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QING (情) IN CONFUCIAN THOUGHT

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Abstract

While the term *qing* is often translated as "emotions", it differs from the contemporary notion of emotions in two respects. Its scope also includes such items as likes, dislikes and desires, and it is often used to refer not just to the actual responses of humans but also to the condition of the heart/mind that underlies such responses. The paper examines the evolvement of the term leading to this usage, and explores the different views of *qing* that evolved leading to the Song-Ming Confucian view of *qing* as a basic part of the human constitution that needs to be properly nourished.

I INTRODUCTION

The notion of *qing* 情 plays an important role in the later development of Confucian thought, and the term is often translated as "emotions". But there are at least two conspicuous differences between *qing* and the contemporary notion of emotions. First, the scope of *qing* includes likes (*hao* 好), dislikes (*wu* 惡) and desires (*yu* 欲), while the contemporary term "emotions" is not typically applied to these items. Second, the term *qing* is often used to refer not just to the responses of humans to their environment, but also to the condition of the heart/mind that underlies such responses. By contrast, the contemporary term "emotions" is not typically used to refer to such underlying condition.

Thus, while the term *qing* has come to be used within Confucian thought in a way somewhat like the contemporary notion of emotions, and while the term "emotions" can serve as a convenient translation, the question remains as to how exactly *qing* should be understood, particularly in relation to those aspects in which it differs from the contemporary notion of emotions. A related historical question is how the term *qing*, which in its earliest usage refers to what is factual or genuinely the case, has come to acquire these connotations. Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this paper will be devoted to addressing these two questions. The three sections will discuss, respectively, the use of *qing* up to the fourth century B.C., in the *Xunzi*, and then in the *Liji*.

The two characteristics of *qing* just mentioned had become fairly established by the time of the *Liji*. But while sharing this understanding of *qing*, three different substantive views of *qing* subsequently evolved, differing on the question whether *qing* is problematic as such or requires regulation without being problematic as such, and whether *qing* as a condition of the heart/mind part of the basic human constitution. The view that *qing* is part of the basic human constitution that is not problematic as such while requiring regulation becomes fairly established in Song-

Ming Confucian thought. Section 5 of the paper will discuss the three different views of *qing* as they evolved from Han to Tang, while section 6 will discuss Zhu Xi's views on *qing* as an illustration of the Song-Ming Confucian understanding. Together, the five main sections of the paper provide an overview of both the use of the term *qing* and the substantive views on *qing* as these evolved in the history of Chinese thought, with special attention to *qing* as understood in Song-Ming Confucianism. The main outcomes of the discussion will be summarized in section 7, the concluding section.

II. USE OF *QING* UP TO THE FOURTH CENTURY BCE

I have argued in previous publication that *qing* is used in early texts to refer to facts of a situation, and is often related to *shi* 實, the way things really are. It is often used in the combination X *zhi qing* (X 之情) to refer to certain characteristic features of a thing, sometimes that thing individually but more often things of a certain kind. These are typically deep features that reveal what things of that kind are really like, or what is genuinely so of such things. And I also argued that this is the sense in which *qing* is used in the *Mengzi*, and that there is no evidence in the *Mengzi* or in transmitted texts datable to before the *Mengzi* that *qing* carries connotations akin to the contemporary notion of emotions (Shun 1997: 183-6. 213-6).

There is one context in the Inner Chapters of the *Zhuangzi* in which *qing* is used in a way that paves the way for this later development. There, when questioned by Hui Shi about his view that humans originally do not have *qing* (*ren gu wu qing* 人故無情), Zhuangzi explains that what he means is that humans, in following the self-so (*zi ran* 自然), will not let their likes and dislike (*hao wu* 好惡) do harm to themselves. Here, *qing*, which (according to Zhuangzi) originally and ideally is absent from humans, could not be referring to tendencies that are characteristic of and genuinely within humans; instead, it has to do with the kind of potentially harmful likes and dislikes that Zhuangzi describes (*Zhuangzi* 2.23a-23b).

As we will see, the "*Liyun*" chapter of the *Liji* refers explicitly to as seven *qing* of humans the items joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, dislikes and desires (*Liji* 7.7a), mentioning dislikes and desires alongside items that are more akin to the contemporary notion of emotions. The mention of desires (*yu* 欲), likes (*hao* 好), and dislikes (*wu* 惡) alongside items more akin to emotions is quite pervasive in early texts. For example, while the *Guoyu* refers to sorrow, contentment, joy and anger (*Guoyu* 8.8a-8b), the *Zuozhuan* pairs these four with likes and dislike and describes the six as being born of the six *qi* 氣 (*Zuozhuan* 25.11a-11b). The *Zhuangzi* also refers to the four sometimes alongside likes and dislikes (*Zhuangzi* 6.2b) and sometimes alongside dislikes and desires (*Zhuangzi* 8.9a), while the *Guanzi* mentions likes and dislikes along with the four (*Guanzi* 10.2a).

An obvious question is why likes and dislikes, and sometimes also desires, are mentioned alongside items more akin to what we would regard as emotions. The passage from the *Zuozhuan* just mentioned provides a hint to the answer. After mentioning the six items together, including

likes and dislikes, the passage goes on to describe joy as born of liking and anger of disliking (*xi sheng yu hao, nu sheng yu wu* 喜生於好 怒生於惡), and presents contentment and sorrow as responses to things that humans like and dislike respectively (*hao wu le ye, wu wu ai ye* 好物樂也 惡物哀也) (*Zuozhuan* 25.11a-11b). That is, joy, anger, contentment and sorrow are based on likes and dislikes in that it is due to the latter that the former arise.

