or sorrowful state (*yin* 隱). The responses also involve one's being unable to bear (*bu ren* 不忍) not just the situation, but also one's witnessing the situation, the resulting pain or sorrow in one's heart/mind, or one's action which potentially brings about or fails to prevent such a situation. Second, while our focus is on harm to others, these responses can also be directed to situations involving actual or prospective harm to *oneself*. This point we illustrated with the example from the *Guoyu* concerning how the people cannot bear (*shu min bu ren* 庶民不忍) a situation in which they themselves are oppressed, a situation that causes them to be in a

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[4] I provide a more comprehensive and primarily philosophical treatment of this question in Shun 2018.

painful or sorrowful state (*min yin* 民隱). Here, what the people cannot bear, and feel pain or sorrow at, is a situation involving harm to *themselves*.

These two points suggest a way of making sense of the idea of no self in relation to the sensitivity to harm involved in the state of one body. When in this state, one still retains, as Zhu emphasizes, the ordinary distinction between oneself and others, and can tell who has been harmed. Because one retains that ordinary distinction, one can also tell in what relation the harmed object stands to oneself, and can respond differentially in accordance with the differences in such relations. But aside from such differentiation in responses, one's responses to situations involving harm to others are similar in nature to one's responses to situations involving harm to oneself. There is no conception of oneself as standing apart from others – in this sense, there is no "separation" (*jian* 間) or "opposition" (*dui* 對) between oneself and others.

To see what this state of no self involves, let us consider a specific form of harm, namely, being wrongfully injured by another party. In previous publications, I considered Zhu's views on anger in response to wrongful injury, and his views illustrate the idea of no self in relation to anger (see Shun 2014; Shun 2015). Consider a situation in which an *offender* has wrongfully injured a *victim*. If the victim is a stranger, I might respond with anger at the situation because I care about the ethical norms that have been violated and perhaps also about the victim as a fellow human, and I might be moved to intervene or take corrective steps. If the victim is someone related to me in a special way, say a friend or family member, I might respond with greater emotional intensity because I care for the victim in a special way, in addition to caring for the ethical norms that have been violated. I might also feel a greater urgency and special obligation to intervene and take corrective steps. This is a matter of differential responses due to different relations to the victim, something that ZHU Xi would endorse and indeed advocate. If the victim is myself, I might also, for the same reasons, respond with greater emotional intensity and feel a greater urgency to defend myself and take corrective steps. To the extent that my response, while different in degree due to the closer relation I stand to myself, is not different in nature from the other two scenarios, this is again a matter of differential response that Zhu would endorse.

But my response when I myself am the victim might take on a special form. I might place a special significance on the way I *myself* am treated by others, and regard wrongful injury of myself as a

challenge to my standing as a person – it impinges on my sense of honor and disgrace. I feel myself insulted and as a result potentially disgraced by the treatment, and my anger is targeted at the offender, not just directed at the ethically problematic situation. This form of anger Zhu refers to as anger that pertains to the physical body (*xie qi zhi nu* 血氣之怒), which for him is a lower, problematic form of anger. This view is continuous with the early Confucian emphasis that one's sense of honor and disgrace should ideally be a matter of the ethical qualities of oneself and one's own ethical conduct, rather than the way one is treated by others. When confronting wrongful injury to oneself, one's attention should be focused on the ethically problematic situation and on the ethical quality of one's response to the situation, not on how one has been personally challenged. One would still respond with anger, just as one would when the victim is a stranger, but this would, for Zhu, be the form of anger that pertains to morality (*li yi zhi nu* 理義之怒) (*Mengzi Jizhu* 1.18b). Because anger that pertains to the physical body focuses on oneself, while anger that pertains to morality focuses on the ethically problematic situation and on the ethical quality of one's response, Zhu also describes the former as residing in oneself (*zai ji* 在己) and the latter as residing in things (*zai wu* 在物) (*Lunyu Jizhu* 3.10b). According to him, one should transform oneself so that one responds only with the latter but not the former kind of anger. That is, even though one still distinguishes between oneself and others in an ordinary sense, one does not attach special significance to oneself going beyond differential responses due to different relations. In short, there is no *emphatic self*.

But the special significance one attaches to oneself can be a matter of *underemphasizing* others rather than *overemphasizing* oneself, that is, a matter of failing to attend sufficiently to others instead of attending too much to oneself. This is the case of harm that does not involve wrongful injury. One tends to respond to situations involving actual or prospective harm of significance to oneself in ways that are familiar and understandable – the heart/mind is conspicuously moved when one becomes aware of the situation, its attention is focused on it, it feels pained or distressed by it, and it is moved to remedy or pre-empt the situation and cannot bear to not so act. Even if no corrective or preventive action is possible or appropriate, one still wishes things to be otherwise and finds the situation unbearable. Sometimes, as when undergoing a surgery, one finds visually witnessing the situation unbearable, and sometimes, as when anticipating a situation that invokes horror, one finds the distress of the heart/mind also unbearable.

It is possible to respond to a situation involving harm to another in a similar manner, as illustrated by the parent-children relationship. When a parent becomes aware of severe and painful injury of her child, whether she directly witnesses it or not, she would respond as if it were herself who has been injured. Her heart/mind is conspicuously moved upon knowing about the situation and is deeply pained and distressed, her attention is focused on the situation, and she is moved to remedy it to the extent possible with caution and fearfulness, She finds unbearable the situation, her awareness of the situation, the pain and distress of her own heart/mind, and her not acting to mitigate the situation. Such responses are as intimate and unmediated as when she herself suffers a similar injury; it is as if part of herself had been injured. In certain specific contexts such as those highlighted by Mencius, which involve direct visual exposure to the harm, one might also respond in a similar manner to harm to another who is not closely related to oneself. And this might also be true of harm to another for whose well-being one has a special accountability by virtue of one's official position, as illustrated by the portrayal of the legendary sages Yu and Hou Ji.