As for *yu* 欲, the term can be used of certain tendencies of the sense organs, such as the eyes and ears, or nose and palate, having to do with their being drawn toward certain objects of sight and hearing, or odors and tastes, in which case they need not involve the heart/mind (e.g., *Lushichunqiu* 2.7a). But the heart/mind can also form more reflective conceptions of what is worth pursing versus what one should stay away form, such as life versus death, or honor versus disgrace, and *yu* can also be used to refer to these more reflective tendencies, warranting the translation of the term as "desire" (e.g., *Lushichunqiu* 10.4b). Joy, anger, contentment and sorrow arise on the basis of these desires, likes and dislikes of the heart/mind, which involve the heart/mind's forming certain conceptions of what is desirable or undesirable. This accounts for the opposition in the *Zhuangzi* to *qing*, understood in terms of likes and dislikes, given the general opposition of the text to letting human life be affected by the heart/mind's conceptions of what is desirable or undesirable. Without mentioning the term *qing*, the text also explicitly opposes joy, anger, sorrow and contentment in other contexts, along with likes and dislikes (*Zhuangzi* 6.2b) or desires and dislikes (*Zhuangzi* 8.9a).

That the term *qing* is used in the Inner Chapters in connection with likes and dislikes suggests that, by the late fourth century B.C., while not yet explicitly used in connection with what we would describe as emotions, the term has started taking on connotations that pave the way for such usage. With that understanding, we turn to the use of *qing* in the *Xunzi*.

III. *QING* IN THE *XUNZI*

The term occurs frequently in the *Xunzi* in the sense of what is genuinely the case, such as the *qing* of right versus wrong or of what is the case versus what is not the case (*shi fei ran bu ran zhi qing* 是非然不然之情) (*Xunzi* 4.3b, 17.8b). The expressions *ren qing* 人情 (e.g., *Xunzi* 14.1a, 14.1b) and *ren zhi qing* 人之情 (e.g., *Xunzi* 2.12a, 2.12b), referring to the *qing* of humans, occur several times, sometimes interchangeably in the same context (e.g., 7.5b-6a, 17.7a). In these usages, even when mentioned along with *yu* 欲, which involves such desires as sensory desires, desire for food or clothing or rest, desire for wealth or honor (*Xunzi* 2.12b, 2.13b, 7.5b-6a, 7.9a), the term mostly continues to emphasize what is genuine in humans.

However, on a number of occasions, *qing* is used in relation to psychological states akin to the contemporary notion of emotions, and this raises the question whether the term might have already acquired this connotation in the *Xunzi*. For example, contentment (*le* 樂) is referred to as the *qing* of humans (*ren qing* 人情) (*Xunzi* 14.1a), and *qing* is used to refer to remembrance of

the deceased (*zhi yi si mu zhi qing* 志意思慕之情) (*Xunzi* 13.14b) as well as worry or delight (*ji xiong you yu zhi qing* 吉兇憂愉之情) (*Xunzi* 13.9a-9b). There are also other uses of *qing* that likely have to do with such psychological states, such as the description of the practice of three year mourning as a matter of establishing these fine patterns in accordance with *qing* (*cheng qing er li wen* 稱情而立文), apparently referring to the sorrow and pain of children of deceased parents as well as their remembrance for their parents (*Xunzi* 13.12b). On one occasion, apparently as an explication of *qing*, the text presents the likes and dislikes, joy and anger, sorrow and contentment of *xing* (nature) as what are called *qing* (*Xunzi* 16.1a-1b), and on another occasion, the same kind of psychological states are described as *tian qing* 天情, or the *qing* of Heaven (*Xunzi* 11.10a). In these occurrences, it is still possible to take *qing* to have the primary connotation of what is genuinely so of humans, while these psychological states just happen to be part of what is genuine. Some scholars have taken such a position, arguing that the term *qing* does not yet has the connotation of psychological states akin to the contemporary notion of emotions at this point in the history of Chinese thought (e.g., Graham 1990: 59-65).

Likely, what we witness in the *Xunzi* is a gradual evolvement in which the term *qing* starts taking on this new connotation, and as might be expected during such a period of transition, it is not easy to adjudicate between whether a term has taken on a new connotation or is used in a novel manner while retaining its old connotation. Still, against the background of the use of *qing* in the *Zhuangzi* that we just considered, and given the way *qing* is commented on in the *Xunzi*, it is likely that the term has already started taking on this new connotation in this text. This point is supported by a closer examination of the use of *qing* in relation to *yu* 欲 and *xing* 性.

We have already noted that certain kinds of *yu* (desires) are presented in the text as the *qing* of humans. To further understand the relation between the two in the *Xunzi*, let us consider Xunzi's comments on Song Xing's views on the issue. In the "*Zhenglun*" chapter of the *Xunzi*, Song Xing is reported as holding the view that the genuine desires of humans are few (*ren zhi qing yu gua* 人之情欲寡) and yet they regard themselves as having many such desires (*yi ji zhi qing yu wei duo* 以己之情欲為多), and so Song Xing led his followers to seek to convince others that their genuine desires are indeed few (*Xunzi* 12.13a). This line of thought assumes that certain problems arise because humans have misunderstood certain facts about the human situation, and the same line of though is found in the preceding discussion of insults in the same chapter. There, Song Xing is reported as holding the view that insults (*wu* 侮) do not constitute a disgrace (*ru* 辱), while people regard insults as a disgrace and fight as a result; to address the problem, he sought to convert people to the former view (*Xunzi* 12.11a).

In reporting Song Xing's views, I have continued to take *qing* to have the primary connotation of what is genuine – there is not yet evidence to regard it as taking on a new connotation and, as we will see, Xunzi's own comment on Song Xing's views also uses *qing* in this manner. In any instance, Song Xing's point is that the basic desires that are part of the human constitution are minimal, and it is certain conceptions of humans themselves that lead them to think otherwise. Other non-human animals, for example, have only such basic desires as desires for food and drink when hungry and thirsty, but humans form other desires such as those for wealth and honor. Such conceptions presumably derive from the operation of the heart/mind, just as the view that insults constitute a disgrace is a conception formed by the heart/mind. What he

advocates is that people return to the state of having only few and basic desires, and this view is reminiscent of Zhuangzi's view about doing without *qing* in the sense of the likes and dislikes that are due to conceptions of the heart/mind.

Xunzi's response is that it is a basic fact about humans, a genuine part of their constitution, that they have plentiful desires. In making this point against Song Xing, he repeatedly uses the idiomatic expression *ren zhi qing* 人之情, showing that *qing* still has the connotation of what is genuine in this context. According to Xunzi, it is a basic fact about humans that they desire such things as wealth and honor and that they desire more rather than less of the objects of their desires, whether these be objects of the senses or material possessions. This can be seen, for example, from the way ancient kings exercise rewards and punishments, awarding wealth and honor as reward and the more is awarded the greater the reward (*Xunzi* 12.13b). On his picture, humans do share a heart/mind that tends to like or dislike certain things, such as wealth versus poverty, life versus death. Unlike Zhuangzi and Song Xing who view this phenomenon as a problematic add on to the basic human condition, Xunzi views it as a basic part of the human constitution which he describes in terms of *qing*.

But in using the term *qing* to emphasize that this condition of the heart/mind, having to do with its tendency to like or dislike certain things, is part of the basic constitution of humans, it is a natural transition to also use the term to refer to such a condition itself. There is evidence in the *Xunzi* that this evolvement in the use of the term has already taken place, as there are instances in which the use of the term cannot easily be understood in terms of its traditional connotation of what is genuine. Consider, for example, his comment in the "*Zhengming*" chapter that is presumably also directed against Song Xing. According to Xunzi, the difference between having plentiful or few desires is a difference between things of different kinds (such as that between humans and non-human animals); it is a measurement of *qing* (*qing zhi shu* 情之數) and does not account for the difference between order and disorder. In his words, the difference between order and disorder resides in what the heart/mind approves of, but not in the desires of *qing* (*qing zhi suo yu* 情之所欲) (*Xunzi* 16.8a-8b). Elsewhere, he opposes one's following the *qing* of humans (*shun ren zhi qing* 順人之情) (*Xunzi* 17.1a) or indulging in one's *qing* (*zong qi qing* 縱其情) (*Xunzi* 16.11a), viewing this as the source of disorder. In these occurrences, it would be more natural to take the term *qing* to refer specifically to the condition of the heart/mind mentioned earlier, rather than just referring to what is genuine of humans. Human desires derive from this condition of the heart/mind, and whether they are few or plentiful is a "measure" of this condition in that they reflect the likes and dislikes of the heart/mind. In the absence of regulation by the heart/mind's approval and disapproval, one will just follow and indulge in such likes and dislikes, resulting in disorder.

Taking *qing* to refer to this condition of the heart/mind allows us to make sense of the relation between *xing* (nature), *qing*, and *yu* (desire) as presented in the text. *Xing* is what Heaven has endowed humans with, *qing* is the underlying substance (*zhi* 質) of *xing*, while *yu* is the response (*ying* 應) of *qing* (*Xunzi* 16.9a). This explication of the relation highlights the fact that the condition of the heart/mind having to do with its likes and dislikes is a basic part of *xing*, the constitution that humans are endowed with, while desires, or *yu*, arise when one comes into contact with external things and when this condition of the heart/mind, or *qing*, responds to such interaction with one's environment. That there is this close relation between *xing* and *qing*

accounts for the frequent use of the combination *qing xing* to emphasize those aspects of *xing* having to do with the likes or desires of humans, including the likes that pertain to the senses (*Xunzi* 17.3a), the desires for food when hungry, warmth when cold and rest when exhausted (*Xunzi* 17.2b), as well as the heart/mind's liking profit and desiring gain (*Xunzi* 17.3a, 17.3b).

As we discussed earlier, this condition of the heart/mind, having to do with likes and dislikes, is linked in early texts to what we in contemporary terms would refer to as emotions, such as joy, anger, sorrow and contentment. It is important to note, though, that *qing* is used in the *Xunzi* not primarily to refer to specific emotional responses, but to the condition of the heart/mind that underlies such responses. Admittedly, the text does explicitly state that the likes, dislikes, joy, anger, sorrow and contentment of *xing* are what is called *qing* (*Xunzi* 16.1a-1b) and elsewhere comments that these six are what is called the *qing* of Heaven (*tian qing* 天情) (*Xunzi* 11.10a). And the terms *xi, nu, ai, le* are often used in early texts to refer to specific emotional responses, and we have translated them as "joy", "anger", "sorrow", "contentment" respectively. But, as is made explicit in the "*Zhongyong*" chapter of the *Liji* that we will discuss in section 4, these terms can also be used to refer not to the specific responses as such, but to certain aspects of the condition of the heart/mind that underlies such responses. The explication of *qing* in terms of *hao wu xi nu ai le* uses these terms in the latter sense, and the six together highlight the six main aspects of the condition of the heart/mind to which *qing* refers.

Thus, in the *Xunzi*, *qing* has already come to acquire the connotation of a condition of the heart/mind that underlies more specific responses including desires, likes and dislikes, as well as what we would in contemporary terms describes as emotions, including joy, anger, sorrow and contentment. This conception of *qing* is further crystallized in three chapters of the *Liji* – "*Liyun*", "*Yueji*", and "*Zhongyong*" – to which we now turn.

IV. "*LIYUN*", "*YUEJI*" AND "*ZHONGYONG*" IN THE *LIJI*

The "*Liyun*" chapter states, through the mouth of Confucius, that the rites are that with which the ancient kings give order to the *qing* of humans (*zhi ren zhi qing* 治人之情) (*Liji* 7.2a). It then goes on to explicate the *qing* of humans in terms of joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, dislike and desires, seven items that are abilities (*neng* 能) that humans have without having to learn, and these are the seven *qing* that the sages employ the rites to give order to (*zhi ren qi qing* 治人七情) (*Liji* 7.7a-7b). It then compares the *qing* of humans to a field (*ren qing yi wei tian* 人情以為田) that the sages employ the rites to cultivate (*Liji* 7.8a, 7.9a), and goes on to describe in elaborate terms how the ancient sage kings cultivated the field of *qing*, making use of such means as humanness and righteousness, rites and music (*Liji* 7.10b). The reference to these items as abilities (*neng* 能), the imagery of a field that needs to be cultivated, and the idea of giving order to *qing* show that *qing* is conceived of as a condition of the heart/mind, one that is a basic unlearnt part of the human constitution and that can be described in terms of the seven aspects that this chapter refers to. In light of the conception of *qing* in this chapter, it is likely that other

references to *qing* in other chapters in connection with human sentiments also carry this connotation, going beyond a reference to what is genuine about humans. For example, in connection with the three year mourning, the "*Wensang*" chapter refers to the sorrowful sentiments of the filial children of deceased parents as the real substance of the *qing* of humans (*ren qing zhi shi* 人情之實) (*Liji* 18.7a, 18.8a), while the "*Sannianwen*" chapter describes the three year mourning period as a matter of certain fine patterns being established in accordance with *qing* (*cheng qing er li wen* 稱情而立文), taking the phrase from the *Xunzi* (*Liji* 18.13a-13b). In these contexts, *qing* likely has the connotation of a certain condition of the heart/mind that underlies the sorrowful sentiments of the filial children and that is part of the basic constitution of humans.