But, outside of such special relationships, contexts and official accountability, humans do not naturally so respond to situations involving harm to others. The absence of comparable sensitivity to harm to others might be due to different factors. It might have to do with the *mode of presentation* of the situation, a point highlighted in *Mengzi* 1A:7. It is common experience that we tend to respond differently to the same situation, say famine victims or young children affected by the 2017 chemical gas attack in Syria, depending on its mode of presentation. We are more intimately engaged when we personally witness or see graphic images of the situation, which is why it is good educational experience for children from developed countries to visit developing countries to gain a more personal experience of what a life of deprivation is like. It is also why, for certain situations involving pain that has to take place for good reasons such as a needed surgical operation, one might prefer to avoid visual exposure to the situation. The reverse side of this natural tendency is that one might be relatively indifferent to situations involving harm for which one does not have a vivid presentation, as in King Xuan's indifference to his people's misery. Part of what the ideal of one body advocates is that we should sensitize the heart/mind to minimize the dependence of such responses on vivid presentation.

Another factor concerns the *closeness of relationship* to the objects of harm. We tend to care more about those closely related to us, and the Confucian advocacy of differential responses takes into account this aspect of the human psychology. But the reverse side of such tendency is exclusivity – one only cares about those with sufficient closeness to oneself through family ties or histories of interactions, and becomes largely indifferent to strangers and those in far off lands. Typically, people are not totally indifferent, as seen from the flood of donations after the 2017 Northern California fires and of blood donations after the 2017 Las Vegas shooting. But part of what led to these responses is the sense of local community as well as the visual presentations of the incidents in news coverage. What the ideal of one body advocates is that we should sensitize the heart/mind to similarly respond to comparable situations outside of our local communities, such as the current famine in South Sudan and Yemen.

Yet another factor concerns the *sense of accountability*. We feel a special responsibility for the people who, by virtue of our social or official positions, are under our care, and are particularly responsive to their harm and suffering. This is the way parents relate to their children, and the idiomatic expression *fu mu guan* 父母官 reflects the expectation that someone in an official position should relate to those under his care as parent to children. Such expectations are still common nowadays. Shortly after about 400 people were buried alive in a landslide in Siaolin Village (*xiao lin cun* 小林村) in Taiwan in 2009, a local official received widespread criticism for spending time dining in a luxury hotel while the rescue work is still in progress. The official's explanation that he was just keeping a promise to celebrate the birthday of his father-in-law did not sit well with the local community. There is the expectation that one should be deeply pained by the disaster that happened to people under one's care, as if one's own children were buried alive, and the official's actions were incompatible with such expectations. Similarly, the prime minister of U.K. was criticized for meeting only with officials and rescue personnel when she visited the site of the Grenfell Tower fire in London in 2017; the failure to meet with the survivors and relatives of the victims was seen as demonstrating an insensitivity to people under one's care. Part of what the ideal of one body advocates is that we should broaden this sense of accountability to all humans, not limiting it to those under one's care by virtue of specific social or official positions. By early Song Dynasty, this broad sense of accountability has become the ideal for all scholar-officials and aspiring scholar-officials. Even without a high office in central

government, one can still send memorandums to the Emperor in an effort to effect changes that benefit all, something that ZHU Xi himself repeatedly did. In modern times, we can discern such a broad sense of accountability in the sentiment that many feel in relation to doing one's share in environmental conservation for the benefit of future generations. To the extent that what we do in our daily lives affect the livelihood of others, we should be sensitive to their conditions as if they were under our care.

The ideal of one body urges us to sensitize our heart/mind to mitigate the various factors that might potentially limit the scope of its sensitivity, so that we can respond with similar intimacy to situations involving harm to any, taking into account the differential responses due to different relations. In the case of anger in response to wrongful injury, it is the tendency to attach special significance to the way one is treated by others that generates an emphatic self, and the remedy is to transform oneself so that one can respond to wrongful injury to oneself in a way comparable to one's response to wrongful injury to others. By contrast, in the case of one's responses to harm in general, it is the tendency to attach insufficient significance to harm to others due to these limiting factors that generates an emphatic self, and the remedy is to sensitize the heart/mind so that one can respond to harm to others in a way comparable to one's response to harm to oneself. In this sense, one incorporates more and more of others into oneself, a process that ZHU Xi, following ZHANG Zai, describes as one of "enlarging the heart/mind".

On this account, the "separation" or "opposition" between oneself and others that the idea of no self opposes has to do with an emphatic self, which concerns a perspective that assigns special significance to oneself going beyond the differential responses due to different relations. The nature of that special significance can vary, but in each instance, it is generated by certain natural human tendencies, whether highlighting oneself as in the case of wrongful injury or downplaying others as in the case of harm in general. This account allows us to make sense of the linkage between the state of no self and qualities akin to humility. In problematic forms of pride, the emphatic self is generated by natural tendencies to make oneself superior to others (*hao sheng* 好勝) or gain their admiration (*hao ming* 好名). The remedy is to view one's own accomplishments, or others' recognition of one's accomplishments, in a way comparable to the way one views the accomplishments of others.

While the sensitivity under consideration involves the heart/mind's responding to harm to others in a manner comparable to its response to similar harm to oneself, there is in either case no implication that such responses should be acted on, or that it is inappropriate to seek to mitigate such responses in special circumstances. It is in order for us to avoid watching a needed surgical operation on ourselves or on others, so as to avoid being subject to the pain or distress associated with the sight. *Mengzi* 1A:7 makes a similar point about staying away from the kitchen, and as we saw, early texts often portray a potential conflict between these responses and one's official duties. While we might have differing conceptions of where resolution of certain potential conflicts resides, the underlying point is that whether to act on such responses is subject to the constraints of a conception of what is proper, however we conceive of its content. This can provide grounds for mitigating such responses under special circumstance, though at the same time we should sensitize the heart/mind so that the scope of its responses to harm extends to all humans. The mitigation of such responses should be grounded in some normative conception, rather than blocked by extraneous considerations including the limiting factors we considered, and more specific factors such as prejudice against the individual harmed or inattention due to other preoccupations.

4.2 Sensitivity to Harm and Contemporary Discussions

Our discussion shows that the sensitivity to harm involved in the state of one body is conceptualized in Confucian thought in a way different from contemporary discussions of such ideas as sympathy, empathy, or self-other merging. This does not mean that these other ways of conceptualizing our responses to harm to others are not applicable to the kinds of examples that the Confucians discuss, such as the infant about to fall into a well, only that they do not describe the Confucian perspective on the responses as conveyed through such terms as *ce yin* and *bu ren*, or through the ideas of one body and no self.

Consider, for example, the attempt to frame the Confucian idea of one body in terms of the contemporary notion of empathy, which is understood in different ways by philosophers and psychologists. Some view it as a matter of having feelings and emotions that are similar to, or congruent with, those of the other party, in a way causally linked to the fact that the other party has such feelings and emotions (e.g., Snow 2000: 66-67). Some take it to also involve one's

imaginatively projecting oneself into the perspective of the other, responding imaginatively from the other's perspective, thereby coming to feel what the other would feel as if one were the other party (e.g. Coplan 2011: 6; Hoffman 2014: 74; Darwall 1998: 263-264, 267-272). Other fine distinctions in the literature on empathy include distinguishing between cognitive and experiential purposes in the exercise of perspective taking, and between undertaking this exercise in a self-directed (what oneself would experience) as opposed to an other-directed (what the other might be experiencing) manner (see Batson 2010: 12-20).

The notion of empathy understood in these specific ways does not describe the kind of responses highlighted in the Confucian idea one body. This is not just because the responses might be to situations involving prospective or actual harm that the other party is not aware of. Even if the other party is aware of the harm and responds to it, the responses highlighted by the Confucians do not, *in themselves*, involve one's projecting oneself into the perspective of the other party or one's sharing her mental states. Instead, the responses have to do with the heart/mind's being conspicuously moved and pained by the *situation*, finding it unbearable and, relatedly, finding unbearable one's witnessing the situation, the resulting pain in one's heart/mind, and one's failing to act to alleviate the situation. None of these elements of the responses is in itself a matter of taking up the perspective of the other party or sharing her mental states. And even though the idea of one body is often presented by the Confucians – as in CHENG Hao's medical analogy – in terms of one's being pained by the pain of others as if it were one's own pain, their point is not that one imaginatively projects oneself into the other party's perspective and shares her pain. Their point is rather that one's heart/mind is sensitized in such a way that it responds to *situations* involving harm and resulting pain and distress to another party in the way that one would respond to *situations* involving comparable harm and resulting pain and distress to oneself.

While the kind of responses the Confucians highlight with the terms *ce yin* and *bu ren* are not *in themselves* a matter of perspective taking or sharing the other party's mental states, this does not mean that they would deny that these other phenomena might occur or could be relevant. To respond in the manner they describe, one has to understand the situation of the other party and what she is going through or might go through. To do so, perhaps one might need to project

oneself into her perspective to arrive at a sense of what it is like to suffer, or for her to suffer, the harm. And perhaps the Confucian idea of *shu* 恕 (reciprocity), explained in *Analects* 15.24 as not imposing on others what one would not wish to be imposed on oneself, could be interpreted as involving some process like perspective taking. Still, it is likely that, from the Confucian perspective, dependence on such process would not be needed, or would at least be minimized, as one approximates the state of one body. It would not be needed if one is responding to harm to a party whom one knows well, involving situations that are relatively familiar, as when a parent responds to a situation involving severe physical injury and pain to her child. And what the ideal of one body advocates is that we should sensitize our heart/mind to similarly respond to situations involving harm to any human. While some process like perspective taking might take place in the course of self-cultivation, the need for such process would be minimized as one makes progress. ZHU Xi himself notes how *shu*, in the prescriptive form presented in *Analects* 15.24, is a method of cultivating humaneness. In the state of humaneness, one would just not impose on others what one would not wish to be imposed on oneself, without further thought and effort, and without the need to engage in this kind of projective exercise. This Zhu takes to be the state that *Analects* 5.12 describes, explaining why Confucius says Zigong 子貢 has not attained this state despite urging him to practice *shu* in *Analects* 15.24 (*Lunyu Jizhu* 3.4b-5a, *Lunyu Huowen* 10.11b, *Zhuzi Yulei* 116, 723-724).

Turning to the notion of sympathy, this is often understood in terms of a response to someone undergoing harm that stems from a non-fleeting positive regard that one has for the well-being of the other party. One might empathize with someone in the senses described earlier without having sympathy – one might take up the perspective of the other party and share her mental states without having positive regard for her. Conversely, one might have sympathy for someone without empathizing with her in the sense of taking up her perspective and sharing her mental states. Compassion is often viewed as structurally similar to sympathy, though it is typically a response to harm of a kind that is significant and central to well-being of the other party

The responses to harm highlighted by the Confucians do not exclude the presence of sympathy or compassion so understood, but their nature differs from the way these notions are often understood in the literature. For example, some have invoked a distinction between the first and

third person perspectives in discussing sympathy. Sympathy is supposed to involve one's viewing harm to someone from a third person perspective, by contrast to empathy, understood in terms of perspective taking, which involves one's viewing things from the other party's first person perspective. The example in *Mengzi* 2A:6 of one's responses to the infant about to fall into a well has been described as a matter of sympathy understood in this manner – one is responding from a third person perspective and out of a concern for the well-being of the infant and for his sake (see Darwall 1998: 261, 263-4, 268-9, 273-6).

While this is the way we ourselves might describe the example *from a contemporary philosophical perspective*, this does not describe the way the Confucians conceptualize the response. As we saw, the terms Mencius uses to present the responses are terms that can be used to describe one's responses to situations involving harm to *oneself*, not just to others, and this feature provides the basis for ZHU Xi to take the extension of such responses to all humans to lead to the state of one body and of no self. Given that the same kind of responses can be directed to harm to oneself, it is difficult to see how the way Mencius conceptualizes these responses can be understood in terms of a third person perspective. Admittedly, one can take a third person perspective on a situation involving harm to oneself in the sense of adopting a more removed perspective comparable to the way some third party views such a situation. But this would be a contrived interpretation of the terms *ce yin* and *bu ren*. When the *Guoyu* describes the pain (*yin*) of the people upon being oppressed and how they cannot bear (*bu ren*) such a situation, it does not appear to be describing a scenario in which the people are taking a more removed third person perspective on their own plight.