Turning to the "*Yueji*" chapter, a discourse on music, it presents the human heart/mind as moving (*dong* 動) when it comes into contact with things and is affected by them. As a result, one responds with sorrow, contentment, joy, anger, reverence and love, these six items then leading to music of the corresponding kinds (*Liji* 11.6b-7a). Later in the chapter, nature (*xing*), that which humans receive from Heaven by birth, is presented as in itself still or inactive (*jing* 靜). When affected by things, it moves or becomes active, thereby resulting in the desires of nature. When things arrive, one's capability of consciousness becomes conscious of them (*wu zhi zhi zhi* 物至知知), and as a result likes and dislikes take shape. If such likes and dislikes are not properly regulated (*jie* 節) on the inside while one's consciousness continues to be drawn on the outside, and if one is not able to properly reflect on this situation, the pattern (*li* 理) of Heaven comes to be lost. As things continue to affect people ceaselessly, and as people fail to regulate their likes and dislikes, the pattern of Heaven is lost and one ceaselessly indulges in human desires (*Liji* 11.8b-9a).

While the term *qing* is not explicitly mentioned, the picture presented is parallel to the one we discussed earlier in connection with *qing*. It emphasizes the role of consciousness and of the formation of likes and dislikes in the interaction of humans with their environment. It is when their capability of consciousness (*zhi* 知) becomes conscious of things they interact with that their likes and dislikes are formed, and it is the failure to regulate such likes and dislikes that gives rise to the problem. As we discussed earlier, this is the conception of *qing* that Zhuangzi finds problematic on the ground that such likes and dislike do harm to the person as such. By contrast, Xunzi regards it as part of the basic constitution of humans which is not problematic as such but needs to be properly regulated. The "*Yueji*" chapter follows Xunzi's view that regulating likes and dislikes is the key ethical task, describing rites and music as being established primarily for the purpose of "making even" the likes and dislikes of the common people (*ping hao wu* 平好惡) (*Liji* 11.8b). Later in the chapter, it comments on how the common people have a nature that comprises both the vital energies and a knowing heart/mind (*xue qi xin zhi* 血氣心知), but do not by themselves demonstrate constancy (*chang* 常) in their sorrow, contentment, joy and anger as the heart/mind is affected by and respond to things they come into contact with (*Liji* 11.13b). This again fits in with the point that *qing*, of which the four items cited are four aspects, has to so with the way the knowing heart/mind is affected by and respond to external things.

Another relevant chapter of the *Liji* is the "*Zhongyong*", which states that when joy, anger, sorrow and contentment are not yet emitted, this is what is called being centered (*xi nu ai le zhi wei fa wei zhi zhong* 喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中). And when they all hit the proper measures when emitted, this is what is called harmony (*fa er jie zhong jie wei zhi he* 發而皆中節謂之和). Centeredness is the great foundation of the world, while harmony is its all reaching path. Having attained centeredness and harmony (*zhi zhong he* 致中和), Heaven and Earth will have their proper place, and the ten thousand things will all be nurtured (*yu* 育) (*Liji* 16.1b). This chapter specifically refers to joy, anger, sorrow and contentment when speaking of the "not-yet-emitted", showing that it is referring to a state in which these four items have not yet been outwardly manifested. This confirms the earlier point that, though I have translated them as "joy", "anger", "sorrow" and "contentment" respectively, the four terms *xi*, *nu*, *ai*, *le* can be used to refer not just to actual emotional responses that are already outwardly manifested, but also to aspects of the condition of the heart/mind that underlie such responses.

As for the use of the term *fa*, it suggests three possible imageries. One imagery is that of archery. *Fa* is associated with the verbal use of *zhong* 中 in the reference to the four items under consideration hitting or striking the proper measures when emitted (*fa er jie zhong jie* 發而皆中節). Such association occurs frequently in the context of archery – *fa* involves letting the arrow shoot forth and *zhong* has to do with the arrow hitting the mark. And the imagery of archery is often used to illustrate the state of a cultivated person – as in archery, the person first straightens himself on the inside, after which whatever is emitted on the outside will hit its proper target. For example, the *Mengzi* comments on how the humane person is like an archer; he straightens himself before letting things come forth (*zheng ji er hou fa* 正己而後發) (*Mengzi* 2A:7), and a similar comment is found in the "*Sheyi*" chapter of the *Liji* on the meaning of archery (*Liji* 20.12a).

The second imagery is that of growth. In the *Shijing*, *fa* is used in an agricultural context in connection with the accomplishment of Hou Ji (*Shijing* 245/5). The line *shi fa shi xiu* 實發實秀 is generally taken by commentators to refer to the growth of an ear of grain from a seedling, and *fa* in the sense of growth is often related to the term *yu* 育, as in the reference in the "*Zhongyong*" to how the way of the sage promotes the growth and nurturing of the ten thousand things – *fa yu wan wu* 發育萬物 (*Liji* 16.12a). The "*Zhongyong*" passage under consideration ends with the comment about how, having attained centeredness and harmony, Heaven and Earth will have their proper place and the ten thousand things will all be nourished (*yu* 育). The mention of *yu* in a context that focuses on *fa* suggests a picture of growth and nourishment.

The third imagery is that of music. The passage refers to how, when the four items all hit the proper measures when emitted, this is what is called harmony (*fa er jie zhong jie wei zhi he* 發而皆中節謂之和). The terms *jie* 節 and *he* 和 are often used, both separately and together, in relation to music, as can be seen from the "*Yuelun*" chapter of the *Xunzi* and the "*Yueji*" chapter of the *Liji*, both being discourses on music. *He* has the connotation of different things of the same kind blending together in a mutually supportive and reinforcing manner, and it is regarded as a key element in music (e.g., *Xunzi* 14.3a, *Liji* 11.7a). *Jie* has the connotation of segmentation, and is used in the combination *jie zou* 節奏 to refer to rhythm and beats (e.g., *Xunzi* 14.1a,

14.1b). The two terms occur together in relation to music in both chapters (e.g., *Xunzi* 14.1b; *Liji* 11.24b), and the use of both terms in the "*Zhongyong*" passage suggests the imagery of music. And the two terms *he* and *jie* are also used of joy and anger, with explicit mention of the term *qing*, in the *Zhuangzi* and the *Huainanzi*, which speak of bringing order to the *qing* of likes and dislikes (deep aversions) and harmonizing the measures of joy and anger – *li hao wu* (*zeng*) *zhi qing, he xi nu zhi jie* 理好惡(憎)之情 和喜怒之節 (*Zhuangzi* 10.5b; *Huainanzi* 13.19b).

Whichever imagery is at work in the "*Zhongyong*" passage, one general point is unaffected. In all three imageries, *fa* is pictured as the emission or coming forth of something out of a certain condition that prepares for that emission and that affects the shape of what is emitted. In the imagery of archery, one should straighten oneself on the inside before letting the arrow come forth or be emitted, just as the humane or superior person straightens himself on the inside in preparation for responding to the external environment. In the imagery of growth, the condition of the seedling prepares for and shapes the way the ear of grain comes forth. And in the imagery of music, the condition of the heart/mind also prepares for and shapes the way it manifests itself outwardly in the form of sounds and music. The general point is that *fa* has to do with the idea of something coming out of a certain underlying condition, in a way that is shaped by that condition. It emphasizes this transition from an underlying condition to its outward manifestation, and this relation is the focus of the passage from the "*Zhongyong*". In stating that when joy, anger, sorrow and contentment are not yet emitted, this is what is called being centered (*zhong* 中), the passage is likely using *zhong* 中 both to make the point that the four items refer to the underlying condition "on the inside" and that the way that condition is constituted "hits" the proper measure. It is only when the second element is in place that the four items will all "hit" the proper measure when emitted, resulting in the state of proper harmony (*he* 和).

V. FROM HAN TO TANG

Our examination of the term *qing* shows that, in texts likely as early as the late fourth century B.C., the term starts to be used not just in the sense of what is factual or genuine, but also in relation to a condition of the heart/mind that is somewhat like the contemporary notion of emotions. It has to do with the likes and dislike (*hao wu* 好惡) of the heart/mind or, in our contemporary terms, the heart/mind's forming conceptions of what is desirable or undesirable. It is in this sense that the passage from the *Zhuangzi* we considered advocates that humans should be without *qing*. Desires (*yu* 欲) in the sense of the heart/mind's being drawn toward certain objects on the basis of such conceptions, as well as deep aversion (*zeng* 憎) of the heart/mind, also fall within the scope of *qing*. But such likes and dislikes, desires and deep aversion can evolve into specific forms depending on the context, resulting in response akin to what we would in contemporary terms describe as emotions, such as joy (*xi* 喜), anger (*nu* 怒), sorrow (*ai* 哀) and contentment (*le* 樂). The two groups – likes, dislikes, desire, deep aversion on the one hand, joy, anger, sorrow and contentment on the other – include items that all have to do with ways in which the heart/mind responds to its environment, differing only in that the former include responses described in more general terms and the latter responses described in more specific

terms. This account for the fact that items from the two groups are often set alongside each other as examples of *qing*.

While this inclusiveness is one way in which *qing* differs from the contemporary notion of emotions, another difference is that *qing*, and along with it terms such as *xi* 喜, *nu* 怒, *ai* 哀 and *le* 樂, refer not just to the actual responses of the heart/mind, but also to the condition of the heart/mind, and along with it different aspects of that condition, that underlies such responses. As such, they are not yet emitted (*wei fa* 未發) as opposed to being emitted (*fa* 發) as actual responses. *Qing* refers to that underlying condition, which has to do with the heart/mind's responsiveness, or propensity to respond, to its environment in various ways, while the terms *xi, nu, ai* and *le* refer to different aspects of that propensity that account for the corresponding patterns of actual responses. *Hao* (likes) and *wu* (dislikes), *yu* (desires) and *zeng* (deep aversion) also refer to different aspects of that propensity that accounts for the more general patterns. Given its association with what we would describe as emotions in contemporary terms, "emotions" would serve as a convenient translation of *qing* with the qualification that *qing* is by comparison more inclusive and that *qing* can refer to either the underlying condition of the heart/mind (in which case it can be translated as "emotional propensities") or the actual outward responses that are the "emission" of this underlying condition (in which case it can be translated as "emotional responses"). This understanding of the term *qing* is largely shared by thinkers from Han onward, though three main divergent substantive views on *qing* evolved.

The "*Yueji*" chapter of the *Liji* emphasizes the point that the transition from this underlying condition of the heart/mind to its emission as actual outward responses is mediated by *zhi*, the heart/mind's conscious awareness of things it comes into contact with and formation of likes and dislikes or, in our contemporary terms, formation of conceptions of what is desirable and undesirable. As we noted, given its general opposition to such conceptions, the *Zhuangzi* opposes such likes and dislikes and advocates one's being without *qing*. Thinkers in the Wei-Jin with an orientation close to that of Zhuangzi continue to regard *qing* as problematic by virtue of its being rooted in these conceptions. For example, Ji Kang speaks repeatedly of suppressing both *qing* and *yu* (*yi qing ren yu* 抑情忍欲) (*Ji Zhongsan Ji* 3.6b) and of minimizing *qing yu* (*gua qing yu* 寡情欲) (*Ji Zhongsan Ji* 4.1a). Viewing *qing* as primarily a matter of likes and dislikes or, in his terms, love and deep aversion (*ai zeng* 愛憎), he advocates not allowing such love and deep aversion to reside in *qing* and not allowing worries and joy to stay with one's thoughts (*yi* 意) as a way to nourish one's life (*Ji Zhongsan Ji* 3.4b).