The Confucian idea of one body advocates that we extend to situations involving harm to others the kind of more intimate and unmediated responses that we have toward situations involving harm to ourselves. If we are to invoke the distinction between the first and third person perspectives at all, it seems closer to the Confucian position to describe it in terms of extending the first person perspective from oneself to others, viewing situations involving harm to others in a way comparable to those involving harm to oneself. But if we do this, it would seem that the Confucian view on anger summarized earlier would involve a reverse move. What it advocates is that we respond to situations involving wrongful injury of ourselves in a way comparable to our responses to situations involving wrongful injury of others. So, if we are to invoke the distinction

between first and third person perspectives, it would appear that the Confucian view of anger advocates extending the third person perspective from others to oneself.

This rather unusual conclusion – that the Confucians advocate a third personal form of response in one case and a first personal form of response in the other – results from our trying to fit the Confucian position into the contemporary philosophical distinction between first and third person perspectives. But that contemporary distinction assumes some distinction of significance between the two perspectives; it assumes that my response to a situation in which I myself am affected differs in some significant way from my response to a situation in which someone else is similarly affected. The Confucian idea of "no self", by contrast, opposes any distinction of significance between myself and others, going beyond differential responses. Thus, in describing the Confucian position in terms of that contemporary distinction, we would be trying to fit it into some conceptual framework that it would itself reject. This is not to deny that the Confucians do work with some conception of one's response to a situation taking a form that is too personally involved (as in the case of the problematic form of anger) or too removed (as in one's being insufficiently sensitive to a situation involving harm to others). But unlike the contemporary distinction, this kind of difference is a difference in degree, with one form merging gradually into the other. After all, for the Confucians, the transition to the idealized form of anger, or the "enlargement of the heart/mind" that involves expanded sensitivity to situation involving harm to others, is a gradual progression that one is supposed to work on over one's life time, and is not a matter of shifting between two distinct points of view.

Instead of the notions of empathy and sympathy understood in these specific ways, a more useful notion for describing the Confucian perspective is that of *connectedness.* A paradigmatic example of the kind of responses to harm to others that the Confucians idealize is the way a parent responds to a situation involving harm to her child. She responds as if this is a situation involving comparable harm to herself, and from her perspective, there is no distinction of significance between herself and her child. She is not responding from a more removed third person perspective – for her, the situation is no less intimate or distressing than a situation in which she herself is similarly harmed. But her response is also not a matter of her projecting herself into the perspective of her child and sharing the child's mental states – after all, the child might not be aware of the harm, and even if he is, her distress depends only on her awareness of

the situation, not on any exercise of imaginative projection into her child's perspective. Her sensitivity to harm to her child is such that it is as if she and her child are connected as one, a point that the *Lüshichunqiu* puts by saying that it is as if they were one body spatially divided into two. What the Confucian idea of one body advocates is that one views all other humans as similarly connected to oneself, albeit with differential responses due to different relations.

This idea of *connectedness* emphasizes the heightened sensitivity of the human heart/mind to situations involving harm to any human. It differs from a picture that underlies much of the contemporary discussion, one that emphasizes the distinctness of the responder from the harmed party – given that emphasis, the focus will be on how one responds from a "third person perspective" to the other party or how one projects oneself imaginatively to respond from the "first person perspective" of the other party. This emphasis on distinctness can also be found in certain ways of understanding compassion, and in a certain puzzlement that has engaged philosophical attention.

According to some, compassion involves a sense of shared humanity, the sense that the harm to the other party is something that could also happen to oneself. It promotes the experience of equality in that it involves one's viewing the other party as an equal fellow human being (Blum 1980: 511-512; cf. Snow 1991: 196-199). Without implying that the Confucians deny that humans are equal, this sense of equality is not part of the Confucian perspective on the idealized form of responses to harm. When the parent responds to harm to her child, her perspective is not that her child is an equal human being like herself, but that he is connected to her as if part of her body. The consideration of equality, which focuses on herself and her child as distinct and separate individuals, is not part of her perspective, which focuses instead on this connectedness.

A certain puzzlement also arises from the emphasis on the distinctness of the responder and the harmed party. It takes the form of a question about how one human can, in some sense, feel or be moved by the harm and suffering that another undergoes, given that the second party is distinct and separate from the first (e.g. Schopenhauer 2005: 85; cf. Cartwright 2008: 296). To address the puzzlement, some have proposed that the two parties are, in some deeper metaphysical sense, actually one despite appearances (Schopenhauer 2005: Part III, Chapter V and Part IV, Chapter II). Others who reject this metaphysical view have proposed instead that the responding party

must have imaginatively projected herself into the other's perspective to so respond (Cartwright 2008: 303). The underlying assumption in these proposals is that, given that the two parties are distinct and separate, some kind of link has to be established between them for one to respond to harm to the other.

Such puzzlement does not arise on the Confucian position because the sensitivity involved in the idea of one body concerns responses of the heart/mind to *situations* involving harm. Each of us can undergo harm and feel physical pain when physically injured. We can also comprehend the situation, and as a result feel pain, sorrow or distress in the heart/mind in response to such situations, on top of any physical pain that we might feel. What the idea of one body advocates is that we sensitize our heart/mind so that it similarly responds to situations involving harm to others. The responses are to *situations* involving harm to others, and do not involve our actually feeling the pain of others or our being directly moved by it, whether this be the physical pain they feel as a result of physical injury, or pain in their heart/mind arising from their awareness of harm to themselves. Our actually feeling their pain in either sense, and our being directed moved by such pain, would have raised a puzzlement, as there is the presumption that they are directly linked to their pain, epistemologically and motivationally, in a way that we are not. But on the Confucian view, the idealized kind of response is a response to *situations* involving harm to them. There is no similar presumption that they are directly linked to such situations, epistemologically and motivationally, in a way that we are not. Indeed, as illustrated by Mencius' example of the infant crawling toward a well, we might be aware of a situation involving harm to them even if they themselves might be unaware of it. And it is this awareness of the situation that triggers the chain of responses described in terms of *ce yin* and *bu ren*, responses that involves the heart/mind's feeling pain and being moved.

The point that there is no presumption that they are directly linked to such situations in a way that we are not is related to the parallel point that there is no presumption that we are directly linked to situations involving harm to ourselves in a way that we are not in relation to situations involving harm to others. That is, there is no presumption that the heart/mind cannot respond to situations involving harm to others in as direct and intimate a fashion as it responds to situations involving harm to oneself. That it can so respond to situations involving harm to others is a fact familiar to us, as when a parent responds to situations involving harm to her child, or when we

respond to visual presentation of young children in deep pain. What the ideal of one body advocates is an extension of these responses broadly to encompass all humans.

Our discussion shows that the notions of empathy, sympathy and compassion do not described the Confucian perspective if these notions are understood in the specific ways in which they have been discussed in the contemporary philosophical literature. Admittedly, these notions can also be understood in a general manner so that they apply more broadly. For example, the notion of empathy has been explained by some in terms of emotional responses congruent with another's situation, without implying that one's feelings match the other party's feelings. All that the idea of congruence involves is that one is positively or negatively affected in accordance with whether one views some occurrence as positively or negatively affecting the well-being of the other party (e.g. Batson et al. 1997: 497; Batson 2010: 11; Hoffman 2000: 29-30). And one can similarly understand the notions of sympathy and compassion in this broad sense, and proposes that these notions, very broadly construed, do describe the Confucian perspective.

One can adopt this strategy if one so chooses, and a similar strategy can be adopted for other philosophical conceptions that one wishes to employ to describe the perspective of Chinese thinkers. But then the question is what purpose is served by such a strategy. The application of these notions understood in the more specific manners in which they have been discussed in the philosophical literature is supposed to further our understanding of Chinese traditions of thought in some substantive way. If, in response to the concern that their application actually distorts our understanding of Chinese traditions, one resorts to very broad construal of the notions, application of these broadly construed notions no longer helps our understanding of Chinese traditions. It adds nothing that is not already obvious to say that the Confucians advocate our responding to others in a way congruent with their situations, where the notion of congruence is understood in this broad sense. And focusing on framing the Confucian idea of one body in terms of empathy, or sympathy, or compassion, even if broadly construed in this manner, runs the risk of hiding from view the distinctive features of the Confucian idea of one body, namely, its emphasis on expanding the sensitivity of the heart/mind and its sense of connectedness to encompass all humans.

Finally, let us consider a certain phenomenon highlighted in recent psychological studies that appears to share with the Confucian perspective the shift away from the emphasis on how the responder to harm and the harmed party are distinct and separate. The phenomenon is presented in terms of the ideas of self-other merging and perceived oneness, ideas that some might invoke to describe the Confucian idea of one body. Again, without implying that the Confucians deny that these ideas might describe certain aspects of the responses to harm they idealize, these ideas do not describe the Confucian perspective on these responses. The idea of self-other merging draws on recent theoretical development concerning the malleable nature of the self – while our self-conceptions are fairly stable over time, they can shift temporarily so that, when one takes the perspective of another and experiences what the other is experiencing, one can come to embody the self within the boundaries of the other. The distinction between self and other is compromised by perspective taking in that there is a conceptual merger of self and other, resulting in a perceived oneness, but without involving a confusion of actual physical distinctness (Cialdini et.al. 1997: 482). There are at least four reasons why these ideas are different from the notion of oneness in the Confucian idea of one body.

First, the Confucian idea of one body describes a relatively enduring state, not a kind of experience that one has in certain specific contexts. It is rooted in the absence of an emphatic self; that is, one does not view oneself as having any special significance going beyond differential responses. Thus, the Confucian idea of oneness describes an enduring posture, unlike the idea of perceived oneness which describes certain experiences associated with the self-other merging that takes place in certain specific contexts.

Second, even if we focus on responses to specific situatiosn involving harm to another, the Confucian perspective on the nature of these responses is different. Self-other merging is supposed to take place in the context of perspective taking; one perceives oneself as residing in the other when one takes on the perspective of the other, and this perspective taking is supposed to facilitate the symbolic merging of the self into the other (Cialdini et.al. 1997: 483, 491-2). But, as we have discussed, perspective taking is not part of the Confucian perspective on the kind of responses to harm they idealize, and hence not part of the Confucian idea of oneness.

Third, the perceived oneness that such psychological studies highlight is primarily a measure of the sense of interpersonal unity that the participants feel with the other party, as conveyed through their responses to certain survey questions. The intensity of such sentiments, as the studies show, is often a function of the closeness of personal relations (Cialdini et.al. 1997: 483-490; cf. Batson 1997: 518-520). By contrast, while the Confucian idea of one body includes an endorsement of differential responses based on different relations, the oneness at issue is not a function of the closeness of relations. Instead, it concerns the absence of a conception of oneself as having a special significance that goes beyond such differential responses, and the Confucian notion of oneness is a normative ethical ideal that one approximates, not a measure of the sentiments one feels toward another party. This does not exclude the possibility that someone who has approximated that ideal might indeed have sentiments that are like the sense of perceived oneness that these psychological studies measure. But the Confucian idea of oneness is not in itself about such sentiments, and the normative proposal is not about what kind of sentiments one should feel.

Fourth, these psychological studies are designed to show that it is perceived oneness rather than empathy that is the real cause of helping action; empathy is a mere concomitant that serves as an emotional signal of oneness (Cialdini et.al. 1997: 483, 491). The Confucian idea of oneness, by contrast, is not in itself a source of motivation. Instead, it describes a normative ideal involving a state of the heart/mind in which one does not view oneself as having a special significance going beyond differential responses. When one has approximated that state, one would be moved in certain ways by situations involving harm to others, as presented through the terms *chu ti*, *ce yin*, and *bu ren*. But oneness is not in itself a source of motivation, though the state of oneness makes a difference to the way one is motivated.

4.3 One Body and No Self

In the previous two sections, we discussed the nature of the sensitivity to harm that is part of the idea of one body, how it relates to the idea of no self, and how it is illustrated by the parent-children relationship. Consideration of the parent-children relationship also helps us make sense of the two other dimensions of the idea of one body, that concerning life giving and that concerning the sense of mission and accountability. A parent’s sensitivity to harm to her child

stems from a relation to the child which also has a positive aspect – she dedicates time and effort to nourishing her child, not just in relation to his physical needs, but also in other ways such as educating and guiding him, a point highlighted in early texts. Furthermore, just as her heart/mind would be pained and distressed by situations involving harm to her child, it also takes delight in situations in which he flourishes, not just physically but in other ways such as success in life. In addition, she views herself as bearing a responsibility and accountability for his well-being in both respects. She sees herself as responsible for nourishing him and accountable should anything falls short in his life that can be traced to insufficient attention or efforts on her part. And she also sees herself as responsible for protecting him from harm and accountable should he be harmed in a way that she could have reasonably prevented. In what follows, we will elaborate further on these two dimensions, concluding with a discussion of the perspective of someone who has approximated the ideal of one body.