Another example is Guo Xiang, who elaborates on the idea of being without *qing* in his commentary on the *Zhuangzi*. Adding to the explanation in the *Zhuangzi* of *qing* in terms of likes and dislikes (*hao wu* 好惡), he further relates such likes and dislikes to approvals and disapprovals (*shi fei* 是非), or the conceptions of the heart/mind regarding right and wrong, desirable and undesirable (*Zhaungzi Zhu* 2.23a). He relates *qing* to *zhi* 知, or the conscious conceptions of the heart/mind, which is a problematic contribution from humans that intrudes on the work of Heaven, a contribution that does violence to life (*Zhuangzi Zhu* 7.2b). Calamities arise because humans form conceptions of loss or gain (*shi de* 失得) and have things they love or dislike (*ai wu* 愛惡), and if one is without *qing*, such love or dislike, loss or gain would not have arisen (*Zhuangzi Zhu* 8.5b). So, on this view, *qing* is always harmful to the human person

(*Zhuangzi Zhu* 2.23b). Accordingly, in responding to things one comes into contact with, one should reflect things as they are without being influenced by *qing* (*jian wu er wu qing* 鑒物而無情); this he takes to be the point of the remark in the *Zhuangzi* about using one's heart/mind like a mirror (*yong xin ruo jing* 用心若鏡) (*Zhuangzi Zhu* 3.19a). At the same time, noting the use of *qing* in the sense of what is genuine when the *Zhuangzi* notes how the Way has *qing* (*you qing* 有情), he speaks of the *qing* of being without *qing* (*wu qing zhi qing* 無情之情), that is, the fact that being without *qing* in the problematic sense is what the Way is genuinely like (*Zhuangzi Zhu* 3.5b).

While viewing *qing* as a common human phenomenon, Guo Xiang's idea of the *qing* of being without *qing* suggests a view of *qing* (in the problematic sense) as a problematic add-on by the human heart/mind rather than being part of the basic human constitution. By contrast, thinkers with a Confucian orientation explicitly regard *qing* as part of the basic human constitution, though differing in the way they view the relation of *qing* to *xing* (nature) and on the question whether *qing* is inherently problematic (taking them closer to the Daoist position) or not problematic in itself though requiring proper regulation. Some view *qing* as an inherently problematic part of the human constitution, while others, following Xunzi and the *Liji* chapters, regard *qing* as not problematic as such though requiring proper regulation.

Two representative thinkers with the former view are Dong Zhongshu in the Han and Li Ao in the Tang. Dong emphasizes the problematic aspect of *qing*, contrasting *qing* with *xing* (nature) which has the potential toward goodness, a potential that he compares to the potential of grain to grow into rice, of eyes to see, and of an egg or cocoon to become a chicken or silk. For him, while *qing* is as much part of the basic human constitution as *xing*, the two are related like *yin* and *yang* (*Chunqiufanlu* 10.4b), and *qing* as well as *yu* (desires) need to be suppressed so that it does not obstruct *xing*'s realizing its potential toward goodness (*Chunqiufanlu* 10.3b). Li Ao likewise regards *qing* as inherently problematic, while viewing it as the activation of *xing*. For him, the *xing* of all humans is good and one can become a sage by ceaselessly following it (*Liwengong Ji* 2.3a). He acknowledges that *qing*, which comprises seven items – joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, dislike, and desires – arises from *xing* in that it is the activation of *xing* (*qing zhe xing zhi dong* 情者性之動). At the same time, he views the ceaseless movements of *qing* as obscuring *xing* and preventing its full realization, in the way that sediments obscure water which is in itself clear or smoke obscure fire which is in itself bright (*Liwengong Ji* 2.1a-1b). In that sense, *qing* is the devious aspect of *xing* (*qing zhe xing zhi xie* 情者性之邪) (*Liwengong Ji* 2.5b), and the fundamental ethical task is to quiet the movements of *qing* so as to restore *xing* (*fu qi xing* 復其性) (*Liwengong Ji* 2.2a-2b). For him, while the sage has *qing* in that the underlying condition for the seven items mentioned earlier is part of the basic human constitution, the sage also does not have *qing* in the sense that such condition is not activated (*sui you qing ye, wei chang you qing ye* 雖有情也 未嘗有情也) – *qing* is present in the sense of the underlying condition but absent in the sense of actual responses (*Liwengong Ji* 2.1b). The way the sage accomplishes this is by quieting *qing* through minimizing the activities of the heart/mind, a point he puts in terms of (referring to an idea in *Yijing* 8.3b) being without deliberation (*lu* 慮) and reflection (*si* 思), or (referring to an idea in *Shijing* 296/4) being without the devious (*xie* 邪) kind of reflection. By doing so, one can return to the original state when the heart/mind is quiet and not moving (*Liwengong Ji* 2.5a-5b).

The latter view is represented by Wang Chong and Xun Yue in the Han. While Wang Chong still regards *qing* and relatedly *yu* (desires) as something to be regulated, he does not emphasize the problematic nature of *qing* in the way Dong and Li do. He regards *qing* and *yu* as dependent on the capability of consciousness; plants do not have *qing yu*, non-human animals have *qing yu* though not to the extent of humans, while the *qing yu* of humans are plentiful (*Lunheng* 7.9b). *Qing yu* by itself is not problematic; indeed, it is upon being moved by *qing yu* that husband and wife have intercourse and give birth to children (*Lunheng* 3.16a). Still, if one just goes along with *qing* and follows *yu* (*shun qing cong yu* 順情從欲), badness arises and one becomes no different from non-human animals (*Lunheng* 10.7b-8a). For this reason, the superior person employs the rites to guard against *qing* and righteousness to limit *yu* thereby following the Way (*Lunheng* 11.16b). In a similar vein, Xun Yue explicitly opposes ascribing badness to *qing*. For him, *qing* is rooted in *xing* in that the likes and dislikes that constitute *qing* are themselves the responses of *xing*, and so it is an error to contrast the two and ascribe badness to *qing*. Rather, *qing* is the movement of *xing* upon being affected, and so both goodness and badness can be traced to *xing*. While *qing*, as such movement upon being affected, might be bad, badness is not the fault of *qing*, though *qing* needs to be regulated to pre-empt badness (*Shenjian* 5.3a-4a).