The state of one body involves not just sensitivity to harm, but also one's devoting attention and efforts to promoting the well-being of others as well as taking delight in their flourishing, in the way one does the same for oneself. Aside from the differentiation in attention and efforts based on different relations, one views one's own well-being and flourishing as carrying no special significance compared to those of others. This point is highlighted by Mencius when he urges King Xuan to take delight in the delight of the people (*le min zhi le* 樂民之樂) and be concerned with their concerns (*you min zhi you* 憂民之憂) (*Mengzi* 1B:4). Here, what one takes delight in is the delight of others, and by extension, others' having access to things they take delight in. Just like the pain one feels at harm to others, this is not a matter of perspective taking or experiencing another's mental state, but a matter of one's taking delight in situations that involve the delight of others or their having access to things that would bring them delight.

On this picture, the relation of life giving and nourishing that one stands to oneself and one's own children should be extended to all humans, with differentiation but without assigning any other special significance to oneself. Reflection on the life giving and nourishing forces in relation to oneself, including the way one receives life and nourishment from ancestors and parents and transmits life and nourishment to children and future generations, as well as the way

food and nutrition nourishes oneself, helps move one to continue life in and nourish others.[5] Reflection on the life giving and nourishing forces in the natural order, such as the way animals breed and flourish or the way plants grow and decline, also helps move one to contribute to this life giving and nourishing process.[6] These reflections help sensitize the heart/mind so that one comes to share in the heart/mind of giving life to and nourishing all humans and things that characterizes Heaven and Earth, a point emphasized by ZHU Xi and the later Confucians. And in extending the way one relates to close family members to all humans, one will be viewing the whole human community as if it were one single family, a point highlighted in the *Liji* and put in early Song Dynasty in terms of one's viewing all humans as if they were one's children and younger brothers.

As for the sense of mission and accountability, we have seen how, in the history of Chinese thought, the scope of application of the parent-children relationship expanded over time to encompass not just the relation of the ruler to the people, but also the relation of a local official to people under his care, as well as the relation of all scholar-officials and aspiring scholar-officials to the human community. In early Song Dynasty, even if one is not in high office, one can still potentially effect changes through memorandums to the Emperor or through the ethical influence of one's teachings. Just as a parent makes nurturing her children a dedication in her life, these "scholars" (*shi* 士) also feel a sense of mission to contribute to the human community, whether politically, ethically or intellectually, sentiments vividly conveyed in the well-known sayings by FAN Zhongyan and ZHANG Zai.

While we live in a different social and political environment in which our contributions to the human community, and to the natural world at large, have to take different forms, this sense of mission and accountability is not irrelevant or unfamiliar. The general idea is that, taking into

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[5] DAI Zhen, in his *Mengzi Ziyishuzheng* 孟子字義疏証 (*An Evidential Examination of the Key Terms and Ideas in the Mencius*), emphasizes how reflection on one's efforts to continue life in oneself should move one to also continue life in others, such as by helping them fulfill their desires.

[6] Among western thinkers, Albert Schweitzer's emphasis on the idea of reverence for life depicts a similar phenomenon. He notes how reflecting on one's own "will to live" fills one with reverence for the "will to live" that is in all things, and how reflecting on life in the natural order, including trees, flowers and insects, fills one with a similar sentiment. For him, ethics consists in one's showing to the "will to live" in all things the same reverence one has to one's own "will to live"; this involves not just a fellowship in suffering but also in joy and efforts (Schweitzer 2009: 136-140, 158-164).

account one's life circumstances and competing demands, and factoring in the differential attention and efforts due to different relations, to the extent that one can reasonably prevent harm to or promoted the good of others, one has a responsibility to do so and should feel accountable if any shortfall results from one's negligence. Those who, without depending on special incentives, engage in efforts at environmental preservation such as recycling and avoiding pollution of air and water, or efforts at slowing climate change such as minimizing emission, do so out of a sense of responsibility to the human community at large, including future generations. And many of us also actively seek to avoid unnecessary damage to plants or unnecessarily taking the lives of animals, while some join in organized efforts to preserve wildlife, again demonstrating our sense of responsibility to preserving the natural environment.[7] The sense of sadness we often feel upon observing the devastation brought by storm or fire to the natural environment is not just sadness at the loss of what is of utility or aesthetic pleasure to ourselves, but is a sentiment that reflects our sense of connectedness to the natural world.

At the heart of the idea of one body is the idea of no self, which involves the absence of a perspective that makes oneself stand out in a way that goes beyond the differentiation in attention, efforts, and responses grounded in different relations. The idea of no self has several complex dimensions that we cannot go into within the scope of this chapter, other than briefly mentioning its connection to some related ideas.[8] ZHU Xi's notion of self-centeredness, or *si* 私, can be understood in terms of the presence of an emphatic self, as seen from his references to the self-centeredness of having a self (*you wo zhi si* 有我之私). His account of the four items presented in *Lunyu* 9.4 – *yi* 意, *bi* 必, *gu* 固, *wo* 我 – is precisely an attempt to spell out how such an emphatic self arises. The linkage of the idea of one body to that of no self also explains why he relates the former idea to qualities akin to humility as well as to the idea of attending to goodness (*shan* 善). When responding to situations we confront, our attention should be on what is ethically appropriate to the situations, and focusing attention in this way pre-empts the intrusion of the emphatic self. For example, when confronting personal injury, so focusing our attention steers us away from viewing the injury as a personal challenge, thereby pre-empting the kind of anger that "pertains to the physical body" or "resides in the self" to which Zhu is

[7] Schweitzer also highlights this sense of responsibility as part of the reverence for life (Schweitzer 2009: 139).
[8] See Shun 2018 for further elaborations.

opposed. So responding to situations also means that one is "responding to situations as they are" (*yi wu dai wu* 以物待物) without "using oneself to respond to things" (*yi ji dai wu* 以己待物). And since one's emotions follow what is appropriate to situations and do not stem from an emphatic self, they are in a sense not one's emotions, and so the sage has "no emotions".