This view of Xun Yue's is reminiscent of the picture presented in the "*Yueji*" chapter of the *Liji*, which speaks of how likes and dislikes are the movements of *xing* when it is affected by things, generating such sentiments as sorrow, contentment, joy, anger, reverence and love, and which speaks of how such likes and dislikes need to be regulated (*jie* 節) to avoid their going astray. This picture becomes the prevalent view among the major Song Ming Confucian thinkers, including the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. As illustration, we will examine Zhu Xi's elaboration on this picture.

VI. ZHU XI ON *QING*

Zhu Xi's views on *qing* and its relation to *xing* closely follow the picture presented in the "*Yueji*" chapter, but with explicit mention of the term *qing*. He characterizes *xing* as not active (*bu dong* 不動) or still (*jing* 靜) by contrast to *qing* which is active (*dong* 動) (*Yulei* 96, 2514), describing this active aspect of *qing* sometimes as the activity of the heart/mind (*Yulei* 96) and sometimes as the activity of *xing*, which is identical with the pattern (*li* 理) that pertains to the heart/mind (*Yulei* 89). That he shifts between speaking of *qing* as the activity of the heart/mind and the activity of *xing* is understandable, given his view that *xing* is the pattern that pertains to the heart/mind – when the heart/mind is activated, it should ideally do so in accordance with the pattern of operation that pertains to it, and so in that sense such activation also pertains to pattern with which *xing* is identical. This point he illustrates with the example of an official position. The heart/mind is compared to the person who receives an official position and the associated responsibilities, *xing* to the official responsibilities that he receives, and *qing* to the actual policies and actions undertaken by the person in that position, which ideally should accord with

the responsibilities he receives (*Yulei* 82). *Qing* can be described as the activity of the heart/mind or of *xing*, just as the person's official actions can be described as his actions or his putting these responsibilities into actual practice.

As examples of *qing*, Zhu cites the four items joy, anger, sorrow and contentment highlighted in the "*Zhongyong*"; that the "*Zhongyong*" speak of their not-yet-emitted state as opposed to their emitted state shows that the four corresponding terms – *xi* 喜, *nu* 怒, *ai* 哀, *le* 樂 – refer to emotional propensities rather than specific responses (*Yulei* 64; cf. *Yulei* 2514). And, following the "*Liyun*" chapter, he also refers to the seven emotional propensities joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, dislike and desires as the seven *qing* (e.g., *Yulei* 2442). In commenting on the idea of the four germs highlighted in *Mengzi* 2A:6, he describes the four germs as pertaining to *qing*, while *xing* comprises the four corresponding ethical attributes. According to him, Mencius' point is that, while *xing* is on the inside and cannot be directly observed, the four germs (*duan* 端), which pertain to *qing*, are the thread ends (*duan xu* 端緒) of *xing* the emission of which can be discerned, and one sees what *xing* is originally like by observing the emission of *qing* (*Mengzi Jizhu* 2.14a). Zhu's point about observing *xing* on the basis of the emission of *qing* (*yin qi qing zhi fa* 因其情之發) shows that he regards *qing* as referring not to the specific responses such as the way one responds to suddenly seeing a child on the verge of falling into a well, but to the underlying propensities of which such specific responses are their emission. From these comments, we can see that he often views *qing* in terms of the underlying propensities, not necessarily the specific responses, and the references to the four germs and the seven *qing* are just different ways of identifying different aspects of such propensities corresponding to the different kinds of responses that such propensities can lead to.

Zhu's presentation of the four germs as *qing* in the sense of underlying emotional propensities differs from Mencius' own use of *qing* in the sense of what is genuine in humans, but the way he understands the nature of these propensities takes up an idea of Mencius'. In *Mengzi* 2A:6, Mencius presents the four germs as the basis of one's ability (*neng* 能) to be ethical; to have the four germs and yet to deny one's own ability is an instance of self-deprivation. In *Mengzi* 6A:6, in response to a question about *xing*, he responds in terms of the *qing* of humans, which has the capability (*ke yi* 可以) of becoming good; one's becoming bad is not the fault of one's own native endowment (*cai* 才). In this connection, he again comments on how every human has the four germs. In past publication, I discussed how Mencius does not distinguish between ability (*neng*) and capability (*ke yi*), how Xunzi emphasizes that distinction in criticism of Mencius, and how native endowment (*cai*) is for Mencius that within a person by virtue of which the person has certain abilities or capabilities (see Shun 1997: 216-218, 224-225, 218-219 respectively). While deviating from Mencius in interpreting the latter's use of *qing* to refer to emotional propensities (rather than just what is genuine), Zhu follows Mencius in presenting *qing* as the basis of certain abilities or capabilities. According to him, and commenting on *Mengzi* 6A:6, *xing* can be compared to water and *qing* to the flow of water. *Qing* can become good or bad, and *cai* (native endowment) is that by virtue of which it has such ability or capability. Even though *qing* or *cai* is not good in itself and only accounts for the

ability or capability to become good, it also cannot be faulted for a person's becoming bad; instead, the fault resides with the person himself. *Qing* is not opposed to and does not obstruct *xing* in the way Li Ao views the relation between the two, a view that Zhu attributes to Buddhist influence (*Yulei* 1380-81).