We will not be able to elaborate on these ideas here, but will conclude with one final observation about the perspective of someone who has approximated the state of one body or no self. On several occasions, Zhu emphasizes that, while we might describe that state in certain reflective terms, this is not the way someone in that state would herself describe things. For example, we would say that someone in that state would not be moved to show superiority over others, but that person herself would not have thoughts about her not being so moved, since having such thoughts already assumes some distinction of significance between oneself and others. And while we would say that such a person focuses attention on goodness without viewing the goodness as something in herself, she would not herself have thoughts about not viewing goodness as something in herself. The general point is that, while we would say that someone in that state would not have thoughts about how she herself stands out from others, she would not so describe herself as that description already assumes (though denying) a conception of oneself as standing out from others, a conception that she does not work with.

For convenience, let us distinguish between an internal and an external perspective on the state of one body or no self. The former is the perspective that someone in that state has, and the latter the perspective that an observer takes up in describing her state. The external perspective differs from the internal perspective in relation to not just what, from the external perspective, is absent from the internal perspective. There can be more positive descriptions from the outside of the state of one body or no self that are not themselves part of the internal perspective. For example, while commenting on ZHANG Zai, Zhu at times describes the state of one body as involving one's grasping the *li* 理 in things, while at the same time emphasizing that someone in that state just responds without having reflective thoughts of this kind. One is pained by a situation involving harm to others in the way one is immediately pained by a cut in a part of one's body, without being dependent on any reflective thought that guides one's response. And one's love for all things flows naturally from the state of forming one body with them, again without being dependent on any reflective thought of this kind. That is, being in the state of one body need not

involve any reflective thought about how that state is supposedly grounded, such as thoughts about how humans and things all owe their existence to Heaven and Earth and are endowed with a common *li* 理.

The point that an external description of someone in an idealized state need not be part of the internal perspective of that person is familiar to us. Furthermore, from the external perspective, while we might in our reflections go beyond mere description and instead seek some reflective account that supposedly grounds that state of existence, that reflective account is not part of what is involved in being in that state. After all, the most ethically admirable people we know are often common people who are unlearnt or even illiterate, not prone to this kind of reflection. It does not mean that someone in that state cannot have such a reflective account, only that having that account is not part of what it is to be in that state. As long as having the reflective account does not mean that one is motivated by that account in one's responses in a way that detracts from the unmediated nature of the idealized kind of responses, having that account would not preclude one's being in the idealized state of one body (see Shun 1996).

Reflecting on the state of one body might lead one to ask how it is possible for us to be in that state, and some might answer by positing some kind of underlying unity of all things that goes beyond appearances. This is a natural direction to take if one regards the idealized state of existence as involving one's literally experiencing the mental states of others, or being directly moved by their well-being as one would one's own. This seems impossible unless, in some ultimate sense, others are part of oneself. And this answer might be developed in two different directions – that when acting to promote the well-being of others and prevent harm to them, one at the same time perceives others' well-being as being literally one's own, or alternatively, without so perceiving things, one is nevertheless acting in a way that shows an insight into this underlying reality (see Schopenhauer 2005:135-143; Cartwright 2008: 296-301; Reginster 2012: 161-2, 166-170). But, as we have discussed, the state of one body is not one in which one actually experiences the mental states of others or is directly moved by their conditions in the way they themselves are. Rather, someone in that state would retain a distinction between herself and others, though she would view situations involving the well-being of others in a way that is not different in any significant way, aside from differential responses, from the way she views situations involving her own well-being. On this picture, there is no perplexity to be addressed

by postulating an underlying reality in which oneself and others are not distinct. The idea of one body is not making an epistemic point about our access to the mental states of others, or a motivational point about how others' conditions can directly motivate us, or a metaphysical point about there being ultimately no real distinction between oneself and others. Instead, it is making an ethical point about how we should, ideally, sensitize the heart/mind so that it can extend its responses in certain situations already familiar to us to other situations involving other humans and things.

Admittedly, ZHU Xi does embed the idea of one body in the framework of a single *li* 理 running through all things that differ in their endowment of *qi* 氣. But it is unlikely that he is led to this latter view through an attempt to address the question how the state of one body is possible, or that it is because he has the latter view that he puts forward the idea of one body. As we saw, the idea of one body combines different themes that have evolved over time and that reflect certain shared experiences, and Zhu likely has taken up these themes as something that also reflect his own life experiences, independently of his views on *li* and *qi*. At the same time, it is not uncommon for a thinker to embed his ethical ideas in the intellectual framework he works with, especially in the context of exchanges with students and associates or disputation with intellectual opponents. Given that Zhu does work with the framework of *li* and *qi*, it is understandable that he would embed the idea of one body within this framework. It need not follow that he is engaged in the exercise of seeking some foundational justification or metaphysical grounding of a proposed ethical ideal. In any instance, however we understand this linkage between these two aspects of his thinking, Zhu himself is emphatic that the linkage, and the framework of *li* and *qi* itself, need not be part of the internal perspective of someone in the state of one body.

Thus, for Zhu, the state of one body is not one that can be characterized in terms of some general reflective beliefs one has, such as beliefs about the fundamental connectedness of all things with oneself through sharing a common *li* 理, or even beliefs about how one does not stand out in any significant way from others. Someone in that state need not have such reflective beliefs, and someone with such beliefs need not be in that state. Instead, the state involves a fundamental outlook on one's place in the world that engages the whole person, not just behaviorally, but also

the way one directs attention, one's sentiments, and even one's demeanor. We can, from the external perspective, describe that state, as well as the perspective of someone in that state, in certain ways, but these need not be the way that person would describe things from the internal perspective. Even if she would so describe things, it is not her having the corresponding beliefs that constitutes her being in that state. Also, someone in that state might describe her perspective in certain ways – a parent might say, for example, that her child's life matters to her as much as or more than her own – and the viewpoint that is so conveyed might well be inseparable from her being in that state. But even if we say that such descriptions convey certain beliefs of hers, it is not because she has beliefs of this kind that she comes to have the outlook she has. Rather, her so describing her way of viewing things is itself an expression of her outlook, which engages her whole person in a way that goes beyond her having such beliefs. This outlook is an experiential state of existence that cannot be fully captured or conveyed by such descriptions, whether these descriptions are by an observer from the outside or by herself from the inside. For this reason, ZHU Xi and other later Confucians describe the idealized state of existence as a form of illumination or clear-sightedness, or *ming* 明. Even if this idealized state can be described in terms of "understanding" (*zhi* 知), it is understanding of a higher form which they call "genuine understanding" (*zhen zhi* 真知), one that differs from understanding of the ordinary kind. An example they use is the way villagers react to news of a tiger approaching the village. A villager who has been attacked and injured by a tiger in the past would react in a way quite different from the others, not just in his behavior, but in his whole person including his feelings and sentiments, facial expression, and overall demeanor. Whatever description he might give of the situation involving the approaching tiger he can also share with the other villagers, and the latter can come to believe in what he says. But whatever beliefs they share with him, they will not be viewing the situation in the same way as this particular villager, whose outlook involves an experiential insight that they do not possess.[9]

[9] This point is presumably part of what is conveyed by the idea that the deepest part of our ethical life has a dimension that goes beyond the theoretical or the rational and that eludes description by language. It involves a kind of experiential insight that has to be personally cultivated, going beyond the endorsement of what one has learnt. Schweitzer puts this point in terms of the mystical that lies at the limit of rationality (Schweitzer 2009: 107-111).

5. Conclusion: Methodological Observations

At the beginning of this chapter, I summarized an approach to the philosophical study of Chinese thought, a study that seeks to draw out the relevance of Chinese traditions of thought for our contemporary experiences and to build a linkage to contemporary philosophical discourse. An underlying assumption in such a study is that these traditions contain insights into human experiences of significance that are shared across cultures and times, insights that are also relevant to our own contemporary life. The approach I proposed builds the desired linkage through these shared human experiences. On this approach, we start from *within* a Chinese tradition and attend closely to the language used, the textual details, and the historical contexts, so as to approximate the perspectives of the Chinese thinkers. We then move *outward* from their perspectives, identifying the kind of human experiences reflected in their ideas that transcend the local and the temporal, and relate their ideas to our own contemporary experiences that are akin to theirs. Only at this point do we link up with contemporary western philosophical discourse, allowing for the genuine possibility that their perspectives might not fit easily into our contemporary philosophical conceptions. Instead, exploring their perspectives on their own terms might suggest interesting alternatives to perspectives commonly found in contemporary discussions, and might even help reshape the agendas of such discussions.

In relation to ZHU Xi's understanding of the idea of one body, our focus is on human experiences of significance that underlie his understanding of the idea and that are shared across times and cultures. These are experiences not specific to him and his followers but are shared more broadly within the Confucian tradition, having evolved in the course of history up to his times. For this reason, we started by tracing the historical evolvement of the different dimensions of the idea from pre-Qin to early Song Dynasty, and when considering his own views on the subject, we bracket aspects of his views that are specific to him and his followers. In this manner, we approximate those aspects of his understanding of the idea of one body that bear on human experiences of significance that we also share, at times using contemporary examples to illustrate these ideas. Only at this point do we elaborate on his perspective in a way that links up with

contemporary philosophical discourse, making sure that we do justice to his perspective in its own terms instead of attempting to fit it into contemporary philosophical conceptions.

In relation to the sensitivity to harm involved in the state of one body, we showed how the Confucian perspective does not fit easily into certain contemporary conceptions of empathy, sympathy, and self-other merging. The terms used by the Confucians are syntactically different in a way that shows that the idealized kind of responses are directed to *situations* involving harm which can be to *oneself* as well as to others. Central to the idea of one body is the idea of no self which, in relation to this sensitivity, is a matter of responding to situations involving harm to others in a manner not significantly different – aside from considerations of differential responses – from responding to situations involving harm to oneself. Empathy understood in terms of perspective taking or having matching mental states is not part of what is involved in the state of one body, nor does this state involve the kind of third person perspective invoked by some to explicate the notion of sympathy. Also, the notion of oneness involved in the state of one body is a normative proposal concerning an enduring state of the heart/mind, as explicated by the idea of no self, unlike the notion of perceived oneness found in the literature on self-other merging, which concerns an experience of interpersonal unity in certain specific contexts that is empirically measurable.

While these contemporary conceptions do not bear on the Confucian perspective, it does not mean that they are not relevant to our own contemporary understanding of responses to harm. What our discussion shows is only that the Confucian perspective is quite different from our own contemporary philosophical perspectives, and that it is important to engage in close philological, textual, and historical studies to understand the Confucian perspective on its own terms. Also, our discussion does not show that these contemporary conceptions do not bear on the Confucian perspective in some other way. What it shows is only that they do not bear on the way the Confucians conceptualize what, for them, constitute the *idealized* kind of responses to harm, which is compatible with the possibility that they might bear on the way the Confucians conceptualize the kind of responses to harm that are part of the self-cultivation process. For example, the idea of perspective taking might well bear on the notion of *shu* 恕 (reciprocity) when presented in its prescriptive form. Furthermore, some of these contemporary conceptions might bear on certain aspects of what the Confucians regard as the ideal kind of responses to

harm, even if they do not describe the Confucian perspective. For example, the idea of perceived oneness might well be an appropriate description of the sentiments of someone responding to harm to others in the manner idealized by the Confucians, even though the Confucian idea of oneness is not about such sentiments, but about the absence of an emphatic self.

Thus, the methodological approach illustrated by the study in this chapter is primarily about our understanding of *the perspectives of Chinese thinkers* on certain human experiences of significance that are shared across cultures and times. While our contemporary philosophical conceptions might describe our own perspectives on such experiences, there is no presumption that they also describe the perspectives of the Chinese thinkers. To understand their perspectives, it is crucial that we start with close philological, textual, and historical studies. It is possible that such studies will lead to the conclusion that some of our own contemporary philosophical conceptions indeed describe their perspectives, but this has to be the conclusion, not the starting point, of such studies.

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