Zhu's association of *qing* with *neng* (ability) is also continuous with the explicit characterization in the "*Liyun*" of the seven *qing* in terms of *neng* (*Liji* 7.7a-7b). On the relation between *qing* and *yu* (desires), he also follows the characterization in the "*Liyun*" of *yu* (desires) as one of the seven aspects of *qing*. At times, like Xunzi who regards *yu* as the response of *qing*, Zhu describes *yu* as coming from *qing* (*Yulei* 93). He compares the heart/mind to water, *xing* to the stillness of water, *qing* to the flow of water, and *yu* to the waves of water that result from what water encounters as it flows (*Yulei* 93-94, 97). The point is that, unlike *xing* which is identical with the pattern that pertains to the heart/mind which in itself is still and inactive, *qing* has to do with the propensities of the heart/mind to become active (*Yulei* 97). But such propensities can be directed in different ways just as the flow of water can lead to different waves depending on what such flow encounters, and this results in *yu*, which is by comparison more directed. Thus, *qing* places a greater emphasizes on certain propensities or capabilities as such, while *yu* places a greater emphasis on how such propensities or capabilities can be directed (*Yulei* 349). On this understanding of *yu*, he follows Cheng Yi (*Ercheng Yishu* 15.2b) who says that there is *yu* whenever the heart/mind has a direction (*zhi you suo xiang bian shi yu* 只有所向便是欲) (*Mengzi Jizhu* 7.28a; cf. *Mengzi Huowen* 39.12b). Thus *yu*, as one of the seven aspects of *qing*, has to do with
the more general aspect of *qing* to be directed toward certain objects whatever these may be, while items such as joy, anger, sorrow and contentment have to do with more specific aspects of *qing* to be directed in a more specific manner. Whether *yu* or these four items, the corresponding terms refer to aspects of *qing* understood as a condition of the heart/mind.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the preceding discussion, we considered both the evolvement of the term *qing* leading to its usage in a sense akin to the contemporary notion of emotions, and the substantive views on *qing* that developed over time. In early texts, items akin to our contemporary notion of emotions, such as joy and anger, are viewed as having their basis in likes and dislikes, and by at least the late fourth century B.C., as in the *Zhuangzi*, the term *qing* has come to be used in connection with likes and dislikes. This paves the way for the usage of *qing* under consideration, and in the *Xunzi*, the transition to such usage becomes conspicuous. In that text, *qing* is presented as the underlying substance of *xing* (nature) and *yu* as (desires) the response of *qing*. That is, *qing* is viewed as an underlying condition rooted in *xing* that makes possible responses in the form of *yu*, which is directed toward specific objects.

In the *Liji*, the idea of *qing* as an underlying condition that makes possible the responses of humans to their environment becomes further crystalized. The "*Liyun*" chapter describes *qing* as an ability (*neng*) and as being like a field that awaits cultivation. It explicitly includes *wu* (dislikes) and *yu* (desires) among the seven *qing*, showing that terms such as *wu* and *yu*, and relatedly, in other texts, *hao* (likes) and *zeng* (deep aversion), can also be used to refer to aspects of the underlying condition that constitutes *qing*. The idea of *qing* as an underlying condition is further reinforced in the "*Zhongyong*" chapter, which refers to a not-yet-emitted as opposed to an emitted state of *xi* (joy), *nu* (anger), *ai* (sorrow), *le* (contentment), showing that these terms can also refer not to specific responses, but to aspects of the underlying condition that makes possible such responses. The use of the term *fa* (emit) also highlights the point that the shape of such responses is determined by this underlying condition, which should be properly nourished. A similar picture is presented in the "*Yueji*" chapter in the way it describes how *hao* (likes), *wu* (dislikes) and *yu* (desires) take shape when *xing* is activated upon interacting with things. In addition, it highlights the role of *zhi* (conscious awareness) in this process, making the point that these likes, dislikes and desires are rooted in certain conceptions of the heart/mind regarding what is desirable or undesirable. All three chapters present the various aspects of *qing*, whether likes, dislikes and desires, or joy, anger, sorrow and contentment, as not problematic in themselves though requiring proper regulation and nourishment. The point is conveyed by, for example. the idea in the "*Liyun*" of cultivating *qing* as if cultivating a field, or the reference in the "*Yueji*" to "making even" (*ping*) likes and dislikes.

Thus, by the time of the *Liji*, the use of *qing* in a sense akin to the contemporary notion of emotion has become fairly established, with two qualifications – *qing* is more inclusive in including likes and dislikes, desires and deep aversions, and the term, along with the related terms such as *hao* (likes) and *wu* (dislikes), or *xi* (joy) and *nu* (anger), can refer not just to the actual responses of humans to their environment, but also to the condition of the heart/mind, along with its varying aspects, that underlies such responses.

This conception of *qing* is taken up by thinkers from Han to Tang, with the three main diverging views described earlier. Those with a Daoist orientation (such as Ji Kang and Guo Xiang) continue the opposition in the *Zhuangzi* to *qing* on the ground that its various aspects, such as likes and dislikes, are rooted in certain conceptions formed by the human heart/mind that are in themselves problematic. By implication, *qing* is not part of the basic constitution that humans are born with, but is a product of the activities of the human heart/mind. Others with a more Confucian orientation regard *qing* as part of the basic human constitution, whether existing alongside *xing* (nature) (as in Dong Zhongshu) or is rooted in *xing* (as in Xun Yu and Li Ao), but they diverge on whether *qing* is problematic as such or just requires regulation and proper nourishment. Dong Zhongshu and Li Ao represent the former position, while Wang Chong and Xun Yu represent the latter.

By the Song Ming period, Confucian thinkers largely take the latter position, and our discussion of Zhu Xi's views illustrates such an approach. *Qing* for most major Song-Ming Confucian thinkers refers to an underlying condition of the human heart/mind that is rooted in *xing*, involving the capability and propensity of responding in various ways to one's environment.

Different *qing* are distinguished by the different kinds of specific responses it can lead to. Terms such as *hao* (likes), *wu* (dislikes) and *yu* (desires) refer to more general patterns of such responses, while terms such as *xi* (joy), *nu* (anger), *ai* (sorrow) and *le* (contentment) refer to more specific patterns of responses. Just like the term *qing*, these *qing*-related terms can refer to different aspects of the underlying capability and propensity as well as different kinds of specific responses. This picture is largely continuous with the three chapters of the *Liji* we considered, including the view of *qing* as something to be properly regulated and nourished rather than as something problematic in itself.

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